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Sažetak 
 
U razdoblju helenističke filozofije razlikuju se tri osnovne discipline, etika, fizika i 
logika (epistemologija). Epikurove osnovne teze u sve tri discipline su u helenističkoj 
filozofiji okarakterizirane kao izrazito kontroverzne, povlačeći za sobom brojne polemike, a 
vrlo često i podsmijeh. U fizici tako Epikur tvrdi da se svijet sastoji od atoma i praznine, u 
etici da je najviše dobro za kojim težimo ugoda, no epistemološka teza čini se 
najproblematičnijom. Osnovu Epikurove epistemologije čini zamisao po kojoj su svi opažaji 
istiniti. Ovom tezom bavit ću se u disertaciji. 
Epikurova epistemologija, kao i epistemološka pitanja ostalih helenističkih škola, 
potaknuta su dvama važnim pitanjima: (i) je li znanje uopće moguće i (ii) ukoliko je moguće, 
na čemu počiva znanje? Epikurovi odgovori na ova pitanja baziraju se na prihvaćanju 
opažajnog iskustva kao temelja na kojem svo znanje počiva. Utoliko je jasno da se Epikura 
može svrstati na stranu empirističke tradicije znanja. No ono što razlikuje njegov empirizam 
od onih iz njegova vremena, ali i od kasnijeg empirizma u povijesti filozofije, jeste zamisao 
da se empirističko znanje može obraniti samo ukoliko se prihvati teza o nepogrešivosti 
opažaja, što ukazuje na radikalnost Epikurovog pothvata 
Međutim, ono što je osobito iznenađujuće u njegovoj empirističkoj epistemologiji je 
pokušaj obrane takvog znanja koja se zasniva na atomističkoj teoriji. Epikur tu slijedi donekle 
Demokrita, koji također polazi od empirističke pretpostavke da je osnova znanja moguća 
samo na temelju opažanja, no u trenutku kada nas opažanje odvede do atomističke teorije, 
opažajni svijet pokazuje se nespojivim s atomističkim i stoga ga Demokrit odbacuje. Drugim 
riječima, svijet boja, mirisa i ostalih fenomenoloških svojstava Demokrit proglašava 
konvencijom, dok je prava realnost ona atomistička, lišena svih navedenih svojstava. 
Epikurova epistemologija je upravo pokušaj spajanja svjetova koje je Demokrit razdvojio. 
Dakle, Epikur želi zadržati sliku svijeta onakvom kakvom je vidimo, to jest, neku vrstu 
naivnog realizma i pokazati da je ta slika svijeta spojiva s atomističkom. Način na koji to 
ostvaruje je već spomenuta ideja o nepogrešivosti svih opažaja. Predmet ovoga rada je 
interpretacija osnovne Epikurove teze, gdje ću pokušati ponuditi argumente u prilog 
Epikurovoj tezi i njegovoj epistemološkoj teoriji. 
Prije nego krenem na konkretniji prikaz onoga čime ću se baviti, potrebno je istaknuti 
da u radu govorim o 'epikurovskoj' filozofiji, te izvore Epikura i kasnijih epikurovaca tretiram 
kao jednako važne primarne izvore. Razlog za to leži u činjenici da je kasnija epikurovska 
škola ostala izrazito vjerna Epikurovim originalnim tekstovima, osobito u usporedbi s drugim 
školama, recimo stoičkom, koja bilježi izrazite promjene doktrina u okviru pojedinih 
disciplina. Kod epikurovaca, s druge strane, stabilnost unutar doktrinarnog sustava bazira se 
na izrazitom poštovanju Epikura, kojeg se gotovo uzdizalo na nivo božanstva. Njegov 
autoritet stoga ostaje neupitan i stoljećima nakon njegove smrti. Za takvo nešto pobrinuo se i 
sam Epikur budući da je sustav prenošenja znanja organizirao na način da su se osnovni 
postulati i filozofski kanoni učili napamet. Primjerice, sačuvano Pismo Herodotu je sažetak 
fizikalnih i epistemoloških doktrina koje su služile upravo tome da ih studenti doslovno 
memoriraju. Osim toga, u svojoj oporuci Epikur je zadao smjernice ponašanja nakon njegove 
smrti iz kojih je vidljiva želja za održavanjem zajednice na okupu i gotovo sektaškom 
jedinstvu. Naime, Epikur je utvrdio datume koji su se morali obilježavati, poput njegova 
rođendana i rođendana članova njegove obitelji, dok su neka okupljanja utvrđena na 
mjesečnoj razini, poput onog posvećenog Metrodoru. (DL X.18) U tako organiziranoj 
zajednici, u kojoj je kult utemeljitelja bio maksimalno poštivan i slavljen, izgradio se 
zajednički identitet i osjećaj pripadnosti, koji nije bio prisutan kod ostalih škola tog vremena. 
Prihvatiti osnovne Epikurove postavke značilo je prihvatiti određeni stil života. Stoga se niti u 
svojim tekstovima kasniji epikurovci ne udaljavaju od originalnog Epikurovog učenja, iako ga 
nadopunjavaju i razvijaju sukladno raspravama aktualnim vremenu u kojem žive. 
Najjasniji dokaz poštovanja prema učitelju nalazimo kod rimskog epikurovca, 
Lukrecija, koji epikurovskoj filozofiji posvećuje djelo De rerum natura. U njemu Lukrecije 
piše o osnovnim postulatima epikurovske filozofije na način da je predstavlja kao jedinu 
istinitu. U isto vrijeme kada Lukrecije piše, aktivna je i epikurovska škola koja djeluje pored 
Napulja i čiji je osnivač Filodem. (De Fin. II.119) Njegovo djelo De signis je jedno od 
najznačajnijih prikaza kasnije epikurovske filozofije o metodama provjere istinitosti 
vjerovanja i zaključivanju na temelju znakova. Filodemovo pisanje jasno pokazuje da se 
Epikura i dalje smatralo apsolutnim autoritetom, što potvrđuje i praksa nekih drugih kasnijih 
epikurovaca, primjerice Kolota, koji svoju filozofsku aktivnost vide u tome da na sustavan 
način pokažu kako su sve ostale filozofske škole u krivu. Sve ovo, dakle, daje za osnovu da 
govorimo o epikurovskoj epistemologiji kao zajedničkoj doktrini Epikura i njegovih kasnijih 
sljedbenika. 
Epikurova filozofija prije svega podređena je moralnoj teoriji i zamisli da je ugoda 
najviše dobro kojem ljudi teže, te je stoga osnovni cilj riješiti se neugode. Jedan od uzroka 
neugode Epikur vidi u krivim vjerovanjima, koji u nas unose nemir i strah, a to su prije svega 
vjerovanje da se bogovi mogu miješati u naše živote, zatim da su nebeska tijela božanstva i da 
je smrt nešto čega se trebamo plašiti. (DL. X.76-7, 124) epikurovska filozofija stoga ima za 
cilj ukloniti ova vjerovanja, dakle djelovati terapeutski, sa ciljem postizanja sreće 
(eudaimonia). No, takva vjerovanja moguće je ukloniti samo ukoliko spoznamo pravu sliku 
svijeta, a to je atomistička teorija, koja će nam onda pokazati da se bogovi ne miješaju u naš 
svijet, da nebeska tijela nisu božanstva, kao i to da smrt nije nešto čega se trebamo plašiti. 
Stoga, potrebno je dakle krenuti u fizikalno istraživanje osnovnih sastavnica svijeta i prave 
prirode predmeta koji nas okružuju, odnosno steći znanje o svijetu. Za Epikura je 
epistemologija stoga podređena moralnoj teoriji i njena funkcija je prije svega instrumentalna. 
No, to ne umanjuje njezin značaj, budući bez znanja o svijetu sreća nije ostvariva. 
Epikur u epistemologiji polazi od toga da je potrebno odrediti sredstva na temelju 
kojih utvrđujemo istinitost ili lažnost vjerovanja. Drugim riječima, potrebno je odrediti 
standarde istinitosti. Problem standarda ili kriterija istinitosti je središnji problem helenističke 
epistemologije, a uvodi ga upravo Epikur. Kod Diogena nalazimo zapis da je Epikur napisao 
djelo O kriteriju, ili Kanon, gdje 'kanon' u doslovnom značenju označava ravnalo kojim se 
provjeravala ravnoća dugih crta. (DL X.27) U skladu s tom metaforom, Epikura smatra da je 
u epistemologiji potrebno pronaći ekvivalentno oruđe kojim ćemo provjeravati istinitost. 
Problem kriterija kojeg potom prihvaćaju i ostale škole, prije svega stoička, tako postaje 
temeljni problem epistemologije, koji se odnosi na utvrđivanje temelja istinitosti. Epikur je 
smatrao da postoje tri kriterija: opažaji (aistheseis), osjećaji (pathe) i pretpojmovi 
(prolepseis). Opažaji i pretpojmovi su epistemološki kriteriji, dok su osjećaji kriterij za 
djelovanje i spadaju u područje etike, te se stoga s njima ne bavim u radu.1 
Rad započinje pregledom razvoja i motivacije koja je dovela do otvaranja problema 
kriterija istinitosti u helenističkoj filozofiji. U literaturi se obično govori o 'epistemološkom 
obratu' koji je nastao uvođenjem ovog problema, budući da se njime fokus interesa u 
epistemologiji sada usmjerava prije svega na pitanje mogućnosti znanja, što implicira 
ozbiljniju potrebu da se odgovori skeptičkom izazovu, te stoga i potrebu da se jasno odrede 
polazišne točke i temelj istinitosti. U radu tvrdim da ono što potiče Epikura na bavljenje ovim 
problemom jeste skepticizam koji proizlazi iz demokritovske epistemologije. Naime, 
Demokrit otvara jaz između svijeta osjetilnog iskustva, koji se sastoji od boja i drugih 
kvalitativnih svojstava s jedne strane, i s druge svijeta kakav zapravo jeste, dakle, svijet atoma 
i praznine. Ono što je osobito problematično jeste činjenica da atomistička slika svijeta 
pokazuje ovu iskustvenu kao neprimjerenu i lažnu, te je stoga razumno odbaciti je što 
                                                 
1 Više o pathe vidi DL X.129, 34; Cicero, De fin I.23. 
Demokrit upravo i čini. Međutim, posljedica toga pogubna je i za sam atomizam, budući da 
metoda dolaska do znanja o atomima polazi od iskustva i nikako od razuma. Epikur je 
svjestan ovih loših, skeptičkih posljedica koje proizlaze iz Demokritove epistemologije i cilj 
mu je pokazati da se obje slike svijeta mogu spasiti. Drugim riječima, Epikur tvrdi da je 
moguće imati znanje o obje realnosti i to tako da se one međusobno ne isključuju, nego 
upravo suprotno – opažaji služe kao znakovi na temelju kojih je opravdano izvesti zaključak o 
postojanju atoma, a atomizam se onda pokazuje kao jedino moguće objašnjenje slike svijeta 
kakvu imamo na temelju iskustva, čime se bavim u posljednjem poglavlju. No, prvo 
poglavlje, dakle, postavlja problem kriterija, pojašnjava motivaciju za bavljenje problemom i 
uvodi nas u konkretnu raspravu kod Epikura. 
U sljedeća dva poglavlja bavim se pojedinačnim kriterijima, opažajima i 
pretpojmovima. Opažaji su osnovni kriterij i temelj cijele epistemologije. Poglavlje o 
opažajima podijeljeno je na dva dijela, budući da tvrdim da Epikur brani tezu o istinitosti svih 
opažaja kroz dvije argumentacijske linije. U prvoj se ne referira na atomizam, nego utvrđuje 
opažaje kao polazišnu točku neovisno o atomističkoj teoriji. U drugom dijelu pokazujem da se 
onda teza da su svi opažaji istiniti opravdava i utemeljuje u atomizmu. Smatram da je važno 
razlikovati ova dva pravca argumenta, budući da bi u protivnom Epikurova argumentacija bila 
cirkularna jer bi se istinitost opažaja izvodila iz atomizma, a atomizam iz istinitosti svih 
opažaja. Tvrdim dakle, da Epikur polazi od argumenta da ukoliko ne prihvatimo istinitost svih 
opažaja, znanje je nemoguće. No budući da je činjenica da imamo znanje o svijetu bjelodana, 
preostaje nam prihvatiti istinitost opažaja. Teza da su neki opažaj istiniti, a neki lažni 
odbacuje se budući da Epikur tvrdi da ne postoji neki viši ili drugačiji kriterij na temelju kojeg 
bi se opažaji mogli odbaciti. Ovu skupinu argumenata, koja je neovisna o atomističkoj teoriji 
nazivam 'a priori' argumentima, utoliko što dolaze prije atomizma. Potom prelazim na teoriju 
opažanja koja je utemeljena na atomističkoj teoriji. Epikur tu uvodi teoriju sličica (eidola) za 
koje tvrdi da se stalno otpuštaju s površine predmeta, te aficiraju osjetilne organe, što onda 
dovodi do stvaranja opažaja. Budući da opažaji u tom procesu potpuno pasivno reagiraju na 
vanjski podražaj, uvijek se potpuno poklapaju sa svojim uzrokom. Također, opažaji su za 
Epikura iracionalni (alogos) što interpretiram na način da ne mogu intervenirati u sadržaj 
onoga što nam je dano vanjskim podražajem. Na temelju toga, tvrdim da je sadržaj opažanja 
nekonceptualan, dok je s druge strane sadržaj vjerovanja konceptualan. Formiranje vjerovanja 
je čin u kojem se sadržaj opažaja interpretira, konceptualizira, što onda otvara mogućnost da 
vjerovanje bude istinito ili lažno. To je osnova Epikurova objašnjenja pogreške, po kojem 
pogreška uvijek leži u formiranom vjerovanju i nikada u samom opažaju. Stoga su opažaji 
samoočigledni i predstavljaju prvi i temeljni kriterij istinitosti. 
Treće poglavlje donosi raspravu o pretpojmovima. Pretpojmovi predstavljaju 
zapamćene slične opažaje određenog tipa predmeta. Na taj način pretpojmovi nam 
omogućavaju da sistematiziramo sadržaj dan u opažaju, tj. da omoguće proces 
konceptualizacije tog sadržaja. To ukazuje na važnost pretpojmova budući da opažanjem ne 
možemo utvrditi što vidimo, nego samo da vidimo, a također nam omogućava razlikovanje 
uloge pretpojmova i opažaja kao kriterija. Iz toga onda proizlazi i funkcija pretpojmova kao 
kriterija istinitosti, budući da vjerovanje u kojem pretpojam nije upotrijebljen na ispravan 
način neće biti istinito. Nadalje, pretpojmovi imaju i ulogu polazišne točke u svakom 
istraživanju, što predstavlja Epikurovo rješenje Menonovog paradoksa. Naime, da bismo 
mogli istraživati bilo što, potrebno je imati pretpojam te stvari da bi uopće mogli krenuti sa 
istraživanjem. 
Konačno, posljednje poglavlje pokazuje metodu koju su epikurovci razvili za 
testiranje vjerovanja. Metoda se bazira na falsificiranju ili verificiranju vjerovanja na temelju 
opažaja. U slučaju vidljivih predmeta, koristimo se direktnim opažanjem, kao u slučaju tornja 
kojeg gledamo izdaleka. Naime, čekat ćemo da se približimo tornju i onda na temelju 
direktnog opažanja utvrditi je li naše vjerovanje bilo istinito ili lažno. No u slučaju nevidljivih 
stvari, i to prirodno nevidljivih stvari ili onih do kojih se nikada ne možemo približiti da bi 
utvrdili njihovu pravu prirodu, ne možemo koristiti direktno testiranje opažajima. Stoga, u tim 
slučajevima, opažanje služi kao znak onoga što je izvan dosega opažanja, kao što su atomi ili 
nebeska tijela. U tom slučaju, smatra Epikur, vjerovanja koja su u skladu s opažanjima su 
istinita, dok ona koja nisu kompatibilna s opažanjem su neistinita. Atomizam, kao najvažnija 
teorija o neopažljivom, se pokazuje kao sukladna osjetilnom iskustvu, te je stoga njime i 
potvrđena. Nadalje, atomizam se pokazuje kao jedina teorija kojom je moguće objasniti naše 
iskustvo svijeta sa svim kvalitativnim svojstvima koja su evidentna u našem iskustvu. Time 
Epikur uvodi atomizam kao najbolje i jedino znanstveno objašnjenje iskustvene slike svijeta. 
Na kraju, opća karakteristika epikurovske epistemologije jeste da je ona radikalno 
empiristička i da se ta slika svijeta brani na vrlo specifičan način: tezom o istinitosti svih 
opažaja i atomističkom teorijom. Osnovni cilj joj je pokazati kompatibilnost osjetilne i 
znanstvene slike svijeta, što Epikura čini bliskim i modernim raspravama o znanstvenom 
objašnjenju. Također, epistemologija ima primarno instrumentalnu ulogu i ne predstavlja 
teoriju o znanju u modernom smislu. Ono što nalazimo nije rasprava o znanju kao takvom, 
kao kod Platona ili Aristotela, nego prije svega samo rudimentarnu teoriju opravdanja, sa 
razrađenom metodologijom testiranja vjerovanja o neopažljivome. 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
The focus of my thesis is Epicurean epistemology. Epicurean epistemology is based 
the thesis according to which all perceptions are true obliging himself to empiricism. 
However his strong epistemological empiricism is combined with and even defended through 
atomistic theory, according to which the knowledge of the real structure of the world goes 
beyond the scope of our experience. In the thesis I shall examine the way Epicurean 
epistemology solves this problem of incompatibility between empiricism and atomism. 
Epicurus solution is based on establishing the means by which knowledge can be gained, that 
is, the criteria of truth. Epicurus held that there are three separate criteria: perceptions, 
preconceptions and feelings.  
In the first chapter I introduce the term ‘criterion’ and explore the general context in 
which the debate about the criterion of truth. I argue that Epicurus’ main motivation lies in the 
kind of atomistic skepticism according to which phenomenal knowledge is impossible. 
In the second chapter I explore the first criterion of truth, perceptions, and examine 
interpretations of the central claim that all perceptions are true. The chapter is divided in two 
parts since I shall argue that Epicurus offers two different lines of argument to support the 
thesis that all perceptions are true. The first claims that unless we accept that all perceptions 
as true, knowledge will be impossible. The second defense the incorrigibility of perception on 
the basis of atomistic theory of perception (eidolic theory).  
In the third chapter I explore preconceptions, the second criterion of truth. I argue that 
the process of formation is purely empirical since they are produced through repeated 
perceptions of individual instances of a particular type of thing. Given this, preconceptions are 
the means by which we recognize types of object, and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ 
account of how we gain knowledge of things. Besides this function, I shall argue that by 
preconceptions we engaged in the process of interpretation of perceptual content, its 
conceptualization which in the end enables us to form beliefs. 
In the last chapter I discuss Epicurus’ methods of testing beliefs. Beliefs about 
observable objects are tested by direct perception through the methods of witnessing or non-
witnessing. By establishing methods of counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing for 
testing beliefs about what is hidden from direct perception, Epicurus show the way in which 
we infer about the existence of atoms and other non-evident things on the grounds of 
perception. 
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Introduction  
 
Following the standard tripartition of philosophy in the Hellenistic period, Epicurean 
philosophy is divided in physics, ethics and epistemology (canonic). In all three branches the 
doctrines proposed by the Epicureans raised controversy and polemical reactions. In physics 
they embraced the atomistic theory, claiming that everything consists of atoms and void; in 
ethics they defend hedonism claiming that the highest good humans pursue is pleasure; and in 
epistemology they hold specific version of empiricism, claiming that all knowledge rests upon 
incorrigibility of perceptions. The principle focus of my thesis is that of Epicurean 
epistemology, which of the three disciplines is the most controversial. Namely, Epicurean 
epistemological theory, as well as other theories from the Hellenistic period, is motivated by 
two important questions: (i) whether knowledge is attainable at all; and (ii) if it is attainable, 
what are its foundations. Epicurus’ answers to these questions show that he wants to defend 
the possibility of knowledge and to claim that the foundation of knowledge is our sensory 
experience. By claiming that knowledge is attained through the senses, Epicurus is placing 
himself on the side of empiricist tradition. What distinguishes his understanding of 
empiricism from that of other Greek philosophers is his rather controversial way of defending 
it, by claiming that all perceptions or sense-impressions are true. Therefore, by accepting the 
thesis according to which perceptions are taken to be the incorrigible foundation of our 
knowledge, Epicurus commits himself to an extremely radical version of empiricism.  
 However, what is even more surprising is that his strong epistemological empiricism is 
combined with and even defended through atomistic theory, according to which the 
knowledge of the real structure of the world goes beyond the scope of our experience. 
Therefore, knowledge of the world based on the atomistic theory diverges from empiricism 
and even seems to defeat it. Before Epicurus, the founder of Greek atomism, Democritus, 
accepted that the theses are irreconcilable and, as evidence suggests, he gave up the 
possibility of knowledge of the phenomenal world. In contrast, Epicurus wanted to save both 
kinds of knowledge and thus produces an obvious tension. On the one hand, he wants to 
ensure the possibility of empirical knowledge which is in accord with naïve realism. On the 
other side, he endorses atomistic theory, which claims that the world’s ultimate structure 
consists of atoms and void. In the thesis I shall examine the way Epicurean epistemology 
solves the problem. Epicurean solution is established on the thesis of perceptual infallibility 
and my main aim is before all to offer a plausible interpretation to support the thesis. The task 
is challenging since it does not presuppose a sophisticated philosophical education to offer a 
few examples in which perception tricked us and thereby refutes Epicurus’ thesis. 
Nevertheless it is hardly believable that Epicurus and his followers, who continue to defend 
his philosophy for almost four centuries, were not aware of these difficulties themselves, so 
the reconstruction of the arguments in favor the thesis becomes more challenging. But before 
starting with an introductory overview of the main epistemological arguments and the aims of 
the thesis let me say a few things in order to say something about the notion ‘Epicurean’. 
Namely, as the title indicates, in the thesis I examine not only Epicurus’ own writings 
as the primary sources but also the writings of his followers for which I take together 
constitutes the Epicurean philosophical system. The reason for this is that the doctrines of 
later Epicureans follow very closely the canonical texts set out by Epicurus himself with 
insignificant divergences. Such a strong cohesion in the philosophical systems is rather unique 
characteristic of the Epicureanism in comparison with other ancient schools, such as Platonic, 
Aristotelian or Stoic, especially if we have in mind that Epicureanism endures for almost four 
centuries. The reason for the stability in the Epicureans’ teachings lies in the fact that the 
school was established more as a doctrinal community in which Epicurus’ authority was 
respected and devotedly worshiped both during his life, but more importantly, long after his 
death. Epicurus himself assured the survival and cohesion of his philosophy, primarily 
through the method of transmission of his doctrines: the students and advocates of 
Epicureanism were supposed to memorize the main postulates. And in his last will Epicurus 
secured the continuation of his philosophy by setting out the continuance of the five 
commemorative offerings, annual and monthly: first to celebrate death of his mother, father 
and three brothers, then the celebration of his birthday, next monthly celebration to 
commemorate Metrodorus and himself and finally the celebrations in the month of Poseidon 
for his brothers and in Metageitnion a cult for Polyaenus (DL X.18). The doctrines postulated 
by Epicurus around which his followers and all later loyalists gathered were practical 
guidance towards happy life devoted of disturbance and pain. Therefore to embrace the main 
postulates of Epicureanism was in fact to embrace a way of life around which this strong 
communal identity was built. This does not mean that there were no innovative ideas and 
arguments in the school, but the fact is that the key postulates, together with terminology and 
methodology remained the same.  
The foremost evidence is Lucretius’(c. 94-55 BC) work De rerum natura in which he 
expresses his deep admiration to the founder of the Epicurean philosophy he defends as the 
only philosophy that reveals truth about the world. David Sedley goes that far to prove that 
Lucretius actually was completely ignorant of any philosophical debate of his time and 
completely focused on Epicurus’ work and Epicurus himself.2 In the time when Lucretius 
wrote his book, near Naples was active an Epicurean school whose founder probably was 
Philodemus (Cicero, Fin. II.119).3 His survived work On Signs is one of the most important 
pieces of evidence for the understanding of the methods of testing beliefs and sign-inferences 
in Epicureanism and their engagement in the debates with other schools of their time. 
Nevertheless, Sedley points out, as “Philodemus’ writings make clear, it was normal for 
contemporary Epicureans to assign virtually biblical status not to the writings of Epicurus 
alone, but jointly to those of the foursome known simply as Hoi Andres, ‘the Great Men’. 
These infallible four were the founding figures of the school, Epicurus, Metrodorus, 
Hemarchus and Polyaenus, and all four were treated as absolutely authoritative”.4 On the 
same line of thought De Lacy’s observation further explains the customary practice of the 
Epicurean school in which “it was an established tradition among Epicureans to devote much 
of their time to the refutation of the philosophers of other schools; and we find as early as the 
third century B.C. that the Epicurean Colotes undertook to prove systematically that every 
philosopher was wrong except Epicurus”.5 Therefore, I take it that this offers a ground to 
speak and explore Epicurean epistemology which was established upon Epicurus’ doctrines 
and preserved their original meaning. 
Epicurus’ philosophical inquiry was driven by our need to understand the sources of 
unhappiness so he recognized that the main disturbance for a happy life proceeds from false 
beliefs, primarily about the gods, celestial phenomena and death. In the Letter to Herodotus 
Epicurus writes: 
 
Among the celestial phenomena movement, turning, eclipse, rising, setting and the like should not be 
thought to come about through the ministry and present or future arrangements of some individual 
who at the same time posses the combination of total blessedness and imperishability. For trouble, 
concern, anger and favour are incompatible with blessedness, but have their origin in weakness, fear 
and dependence on neighbours. Nor should we think that beings which are at the same time 
conglomerations of fire possess blessedness and voluntarily take on these movements. (DL X.76-7, 
transl. LS 23C) 
 
                                                 
2 In his Sedley (1998) he offers a reconstruction of this argument based on the idea that the main source 
Lucretius had for his poem was Epicurus' On Nature. 
3 For an extended discussion see De Lacy (1978), Asmis (1984). 
4 Sedley (1998), 67-8. 
5 De Lacy (1978), 153. Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. 1107 E. 
So correct beliefs that the gods do not interfere in human affairs, that celestial bodies 
are not divine, as we are told in the passage, together with the belief that “death is nothing to 
us” (DL X.124) will take away the fears and conduce to a good life. Therefore, what becomes 
the crucial condition for happiness is the requirement to have true beliefs about the world we 
live in. For Epicurus this consequently opens the need for a scientific investigation through 
which genuine knowledge about the things in the world is to be obtained. Therefore, 
epistemology which is supposed to give us knowledge of the world around us becomes 
closely connected to physics and both subordinated and necessary for ethics. Although the 
function of epistemology within this general framework is more instrumental, Epicurus 
offered a unique epistemological doctrine and opened some entirely new problems that 
marked the beginnings of epistemology as a separate discipline in Epicurean philosophy.  
 Since objective knowledge about the world becomes a matter of supreme importance, 
Epicurus regarded that this aim required establishing the means by which knowledge can be 
gained. To establish the means for Epicurus was to set out the criteria of truth, that is, the 
standards by which the truth is ascertained. Epicurean epistemology was called canonic 
because of Epicurus’ work About the criterion, or Canon (DL X.27), where ‘canon’ literally 
means a yardstick or rule or straightedge. The title suggests that Epicurus sought to find an 
epistemological tool equivalent to the canon metaphor, namely the straightedge for 
‘measuring’ truth. According to the sources Epicurus held that there are three separate 
criteria: perceptions, preconceptions and feelings (DL X.31; Cicero, Acad. II.142). The first 
two are the criteria for theoretical knowledge, whereas feelings are specifically criterion for 
action.6 I will not go into debate about feelings as the criteria, since to deal with them would 
go beyond the interest of the thesis. Therefore, I shall focus on the remaining two: perceptions 
and preconceptions.  
 In the first chapter I shall introduce the term ‘criterion’ and explain the general context 
in which the debate about the criterion of truth is developed. Commentators usually speak 
about ‘epistemological turn’ in order to explain specific changes and the shift of interest that 
marked the beginning of Hellenistic epistemology, with Epicurus as the one that opens this 
debate. I shall follow that line of interpretation arguing that Epicurus’ main motivation lies in 
the kind of atomistic skepticism according to which phenomenal knowledge is impossible. 
Therefore, in this chapter I will say something about possible antecedents of skepticism 
before Epicurus, that is, atomistic skepticism. Consequently Epicurus’ quest for the criteria of 
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as the yardstick for judging every good thing” (DL X.129, transl. LS 21B). Cf. DL X.34, Cicero, Fin I.23.  
truth is the reaction to atomistic skepticism and his aim is to secure the possibility of 
knowledge by appropriate methods as the canon metaphor suggest and to close the gap 
between phenomenal world and the world of atoms and void. Namely, I will argue that 
Epicurus’ main epistemological aim of saving both phenomenal knowledge and knowledge 
provided by the atomistic theory is established upon rather peculiar strategy for this ambitious 
task: the claim about perceptual incorrigibility. This strategy becomes clearer in the second 
chapter which is dedicated to the interpretation of the central thesis that all perception is true. 
 So, in the second chapter I explore the first criterion of truth, perceptions, and examine 
interpretations of the central claim that all perceptions are true. The chapter is divided in two 
parts since I shall argue that Epicurus offers two different lines of argument to support the 
thesis that all perceptions are true, the first reflecting his motivation for the thesis and second 
justification of the thesis. I shall argue that Epicurus’ motivation for the thesis about 
perceptual incorrigibility is defended independently of the atomistic theory based on the idea 
that unless we accept that all perceptions as true, knowledge will be impossible. In the second 
part of the chapter I shall explain that justification of the thesis that all perceptions are true is 
provided by the atomistic theory of perception. I shall argue that such an explanation offers a 
basis for the claim that the truth of perceptions should be understood as an exact match of 
perceptual content with its cause, namely eidola. I attempt to further clarify the infallibility of 
perception and its contrast to belief which can be true or false by interpreting perceptual 
content as non-conceptual. In my view this is precisely what enables perception to serve as 
the self-evident truth and the primary criterion of truth. 
 The third chapter is dedicated to the second criterion of truth, preconceptions. In the 
first part I shall discuss the origin of preconceptions and the way they are formed. I attempt to 
show that the process of formation is purely empirical since they are produced through 
repeated perceptions of individual instances of a particular type of thing which as a result 
produces a “universal stored notion”, that is, preconception (DL X.30). In spite of the fact that 
they are completely dependent upon perceptions, preconceptions serve as the criterion on their 
own. However, the dependence upon perception secures that preconceptions are also self-
evident, that is they do not need further proof. I shall argue that preconceptions are the means 
by which we recognize types of object, and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ account of 
how we gain knowledge of things. By this Epicurus attempts to reply to well known ‘Meno 
paradox’ and to show that preconceptions serve as the starting point for any inquiry. Besides 
this function, I shall argue that by preconceptions we engaged in the process of interpretation 
of perceptual content, its conceptualization which in the end enables us to form beliefs. 
 In the last chapter I discuss Epicurus’ methods of testing beliefs. Beliefs about 
observable objects are tested by direct perception through the methods of witnessing or non-
witnessing. Armed with self-evidently truths about observable world, Epicurus maintains that 
these truths can serve as signs for inferences about what is non-observable or non-evident. By 
establishing methods of counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing for testing beliefs about 
what is hidden from direct perception, Epicurus show the way in which we infer about the 
existence of atoms and other non-evident things on the grounds of perception. In the end this 
explains Epicurus’ unique project of coupling empiricism and atomism.  
 
In the thesis I rely primarily on Epicurus’ own text, the Letter to Herodotus, saved in 
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Diogenus’ work is the major source since 
it brings relevant biographical information. But more importantly Diogenes offers very useful 
summary of Epicurus’ epistemological doctrine and the theory of the criteria of truth Also he 
preserves two other original Epicurus’ letters, the Letter to Pythocles in which he mostly 
discusses celestial phenomena and the Letter to Menoeceus dedicated to ethics. Besides three 
letters, Diogenes also preserves a collection of short Epicurus’ sayings called Principle 
Doctrines (Kuriai doxai) which contains some significant arguments for the epistemological 
discussion. Another relevant source is Epicurus’ book On Nature the fragments of which are 
found in a library in an Epicurean villa in Herculaneum.7 Inevitable source of the later 
Epicurean philosophy is previously mentioned Lucretius’ De rerum natura and Philodemus’ 
De signis and also Diogenes of Oenoanda. From the camp of non-Epicurean writers which are 
often hostile in presentation of Epicureanism, relevant epistemological presentations of the 
doctrine we find in Cicero’s Academica, De natura deorum and De finibus, in Sextus 
Empiricus, and Plutrach’s Adversus Colotem. 
 I used translations from Long and Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1, 
Translations of the principle sources with philosophical commentary where it was possible. 
For the paragraphs not included in LS, I used other available translations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The most extended work on the reconstruction and interpretation of the scrolls that were saved after erruption 
of Vesuvius is done by David Sedley. See his Sedley (1973), Sedley (1998). 
  
 
 
 
1. THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION OF TRUTH 
 
The central problem of Hellenistic epistemology is the problem of the criterion of truth. The 
word ‘criterion’ is used differently but it can be said that it is the transliteration of the Greek 
word which literally means a ‘means of judging’, and it is commonly used to signify the sense 
organs. However, in spite of the fact that the word is essential for the epistemological debate, 
we do not find within the writings of the main philosophers of that time precise explanation or 
discussion of the term. In the examination of the different usage of the word ‘criterion’ Striker 
emphasizes one philosophically important fact.  
 
The philosophical term of art kriterion, on the other hand, appears to be related with the Attic word 
krites, which refers not to a judge but to an “evaluator” (Fraenkel: Beurteiler) or arbiter – thus, for 
example, the person who judges the tragedies in a play contest (cf. Aesch. 3, 233; Isocr. 15, 27; Xen. 
Symp. 5, 10; Demost. 21, 18 – Debrunner, Geschichte, pp. 58-59). By a kriterion, then, is understood a 
means or instrument for evaluation, and by a kriterion tes aletheias in particular, a means for 
evaluating everything which can be characterized as true or false.8 
 
Thus, the criterion of truth is in fact some kind of epistemological instrument that 
serves for testing and evaluating judgments, appearances, perceptions, or as Striker says, of all 
the things to which the truth value can be ascribed. But as a technical term in epistemology 
we cannot find it before 300 B.C. and the sources suggest that Epicurus is the first one who 
introduces the term into philosophical language in the sense of an epistemological instrument 
for ascertaining the truth. (DL X.31) However, if we proceed from this general account of the 
meaning of the term ‘criterion’ to specifying its characteristics or functions, we are faced with 
the diversity of the things that are taken to be the criterion of truth in the Hellenistic period, 
such as senses, reason or perceptions, appearances or preconceptions and concepts and 
consequently we can find that the term ‘criterion’ is used in a lot of different senses. 
In spite of the diversity of meaning it seems possible to extract and classify a few 
types of senses in which the term ‘criterion of truth’ is used. The task of a systematic 
presentation of the meanings and usages of the term is done by Sextus Empiricus whose 
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systematizations is not concentrated only on the Hellenistic period but tends to classify its 
broader usage in antiquity. Historically Sextus stands at the end of the very long philosophical 
discussion about the criterion of truth and thus, having before him previous doctrines, he 
attempts to summarize and give us a retrospective analysis of all the main conception of the 
criterion. 9  However, we have to bear in mind that Sextus’ approach to the problem is that of 
a skeptic and that his investigation of the term ‘criterion’ is to some extent biased by that 
theoretical background of the Phyrronian skepticism. The main sources for the discussion 
about the problem of the criterion of truth and the notion ‘criterion’ itself are Outlines of 
Phyrronism and Adversus Mathematicos.  
Sextus’ examination of the term ‘criterion’ contains of several divisions and 
classifications of the senses in which the term is used. Our focus here is the sense used in the 
explication of the problem of the criterion of truth, but it is important to notice that Sextus 
analysis of the term starts with the most general division of the two senses of the term 
‘criterion’, namely the criterion of truth and the criterion of action (PH I.21). Sextus’ stances 
towards the above mentioned criteria are radically different: while on the one hand his overall 
aim is to show that we should suspend judgment about the existence of the criterion of truth, 
he is eager to accept the existence of the criterion for action. I will briefly explain the latter 
criterion, since it will be important for understanding of Epicurus’ criteria later on, and then 
will focus on Sextus’ explanation of the different usage of the term ‘criterion’ in the context 
of the discovery of truth. 
In Outlines of Phyrronism, when the distinction between the two senses of ‘criterion’ 
is introduced for the first time, Sextus defines the criterion for action as something “attending 
to which in everyday life we perform some actions and not others” (PH I.21). Sextus’ 
acceptance of a practical criterion is rooted in the specific explanation of what regulates and 
guides human action and behavior, and more importantly in his aim to explain in what way 
the practical life of a skeptic should be understood. The main part of that explanation is 
related to the central skeptical method which suggests withholding belief about anything that 
is non-evident or “unclear” (PH I.13) and consequently obliges a skeptic to live a life 
“without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects” (PH I.14). In other 
words, skeptics propose to suspend judgment about everything external to us, such as tables 
and chairs, starting from having beliefs about physical objects in the external world to more 
                                                 
9 Nevertheless, as Striker (1996) points out, Sextus probably took these divisions in usage and meanings from 
some handbook, which was probably the common source of that time, since almost the same division is found in 
Pseudo Galen's De historia philosophica.  
complex cases of beliefs about the dogmatist theories and the philosophical arguments, 
because in all those cases we can never go beyond our appearances in claiming how things are 
in themselves. Sextus says: 
 
For example, it appears to us that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a 
perceptual way); but whether (as far as argument goes) it is actually sweet is something we investigate 
– and this is not what is apparent but something said about what is apparent. (PH I.19) 
 
However, this strategy leads to the famous objection to ancient skepticism according 
to which the skeptics’ life is doomed to passivity, since participation in everyday activities 
presupposes having beliefs about the things we want to do and having beliefs is considered as 
a basis for human action and behavior. For example, what guides my action of taking an 
umbrella with me is a set of beliefs that it is raining outside, that rain will make me wet and 
that being wet is unpleasant for me. If according to Sextus, I am supposed to withhold beliefs 
about external things, what will explain my behavior that, for example, when it is raining I 
take my umbrella? Sextus’ answer is that our actions are not guided by beliefs, but by 
appearances.10 According to what is said, my behavior than is not explained by having beliefs 
about the rain, but only through giving assent to the passive appearances which are limited to 
the content of my immediate sensory experience.11 This means that I give assent to a passive 
appearance that, for example, the rain is not pleasant, but I withhold further active formation 
of a belief that the rain itself is a kind of thing that is not pleasant. Sextus’ claim that relying 
on appearances and withholding judgment about external things secure a criterion and 
guidance for practical life, ‘allows the skeptics to live their skepticism’ and leads to the final 
skeptical aim, tranquility of mind (ataraxia).12  
We can leave aside the practical criterion and turn to the main subject of our 
investigation, the criterion of truth, which is introduced for the first time in this sense in the 
already mentioned passage PH I.21. Although Sextus does not name it there as kriterion tes 
aletheias, it is clear that he is talking about it because the definition is almost the same as in 
PH II.14, where he turns to the exploration of the criterion of truth itself and attacks it. What 
we find in both passages is the idea that the criterion of truth should “provide conviction 
about reality or unreality of something” (PH I.21) or that it is something “by which […] 
reality and unreality are judged”. (PH II.14) Therefore, the general definition of the criterion 
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“The skeptic's beliefs“, Burnyeat (1980) and his article “Can the Sceptic live his scepticism?“. 
11 At this point again it is an open question whether giving of an assent is a belief or not. 
12 Cf. Burnyeat (1980) in n. 9 where he argues for the impossibility of a practical life for the Skeptics. 
of truth according to Sextus in PH implies that the criterion of truth is something that should 
allow us to identify which of our appearances are true in the sense that they actually 
correspond with the objective nature of things and thus provide us with true beliefs about 
reality and consequently with the knowledge of it. However, this general definition of the 
criterion still does not tell us much about what kind of things the criterion is, it only gives us a 
vague idea that the criterion is some kind of “the most important prerequisite for judging truth 
and falsehood”.13 
We find a more specific explanation in PH II.15-17 and M VII.31-37 where Sextus 
examines the different usage of the term ‘criterion’ distinguishing the various senses of 
application. The first distinction is between three senses in which the term ‘criterion’ of truth 
is used, which are (i) general, (ii) the special and (iii) the most special sense (PH II.15; M 
VII.31-32). Sextus supplements the distinction with examples in which he states that when 
talking about the general sense of the term ‘criterion’ he has in mind natural standards of 
apprehension such as seeing, hearing, tasting and the rest of the sense organs; when talking 
about the special sense he thinks of every technical measure of apprehension such as ruler or 
compass; and finally, when talking about the most special sense he again mentions every 
technical measure of apprehension, but now the apprehension that is related with the non-
evident things. The fact that in the last sense the criterion is connected with the non-evident 
things makes this criterion not applicable to everyday things but only to something that Sextus 
names as logical things (ta logika) or the things that are the subject matter of a logic or 
theoretical entities, used by dogmatic philosopher in order to determine the truth.14 Probably 
what he has in mind here is the sense in which the criterion should provide us with a grasp of 
the truth about the non-evident or non-clear things (adela), such as for example the 
knowledge of atoms and void, while in the previous meanings the criterion grasps the truth of 
evident things (enarges), such as existence of bodies, if we take the example of one of the 
dogmatic school in Hellenistic philosophy.15  
The next division is concerned with the latest sense of ‘criterion’, the logical one, 
which can be further divided into three senses: (a) criterion in the sense ‘by which’ we make 
judgments (for example, by men or some other agent); (b) in the sense ‘with which’ we make 
judgments (for example, through perception, intellect or both) and in the sense ‘in virtue of 
which’ (for example, in virtue of the application or some similar act in which we perform the 
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due to the signs. 
judging). Sextus’ explanation of the distinction is found in M VII.35-37 where he uses the 
following metaphor to explain the ‘logical criterion’: 
 
For just as in the process of examining heavy and light objects there are three criteria, (i) the man who 
weighs, (ii) the scales, and (iii) the act of weighing, and of these the weigher is the criterion of the 
agent, the scales that of the instrument, and the act of weighing that of the use. (M VII. 36)  
 
First thing that should be noticed about the metaphor is that Sextus’ aim is to show 
that there is an analogy between the process of measuring heavy and light things and the 
process of “measuring” truth and falsehood. Next, the metaphor suggests that all the cases of 
measuring necessarily involve three things: first, an agent who is maintaining the measuring; 
second, an instrument, such as scale or straightedge, by which something is measured and 
finally, the particular act of measuring or the application of the instrument on the object that is 
measured. The same tripartite structure, as analogy with the differentiating between the heavy 
and light objects, should work in the cases of making a judgment or metaphorical measuring 
the truth. Namely, it is obvious that in order to tell the truth from falsehood we need to have 
an agent (anthropos) who is judging, just as we need an agent in any case of measuring. Next, 
likewise an agent needs some kind of equipment or instrument that enables her to differentiate 
heavy from light things, necessary equipment for making the judgment is perception 
(aisthesis) or reason (dianoia). And finally, to the particular act of measuring or the 
application of the weighing scale corresponds the very act of application (prosbole tes 
fantasias) of the cognitive instruments, perception or reason, or the using of perception or 
reason in order to differentiate truth from falsehood.  
 So what is significant from Sextus’ elaboration of the different senses of the 
logical ‘criterion’ for our purposes? First, I would like to indicate a few points that can be 
extracted from Sextus’ analyses about the general usage of the term ‘criterion’ in Hellenistic 
epistemology, after which I would like to point out some important features of Sextus’ 
exposition for the understanding of Epicurean usage of the notion ‘criterion’. We can start 
with the fact that Sextus’ analysis starts from the extremely general definition of the criterion 
of truth, according to which the criterion of truth is something by which we determine truth 
about reality. It is significant that the definition from which he starts is wide and general 
enough and as such can be accepted by all philosophers who are using the term, both 
dogmatists and skeptics. However, as it becomes obvious from Sextus’ examination of the 
term, there are certain important differences between the schools and change over time in 
usage of the term.  
 The target of Sextus’ further analysis is the logical sense of the term ‘criterion’, 
where he offers again another classification, namely the tripod classification based on an 
analogy with the weighing. The tripod classification shows that the various senses of logical 
‘criterion’ rely on the specific explanation of the act of measuring that involves three things: 
the agent, the instrument and. The term ‘criterion’ thus can be understood in three senses: 
first, in the sense of an agent who is making the judgment, next in the sense of an instrument 
by which an agent is judging and third, in the sense of the application of the instrument, or the 
act of judging. And although Asmis stresses that again, in this second classification the 
change is due to the increasing precision of the usage of the term, in the sense that “the second 
adds precision to the first, and the third to the second”16, this does not seems to be so obvious 
as in the case of the first classification. On the contrary, it seems to me that while in the first 
classification we can sense the progress towards more precise and narrower usage of the term, 
in the case of second classification it seems that all three senses are of equal precision. This 
seemed to follow from Sextus’ analogy with weighing from which we cannot conclude that 
the difference in the meaning of the term ‘criterion’ consists in the fact that the sense of the 
‘criterion’ as measuring instrument adds precision to the sense as an agent who is measuring. 
More appropriate reading of the example suggests that Sextus’ aim is to show that in every 
case of measuring we need three things, an agent, an instrument and the act of application of 
the instrument, but all three listed things serve as equal constituents of the explanation of the 
measuring process. And since the making of judgment is the process of measuring or 
determining the truth, the same works for the criterion in this case. Therefore, it seems that the 
difference in the meaning of the logical ‘criterion’ is not in the levels of precision, as 
suggested by Asmis, but rather in pointing to the different, but equally relevant means of 
every process of measuring. The dispute in Hellenistic epistemology, as skeptics attempt to 
show, is focused around the choosing one of the possible senses as the right one in order to 
secure the possibility of knowledge. 
 This common twofold usage of the term ‘criterion’ in Hellenistic philosophy reflects 
another interesting point relevant for the uncovering of the overall picture of the problem of 
the criterion of truth and its arousal from the problem of possibility of knowledge. It appears 
that the distinction of the meaning of the ‘criterion’ on the cognitive faculties on the one hand 
and the acts of perceiving or reasoning on the other guiding our discovery of truth, can be 
formulated in terms of more general epistemological questions concerned with the possibility 
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of obtaining knowledge. Namely, when talking about perception or reason as cognitive tools 
by which we are discovering truth and gaining knowledge, in fact we are talking about the 
sources of knowledge. Likewise, the meaning of the ‘criterion’ as an act of application of the 
cognitive instruments and actual judging in terms of perceiving or reasoning, might be 
understood as a quest for a cognitive method that enables us to determine the truth. The 
debate about the notion ‘crterion’ suggests something general about the Hellenistic 
epistemology. 
The epistemological debate in the Hellenistic period is usually presented as placed 
around the two main questions.17 First of them asks whether there is such a thing as a criterion 
of truth. If the answer to the first question is positive, we are faced with the second one, 
namely, if the criterion of truth exists, what exactly it is. The reason for this lies in the fact 
that all major philosophical schools of that period, Epicureans, Stoics and Skeptics, presume 
that these questions must be answered in order to defend and justify the possibility of having 
any knowledge about the world. This is considered to be a serious ‘epistemological turn’ in 
ancient epistemology and something that sharply differentiates epistemological interest within 
the Hellenistic period from the previous debates on knowledge.18 The main difference 
between the two periods of ancient epistemology is the following. It seems that philosophers 
before Hellenistic period of philosophy never seriously questioned the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge and quite firmly believed that we have knowledge of many things. Since they start 
with the assumption that knowledge as such exists, their epistemological interest was oriented 
toward finding the appropriate definition of knowledge, analysis of its structure and 
identification of the objects of knowledge.  
This qualification, however, naturally leads us to the question of the causes or the 
circumstances that give rise to the ‘epistemological turn’. Namely, why do we find the switch 
within the epistemological debate about knowledge exactly in Hellenistic philosophy and not 
before in ancient epistemology? Brunschwig indicates that we can explain the 
‘epistemological turn’ by pointing out philosophical and historical considerations that 
underlie the process of shifting of the epistemological interest. Although he takes them to be 
two separate considerations, it seems to me that they cannot be separated, since philosophical 
consideration explains and overlaps with the historical one. This similarity will become clear 
when we see what Brunschwig says about the philosophical consideration. Namely he claims 
that, 
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 “…it seems natural to suppose that the birth of an epistemology worthy of the name – that is to say, of 
systematic reflection on the possibilities and the limits of knowledge, on its criteria and its instruments 
– implies prior existence of a sceptical challenge; for there must be something to jolt us out of the 
naïve complacency which marked our initial forays into the field of knowledge before we have taken 
stock of the intellectual means at our disposal. The gage will be thrown up – and picked up – only by 
men who have already lost their epistemological virginity.”19 
 
  In other words, the philosophical reason for the ‘epistemological turn’ within 
Hellenism, according to Brunschwig, is motivated by skeptical challenges existing in the 
philosophical scene before the Hellenistic period. The epistemological turn is then considered 
as a transformation from the habitual epistemological pattern of Greek philosophers before 
the Hellenistic period who take the possibility to gain knowledge as true, without questioning 
it, to the more fundamental and challenging question of the overall possibility of knowledge 
in the first place. To put it differently, philosophers in Hellenism open the Pandora’s box of 
epistemology by asking the epistemological question of the possibility of knowledge prior to 
the questions of its nature and structure. This means that the question about the possibility of 
knowledge is placed as the central since the pursuit for the reliable means for attaining the 
objective truth about the world has to be established before any account of what knowledge is. 
In the Hellenistic period this task is investigated under the problem of the criterion of truth 
which can be defined, according to Striker, as “the question of whether it is possible to 
distinguish with certainty between true and false opinions or assertions, and if so by what 
means”20.  
Regarding the historical background previous to the Hellenistic period, Gisela Striker, 
who has made the most comprehensive and overall research on the problem of the criterion of 
truth, makes the following point 
 
“There must have been a skeptical undercurrent from the time of the sophists on, most notably in the 
Democritean school. But we have to turn mainly to Plato and Aristotle to recover some of the 
evidence, and it seems that they had little patience with doubts about the possibility of knowledge. 
Seeing impressive disciplines like mathematics, astronomy, medicine and other natural sciences 
develop, they may have found it unnecessary to worry about their very possibility, and more important 
to investigate the structure of scientific theories and the characteristics of scientific understanding.”21 
 
 In the quoted passage Striker emphasizes two important points relevant for the 
explanation of the origin of the problem of the criterion of truth. Namely, she claims that on 
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the one side there had been skeptical endeavors previous to the Hellenistic period, but on the 
other the main philosophical figures of the classical period, Plato and Aristotle, had never 
taken the impossibility of knowledge too seriously. The view about the origin of the problem 
of the criterion, as presented by Brunschwig and Striker, recently is criticized by Lee.22 She 
claims that it is wrong to assume that “earlier philosophy was marked by a naïve complacency 
about whether knowledge is really possible” for the following reasons:  
 
First, earlier thinkers anticipated many of the arguments employed by Hellenistic sceptics. “Sceptical” 
arguments were in the air from the period of the Presocratics on, although not in the form of a well-
defined position, but in the form of certain loosely related ideas and arguments. And they did not go 
unnoticed; the potentially destructive force of these “sceptical” arguments was appreciated by 
philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. Their formulation of the problems confronting the 
possibility of knowledge, together with their responses and attempts at defusing those problems, 
would inspire and anticipate many of the debates between sceptics and their opponents in the 
Hellenistic period. 
 
She supports her view by many passages of the philosophers in the classical period who 
seriously took skeptical arguments starting from the distinction between how things appear to 
us and how things really are. From this distinction they inferred that knowledge is impossible 
for either the metaphysical reason, which concentrates upon the impossibility of knowledge of 
the real nature of things (for example, Heraclitus), or for the epistemological reason, which 
emphasizes that the impossibility of knowledge is a result of limitations of our cognitive 
abilities (for example, Xenophanes or Democritus). Therefore, once the sharp distinction 
between appearance and reality is introduced, the gap between appearances and reality is 
opened and knowledge beyond appearances becomes doubtful. This implies that the account 
of the epistemological turn, with which I started and to which I am very inclined to, calls for 
some qualifications. It is not the case that philosophers in the classical period did not discuss 
skeptical arguments neglecting them as unimportant, which is suggested by Brunschwig 
quotations. On the other hand it is clear that these skeptical challenges were not discussed in a 
systematic way as it was later done by the Skeptics in the Hellenistic period, but nevertheless 
they were considered very seriously. Therefore, the changes within epistemology in the 
Hellenistic period are not so drastic and abrupt. The epistemological turn in the Hellenistic 
epistemology thus should be seen as a tendency towards a systematic analysis of the 
foundation and finding the firm starting point for ascertaining the truth of beliefs.  
Another fact that also signifies something relevant for the understanding of the origin 
of the problem is the following. The evidence suggests that it was Epicurus’ who introduced 
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the notion of the criterion of truth into the Hellenistic debate. (DL X.31) If this is so, given 
what is said so far, it appears that Epicurus is actually the one responsible for the 
epistemological turn and moreover that he is motivated by some kind of skeptical challenge. 
My attempt is to support this assumption and to argue that Epicurus is actually motivated by 
atomistic skepticism indicated in Democritean epistemology with which he was familiar. Of 
course, this is contradicted to the reports we find in the sources according to which Epicurus 
proclaimed himself to be self-taught and without formal education.23 However, it is hard to 
believe so. The other pieces of evidence suggest more plausibly that Epicurus was influenced 
by two important philosophical figures of that time, namely his teacher, Nausiphanes, who 
was an atomist and a follower of Democritus24, and the skeptic Pyrrho25, who was 
Nausiphanes’ teacher. It is also interesting that Pyrrho, as Diogenes reports, was familiar with 
atomism through Anaxarchus.26 Finally, in Sextus’ reports we find that Anaxarchus, together 
with Metrodorus adopted Democritean atomism, but also accepted its skeptical implications 
and rejected the criterion. Metrodorus formulates his position by saying that “we know 
nothing, nor do we even know the very fact that we know nothing”27. So, already this very 
brief teacher-student historical reconstruction implies that at the time of Epicurus’ 
philosophical development there were present some versions of skepticism that traces its 
origins back to the work of Democritus. Leaving aside more careful historical reconstruction 
we can turn to another passage which appears to support my suggestion that Epicurus’ theory 
of the criterion of truth is motivated by Democritean skepticism. In the following passage 
Plutarch delivers the following report: 
 
Colotes first charges him [Democritus] with assertin that no object is any more of one description than 
of another, and thus throwing our life into confusion. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1108F, transl. De Lacy) 
 
Colotes is one of the earliest Epicurus’ followers and as I explained in the introduction, there 
is no reason for not taking that Colotes claims were also Epicurus’ own views. So, for what is 
actually Colotes accusing Democritus for? The accusation is based on the version of ou 
mallon or ‘no more’ argument, well known in ancient times.28 This argument is found in the 
most cited Democritus’ fragment which is usually considered to be a central for understanding 
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of Democritus’ epistemological considerations. We find it in Sextus, which is the most 
relevant source for Democritus’ epistemology, where he reports Democritus saying the 
following: 
 
For from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and bitter to others, they say that Democritus 
deduces that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and for this reason utters the phrase ‘No more’, which is 
Sceptical. (SE PH I.213, transl. Annas and Barnes) 
 
Ou mallon argument in the quoted passage indicates that the thing in question is ‘no more’ 
sweet than bitter. That is, on the basis of the cases of conflicting appearances in which the 
same thing, a, appear to be both F and not-F, we say that a is ‘no more’ F than not-F. What is 
the consequence of such a claim? In the following passage O’Keefe explains it in the 
following way: 
 
The theme that is consistent throughout the various ou mallon arguments is the move from the 
observation that some property of an object differs relative to different observers, times, or conditions 
(a is F to me, but not-F to you, or F under certain circumstances, but not-F under others) to the 
conclusion either that the object does not, in itself, have that property, or that we cannot know whether 
the object has that property or not.29 
 
So according to O’Keefe there are two possible readings of ou mallon argument: (i) 
eliminative, according to which a is neither F nor not-F and (ii) that we cannot know whether 
a is F or not-F. However, to this we should add the third possible reading, relativistic, 
according to which a is both F and not-F, which was probably position of Protagoras as we 
find it in Platos’ Theaetetus.30 Sextus points out that Democritus’ position is usually 
associated with skepticism, against which Sextus clearly argues. Namely by the time Sextus 
writes ou mallon arguments became a part of regular skeptical weapon and they were 
probably used in this second sense, from which the Skeptics infer to the suspension of 
judgment.31 So Sextus emphasizes that Democritus’ position is distinct from skepticism since 
Democritus uses ou mallon in the first, eliminative sense, proposing by that elimination of 
phenomenal qualities. As Sextus reports, Democritus by saying that honey is no more sweet 
than bitter deduces that honey does not have any of the qualities in question and by that 
affirms dogmatist’s conclusion about the nature of honey, namely, that it is neither sweet nor 
bitter. 
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In another often cited passage Sextus presents Democritus’ position in the following 
way: 
 
For he says “By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by 
convention colour; in verity atoms and void.” […] In fact we know nothing firm, but what changes 
according to the condition of the body and of the things that enter it and come up against it. […] And 
again he says “It has been shown in many ways that in verity we do not understand what each thing is 
or is not like. (SE M VII.135-6, transl. Bett = DK B9, B125) 
 
We can say that from the quoted fragments it follows that Democritus thinks that the 
knowledge about the things in the world is limited to the extent that what we can know only 
the real nature of the things, namely their atomical structure. Phenomenal properties then 
appear to be just conventional constructs since they exist only within the relation between the 
observer and the atomical structure of the solid. What can be inferred than is the following 
conclusion about Democritean epistemology: given that the phenomenal properties are mere 
conventional constructs, there is no genuine knowledge about them, since knowledge is 
secured only for the real and intrinsic nature of the thing, and for Democritus it is knowledge 
of atoms and void. Given this skepticism cannot be associated with Democritus, at least not as 
a full blown rejection of any knowledge or as some other version of the argument that 
suggests total impossibility of knowledge.32 
 However, this only one possible reading of Democritus’ arguments. What follows 
from Democritus’ position is that the gap between the reality as it is reported by the sense on 
the one hand and the real nature of the things, that is, their atomic structure on the other, is 
now sharply differentiated. Phenomena are not genuine pieces of knowledge since they do not 
reveal truth, but just the contrary, they misrepresent the real nature of the things because of 
which what is in reality always remains beyond the scope of the reach of perception. But how 
did we loose the knowledge of atoms? Some passages strongly indicates that Democritus 
infers a total skepticism, for as Sextus reports, Democritus also claims that “However it will 
be clear that to know in verity what each thing is like is hopeless”. (SE M VII.137, transl. 
Bett) So, on what grounds is built this other interpretation according to which Democritus is a 
full blown skeptic? The fragment that supports this reading comes from Galen where he says 
that Democritus rejects all knowledge saying “Wretched mind, you get your evidence from 
us, and yet you overthrow us? The overthrow is a fall for you.” (Galen, On medical 
experience = DK B125, trans. Taylor) This suggests that Democritus is caught in the reductio, 
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since atomism being established upon sense-experience, falls together with the rejection of 
perception as unreliable.33 The reductio can be expressed in the following form: 
1. Knowledge is based on perception. 
2. Perception leads to the atomistic theory. 
3. The atomistic theory proves that perception does not reveal knowledge. 
4. All knowledge is impossible.  
In other words, atomist theory starts from the observation of the macroscopic objects and uses 
sense reports as a basis for the inference on the theoretical entities existing on the microscopic 
level. The theory, however, reveals that the true nature of things lies only on atomistic level, 
opening thus a gap between the appearances, which are claimed to be a mere conventional 
construction, and the objective reality explained in terms of different atomical configurations. 
But then, maintaining that the evidence from the senses is unreliable and proposing its 
abandonment cut off the very basis of the atomist theory and thus opens a possibility for a 
total skepticism in which not only phenomenal knowledge is rejected, but atomism as well. 
 In the end we are left with two different interpretations of Democritus, the 
former takes him to be a skeptic only in regards of phenomenal properties and the later 
presents him as a skeptic in regards of all knowledge. What can we infer from this that is 
relevant for development of Epicurean problem of the criterion of truth? Well, if we go back 
to Colotes’ quotation it becomes clear that Epicureans infer some serious skeptical 
conclusions from Democritus’ epistemology. Also some other sources indicate that 
philosophers after Democritus pushed further the epistemological consequences of his 
atomism and thereby they “watered the seeds of skepticism which they found sprouting in his 
epistemological nursery”34. The one who comes closest to this position is Metrodorus, who 
accept the utmost consequence of the unreliability of perceptions and reject knowledge saying 
that “None of us knows anything not even whether we know or do not know this very thing”. 
(Eus. PE XIV.19.8 = DK 70B1, transl. Brunschwig)  
The point I want to make is the following. The hypothesis I am suggesting is more 
cautious and neutral on the interpretation of Democritus’ epistemology as either skeptical or 
not. In either case there is a reason to say that Democritus is aware of the problems that his 
epistemology faces and he puts them on the agenda. He questions and opens serious doubts in 
the possibility of knowledge about secondary qualities and the phenomenal world. This 
follows from the central epistemological problem Democritus puts forward according to 
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which there is a strong discrepancy between the world of experience and the world explained 
by atomistic theory, since only the latter reveals the real nature of the world. What opens the 
gap between the sensory experience of the world and the world itself is the conflict within our 
perceptual reports, expressed in the form of ou mallon argument which strongly suggests that 
the sense reports are not reliable. And it is important to notice that for our purposes it is 
completely irrelevant whether Democritus himself in the end adopts total skepticism or not, 
but the main point is that he notices this gap and leaves the possibility for drawing skeptical 
conclusions wide open, which was probably done by some of his later followers. The more 
important problem, to which Epicureans concentrate, was that abandoning perception makes 
the epistemology in Democritus’ terms deeply problematic because of the unwanted 
consequences fatal for both phenomenal knowledge and for the atomistic theory.35 So no 
matter what Democritus’ views about the possibility of knowledge actually were, the 
possibility of losing knowledge was one very possible threat.  
So, my point is that the most fatal consequence to which Epicurus reacts in my opinion 
is that the total rejection of perception is fatal for atomism. This than has further 
consequences observed by Colotes, and similarly reported by Lucretius who says the 
following: 
 
For not only would all reasoning come to ruin, but life itself would at once collapse, unless you make 
bold to believe the senses, avoiding precipices and all else that must be eschewed of that sort, and 
following what is contrary. (Lucretius, DRN IV.507-512) 
 
So the rejection of perceptions according to Lucretius leads to the practical impossibility of 
life, since without perception it is impossible to form any other belief and basis for humans to 
act. This means that in order to perform any basic action, such as avoiding precipices, it is 
necessary to have beliefs that guide one’s action, namely beliefs that there is a precipice in 
front of me and that not avoiding precipices is dangerous. But one of the most natural ways to 
form the belief that there is a precipice in front of me is to see it since seeing gives us the 
primary evidence that there is a precipice.36 Therefore, abandoning perceptions leads to the 
impossibility of making belief which finally ends up with the inability to act.  
 Another similar report of comes from Diogenes of Oenoanda, a later Epicurean known 
as extremely faithful to Epicurus’ original doctrines, who reports Democritus’ position 
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similarly to both Colotes and Lucretius, but also states the unwonted implication of 
Democritus’ position. Diogenes writes the following: 
 
Democritus made an error unworthy of himself in saying that only the atoms that the only the atoms 
exist in reality, and everything else by convention. According to your theory, Democritus, we shall be 
unable, not merely to find out the truth, but even to live, avoiding neither fire nor murder. (Diogenes 
of Oenoanda, fr. 7, transl. Smith)37 
 
So what appears from the reports of the Epicureans is that they consider Democritus to claim 
that knowledge is possible only of atoms and void, which means that they do not regard him 
as obliged to the thesis about a total impossibility of knowledge. However, they take it that he 
infers to unreliability of perception, probably from their relativity and conflicts within 
perceptions, and exactly by that he faces skeptical difficulties: by perceptions we infer to 
atomism, so if atomism denies perception, there is no starting point from which inference 
about reality can proceed. What the Epicureans actually realize is that perception and 
atomism, to say it colloquially, ‘together stand and divided they fall’. I take it that this is the 
reason why Epicurus starts to seek a firm starting point for knowledge, that is, he seeks the 
criterion of truth in order to defend atomism, but more importantly to defend his moral theory.  
 As it is reported by Diogenes Laertius, the principal epistemological work of 
Epicurus in which he discusses the problem of the criterion of truth, is entitled The Canon 
(DL X.31) and it is probably one of the first works in which the notion of criterion is 
developed and used as a technical epistemological term. Therefore, the branch of philosophy 
in Epicurus that deals with the problem of the criterion of truth and other epistemological 
issues is called Canonica. Previous Sextus’ discussion introduces the instrument metaphor in 
order to illustrate one of the senses in which the term ‘criterion’ is used, namely as a tool, 
such as scales for discrimination of heavy and light things. The metaphor thus implies that 
regarding truth and falsity the criterion is supposed to be some kind of cognitive tool for the 
discrimination of beliefs. Exactly this metaphor lies at the core of Epicurus’ understanding of 
the term ‘criterion’ and the function it has within the problem of securing true beliefs about 
reality and knowledge of it. There is, however, an ambiguity over proper sense in which 
Epicurus is using the term ‘kriterion’.  
The term ‘kanon’ literally means carpenter’s straightedge or yardstick, namely an 
instrument used for ascertaining straightness and Epicurus uses the term ‘kanon’ in that case 
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synonymously with the term ‘criterion’.38 By this Epicurus strongly suggests that the criterion 
of truth should be understood in accordance with the instrument analogy, namely as an 
instrument for determining the truthfulness of our beliefs. That instrument for Epicurus are 
the senses, and as we shall see later, also the mind.39 Striker takes this to be one of the senses 
in which Epicurus understands the term ‘criterion’, namely the one that literally goes along 
with the instrument or ‘kanon’ analogy and labeling them as “means of judgment”40. In other 
words, an analogy is drawn on one side between a straightedge and the sense organ and on the 
other between the straightness and the truth. For this sense of the term ‘criterion’ as a 
cognitive faculty, Striker says that it is the most prevailing, but philosophically not so 
interesting.41 To put it differently, in this sense the term ‘criterion’ keeps the strict connection 
with the instrument metaphor, since the sense organ itself literally plays the role of an 
instrument or a tool, and the functioning of the organ is to be understood as application of a 
straightedge in the act of measuring. However, this is not the only possible sense in which 
Epicurus understands the notion ‘criterion’, since he speaks about the perceptions and more 
importantly preconceptions as well.  
In this other sense, the notion of criterion is applied to perceptions and preconceptions 
in which they are not understood as the cognitive faculty. In other words, this second usage of 
the notion ‘criterion’ is more abstract, since it seems that Epicurus is turning away form the 
functioning organ as means of discovering truth to the content of perceptions and 
preconceptions. We can understand this as moving away from the literal instrument metaphor 
in which we have an understanding of the criterion in the sense of cognitive faculty to the 
understanding of the criterion as the faculty of judgment. Namely, if we take it that the 
criterion of truth is perception than we are not speaking strictly about the instrument 
metaphor, since with the content of perception we cannot draw a precise analogy to an 
instrument as it is possible if a sense organ is the criterion. In this case what is emphasized is 
that the criterion serves as the grounds for making judgments. This is in accordance with 
usual reports that ascribe to Epicurus the following criteria. Diogenes reports that Epicurus in 
The Canon lists three criteria of truth: sense perceptions (aistheseis), preconceptions 
(prolepseis) and feelings (pathe), and his followers later added a fourth to this list, application 
or focusing of mind (phantastike epibole tes dianoias). Diogenes’ report is parallel to another 
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important sources, namely Cicero’s Academica, where we find that Epicurus is “limiting the 
criteria to the senses, our conceptions of things, and pleasure” (Luc. 142) and Philodemus’ 
report in De Signis where he states that the things called criteria are “perceptions, 
preconceptions, mental perceptions and feelings”. (De sign, fr. 1) 
Obviously Epicurus was not very careful with this distinction. Anyhow, is not wrong 
to say that the Epicurean epistemology in general, or canonic is the quest for cognitive tools 
by which we can measure truth and falsehood, that is, he is concerned with the establishing of 
a prerequisite for ascertaining the truth. Also it is evident that he allocates the special role in 
this process to perceptions. The reason, as I argued is the threat of Democritean skepticism. 
Epicurus obviously wants to defend the idea, indebted also in Democritean epistemology, that 
perceptions are considered to be a candidate for a criterion because of their specific nature 
which enables them to “provide evidence on the basis of which we judge (krinomen) what is 
true and what false, just as the evidence of witness in a court is used by the judge to determine 
the truth of the matter in dispute”.42 In other words, this ‘forensic analogy’, as Taylor calls it, 
suggests that perceptions can be taken as criteria of truth only if they are sort of things that 
reliably witness objects in the world or in other words, if they are themselves reporting truth.  
The evidential character of perceptions is very close to a commonsense explanation of 
how we get to know the truth about reality. The first plausible answer, not yet entangled in 
serious epistemological debate on the problem of knowledge, would primarily suggest that 
our natural cognitive faculties, such as perception, are the reliable and primary sources that 
provide us with information about reality. And although learning bits of epistemology and 
facing skeptical arguments, such as conflicting appearances might weaken our initial 
inclination to trust the report of the senses, philosophers who continue to defend the 
commonsense explanation of how knowledge of the external world is attained are not so rare 
in the history of philosophy.43 It seems that Epicurus stands at the beginning of that tradition. 
The qualification I want to emphasize is that I will refer to the common sense as referring to 
somewhat naïve reliance on the reliability of the senses common to all human beings and 
assume that perceptions truly and directly report properties of objects in the world and thus 
can be taken as a firm foundation for knowledge. Given this, the position from which 
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the senses are the first and primary tools we use to discover the true nature of the things in the 
world. However, what he has to prove is his claim that all perceptions are infallible. The 
defense of this thesis, I will argue in what follows, is motivated by Democritean skepticism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. EPICUREAN CRITERIA: PERCEPTION 
 
Generally speaking, the account of perception as the criterion of truth can be 
summarized as interpretation of Epicurus’ central epistemological thesis that all perceptions 
are true. This task might seem doomed to failure since the cases of false perception, such as 
illusions, hallucinations, are more than obvious not only to an epistemologist. However, I 
believe that this was obvious to Epicurus as well, which in the end confronts us with a 
dilemma: we can either proclaim his epistemology as one big farce, as many ancient 
philosophers did, and dismiss him as a serious philosopher, or we can take it as a challenging 
and interesting puzzle and try to understand Epicurus’ argument for the thesis. In my opinion, 
although the thesis is controversial and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main 
sources shows us that Epicurus’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but 
supported with some serious arguments.  
 I will try to show that the arguments for the thesis divide into lines of arguments that 
can be analyzed separately. On the one side, we can find arguments that support the thesis of 
the incorrigibility of perceptions in the fashion of the commonsensical line of thought already 
indicated in the previous chapter. Namely, this line of argumentation further explain 
Epicurus’ motivation for taking perceptions as a secure foundation of our knowledge that 
leads him to the formulation of the thesis. What makes these arguments different from the 
other group is the fact that they can be understood as ‘a priori’ arguments for the claim that all 
perceptions are true, where ‘a priori’ means that they are developed independently of the 
atomistic theory. The other line of argumentation relies on atomism and further explains and 
justifies the thesis. My aim is to show that these two lines are separate, and that in order to 
establish the thesis and justify it, Epicurus is motivated by reasons independent of the 
atomistic theory. However, the real justification of the perceptual incorrigibility will be 
explained through the atomistic theory of perception, since his final aim is to shoe that 
phenomenal knowledge and atomism are compatible. Thus in the other line of arguments I 
will explore three things: first, the mechanism of perception, second the content of perception 
is, and finally I will offer an account of what Epicurus’ understanding of truth is. Therefore, I 
will claim that while the reasons motivating Epicurus to establish and justify the thesis that all 
perceptions are true are independent of the atomistoc theory, the establishing of the thesis 
itself than is aimed to prove the atomism and to get further support by the atomistic theory.  
 A similar version of the development of the central Epicurean epistemological thesis 
can be found in Striker and Asmis. Striker clearly explains that there are two possibilities of 
the way Epicurus reached the thesis, namely “either through analysis of perception, which 
convinced him that all sense impressions are true […] or his initial arguments for the thesis 
were independent and the analysis was developed later to defend the thesis against obvious 
objection”44 We shall see later to what degree these two lines of arguments are independent; 
so far it is enough to address the central idea of Striker’s interpretation. In Asmis’ work, this 
idea of separating two groups of arguments underlies her reconstruction of Epicurean 
epistemology as a specific scientific methodology that guides our quest for truth. She claims 
that we have to differentiate between the pre-theoretical methodological principles and their 
posterior justification, emphasizing that it is important to keep the two lines of argument 
separate since “the initial rules are stipulative; and although they may be cleared up by 
explanation, they must be applicable without the benefit of theory“.45 My argumentation will 
mostly follow and rely on Striker’s and Asmis’ main ideas in order to show that these 
arguments are separate and independent of atomistic theory. I will try to show that this is 
important because of the following.  
 Epicurus by accepting the thesis, according to which perceptions are taken to be the 
incorrigible foundation of our knowledge, commits himself to an extremely radical version of 
empiricism. This implies two important things. First, the claim for providing incorrigible 
foundation for knowledge reflects Epicurus concern with the threat of Democritean 
skepticism. As I previously argued the problem of the criterion of truth occurs in the 
Epicurean philosophy as a reaction to previous skeptical inclinations and the arguments that 
proceeds from the various cases in which from the relativity of phenomena their unreliability 
was inferred. I believe that this skeptical challenge posed by Democritus has important 
motivational force for the thesis about truthfulness of all perceptions before the atomistic 
theory is revealed, simply because we need to secure the absolute reliability of perceptions, 
that is, to establish them as a firm starting point from which other truths, i.e. atomism, can be 
inferred. Second, in the second stage then Epicurus’ strong epistemological empiricism 
manifested in the thesis that all perceptions are true is combined with and further defended 
through atomistic theory, according to which the knowledge of the real structure of the world 
is not within the scope of our experience. By putting these seemingly irreconcilable theses 
together, Epicurus meets the tension introduced by Democritus. But unlike Democritus 
Epicurus wants to ensure the possibility of empirical knowledge which is in accord with naïve 
realism. At the same time he also endorses the atomistic theory, which claims that the world’s 
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ultimate structure consists of atoms and void. The fatal consequence by which knowledge of 
the world based on the atomistic theory diverges from empiricism and even defeat it in 
Epicurus view, I will argue, is supposed to be solved by the acceptance of the truthfulness of 
all perceptions. I will try to argue for this through the separation of two lines of arguments for 
perception as the criterion of truth. The reason for this I find in the specific function Epicurus 
allocates to perception, namely to serve as the sign for inferences of what is unobserved, such 
as atoms and void.46 Given this, the crucial part of Epicurus’ epistemology is that the defense 
of the atomistic theory lies on the acceptance of truthfulness of all perception. In my opinion 
this strongly suggests that the arguments for reliability of perception have to be established 
previously to atomistic theory, implying that the justification of perceptual incorrigibility 
based on atomistic theory will be developed independently. In this way, the epistemological 
theory in whole avoids another problem, namely the objection of circularity according to 
which the atomistic theory is justified through the thesis of perceptual ineffability and vice 
versa. 
 Therefore, I propose that we need to separate these two lines of arguments because by 
doing so we are able first, to relate Epicurean epistemology to skepticism as an originator of 
the problem of criterion of truth; second, it will help us to solve the tension problem between 
empiricism and the atomistic theory; and finally, the separation of the two lines of argument 
helps us to avoid the objection form circularity. In what follows my aim is to give textual 
support for the first line of arguments that reflects Epicurus’ motivation for taking perceptions 
to be the first and the most important criterion. As I already indicated in the introductory part, 
my attempt is to emphasize that here Epicurus is driven by a Democritean skepticism but also 
by a commonsense understanding of the role perception have in acquiring knowledge about 
the world – we rely on the fact that perception tell us what the world is like. Since I will try to 
show that these arguments are independent from atomistic theory of perception, I propose to 
call them ‘a priori’ motivational arguments.  
  
2.1. ‘A priori’ arguments for the thesis ‘all perceptions are true’ 
 
Tradition before Epicurus recognizes two main sources for knowledge about the 
world: sense perception and reason. Epicurus puts himself on the side of empiricist, insisting 
that all knowledge must proceed from sense experience, since perceptions provide primal 
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cognitive contact with the external world. The thesis about perceptual incorrigibility becomes 
the cornerstone of his epistemology. The crucial question concerns the problem of the way 
Epicurus develop his central thesis. We may begin the analysis of his position with the 
following argument, usually taken by scholars47 to be the major argument to indicate the 
supremacy of perception: 
 
If you fight against all of your perceptions (aisthesein) you will not have a standard against which to 
refer even those judgments which youpronounce false. (KD XXIII, transl. Hicks) 
 
 This quote, although very short and concise, summarizes in fact the core idea of 
Epicurean epistemology based on sense-perception as the criterion of truth, but more 
importantly, it also guides us towards specific arguments that reveals why Epicurus adopts 
very specific epistemological position. The quote undoubtly show that Epicurus firmly takes 
sense perceptions to be the origin of any judging and discrimination between truth and 
falsehood and also indirectly implies that we have to take all of them as true. However, our 
main task is here to explain the reasons Epicurus has for the claim that the perception are the 
criterion of truth and furthermore, why he takes all of them to be true.  
The second part of the quoted sentence indicates the possible answers to the posed 
questions. Epicurus straightforwardly asserts that unless we take all perceptions to be true, we 
are left without the possibility of judging or of distinguishing truth from falsehood. In other 
words, knowledge is not possible unless all perceptions are true. The versions of this 
argument we find in several other sources, predominantly in the work of Cicero who in 
several different places reports that according to Epicurus unless all perceptions are true, 
knowledge is not attainable.48 It follows from this quite obviously that Epicurus’ aim is to 
show that there is an ultimate and exclusive connection between perceptions and knowledge, 
such as that falsity of perceptions threatens the possibility of knowledge. The reason for 
taking this to be the fundamental epistemological aim as I argued lies in Epicurus’ main 
concern which is to secure the possibility of knowledge. The way he sees this epistemological 
project is by providing us with the standard or the criterion by which we can firmly determine 
the truth necessary for acquiring knowledge of reality. Therefore, what underlies Epicurus’ 
consideration is the problem of the criterion of truth in general initiated by the skeptical 
inclinations. Namely, if we do not have the criterion of truth, there is no knowledge of the 
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external world, because we are left without the possibility of distinguishing truth from 
falsehood.  
Although some scholars question this idea49, I argued that Epicurus’ is aware of the 
skeptical threat and that he sees the solution to the problem in taking sense-perceptions to be 
the criterion of truth. The skeptical challenge indicated by the Democriteans relies on the 
strong discrepancy between the world of experience and the world explained by atomistic 
theory which consequence is that the latter refure the former. Now we see that Epicurus 
proposes a specific epistemological framework in which he maintains that the possibility of 
any knowledge is guaranteed exclusively on the assumption of the incorrigibility of all 
perceptions, since otherwise, knowledge is impossible and skepticism wins. So we see that 
Epicurus’ method by which he attempts to close the gap starts first from proving the 
incorrigibility of perceptions as the foundations of all knowledge. So finally, the reply to 
Everson, who is not convinced that Epicurus is motivated by skepticism, might be this. The 
version of skepticism Epicurus is confronted with is the one that is directed primarily to 
denying the possibility of the objective knowledge of phenomenal properties. It is inspired by 
the relativity of perception which implies that the reports of the senses do not discover the 
true nature of things and from this follows the conclusion that the true and objective nature of 
things stays out of our epistemological grasp. To put it differently, falsity of perception means 
that they do not discover the real nature of the things and therefore must be abandoned as a 
secure guide towards the truth. In its final consequence, this leads to another fatal implication 
for atomism as a theory that secures us with knowledge of reality, because the unreliability of 
perceptions undercuts the foundation of atomism itself. Therefore, Epicurus’ first aim is to 
prove that the knowledge of phenomenal properties is possible. 
So far it becomes clear that Epicurus does not establish the thesis about perceptual 
incorrigibility straightforwardly. Scholars agree that the form of argumentation for the thesis 
that all perceptions are true is not straightforward since Epicurus establishes it by showing 
that other possible options we might hold concerning the truthfulness of perception are just 
false.50 In other words, as Long and Sedley51 put it, it seems that Epicurus’ strategy is to show 
that (a) skepticism, according to which all perceptions are false, and (b) the thesis that some 
perceptions are false and some true, cannot hold. Therefore rejection of those two options 
leaves only one remaining option, namely, (c) that all perceptions are true. I agree with Long 
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and Sedley that Epicurus’ reply to the skeptic is grounded in examinations of these 
possibilities, starting first with the global rejection of perceptions in KD XXIII, and second in 
KD XXIV considering the option that some perceptions are true and some false.  However, I 
find that there are two questionable points with the next steps in Long and Sedley’s 
reconstruction. First, is their interpretation of Epicurus’ reply to skepticism based on self-
refutation argument one that Epicurus most probably has in mind? Or to put it in a more broad 
perspective is self-refutation argument necessary for establishing the thesis about perceptual 
incorrigibility as it is argued by Long and Sedley? And second, does this strategy according to 
which Epicurus establishes the thesis that all perceptions are true by elimination of other two 
possible options truly reflect Epicurean motivation with this issue?  
Long and Sedley’s interpretation of Epicurus’ strategy against skepticism formulated 
in that particular way relies on the evidence of the following passage of Lucretius: 
 
Moreover, if anyone thinks that nothing can be known, he does not even know whether that can be 
known, since he declares that he knows nothing. I will therefore spare the plead cause against a man 
who has placed his head in his own footsteps. And yet even if I grant that he knows that, still I will ask 
just this: since material things had no truth for his vision to begin with, how he knows what it is to 
know or not to know as the case may be, what gave him the concept of true and false, what evidence 
proved that the doubtful differs from certain. (Lucretius, DRN IV.469-77, transl. LS 16A)  
 
Scholars agree that this passage offers two arguments against the skeptic. The first two 
sentences contain the first argument according to which skepticism is a self-refuting position. 
The rest of the passage gives the second argument which refutes skepticism as conceptually 
indefensible by showing that the skeptic’s use of the concepts of truth and falsehood is 
illegitimate. However, scholars disagree about the target of Lucretius’ argument, specifically 
whether Lucretius is presenting the original version of skepticism confronted by Epicurus or a 
version developed subsequently, current in Lucretius’ own time.52 The problematic part of 
Lucretius text that opens the debate whether Lucretius is closely following Epicurus or giving 
arguments of later Epicureans is the one that put forward the self-refutation argument or 
peritrope53, that became a famous and standard tool against relativism and skepticism in 
ancient epistemology. However, in Epicurus’ saved writings the self-refutation argument is 
not used against skepticism. This problem seems to be relevant for our present purposes since 
we are dealing with Epicurus’ motivation for his thesis that all perceptions are true, and the 
crucial element for establishing the thesis is refutation of skepticism, i.e. the claim that all 
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perceptions are false. So the first task is to explain whether Lucretius’ version of skepticism, 
as Long and Sedley understands it, indeed reflects Epicurus’ own understanding of the issue 
and second is to do the same comparison for the versions of refutation of skepticism in 
Lucretius and Epicurus.  
 Let us examine Lucretius’ arguments more closely to see if there is enough evidence 
for taking Lucretius’ version of skepticism to be the same Epicurus has in mind. His overall 
anti-skeptical arguments as reconstructed by Sedley have the following structure54: 
 
S1 A self refutation argument: the sceptic’s thesis undermines his own commitment to it, in 
that he cannot claim to know whether it is true (469-72). 
S2(a) An argument questioning the sceptic’s access to the conceptions needed to make his 
case coherently. By denying himself cognitive access to conceptual distinctions like 
‘true/false’ (notitiam very . . . falisque, 476) and ‘certain/uncertain’, the sceptic cannot claim 
to grasp the dependent notion of knowledge either; or, therefore, to understand the terms in 
which he formulates his own skepticism (473-7). 
S2(b) The conception of ‘true’ in fact comes from the senses, which must themselves be 
irrefutable (478-99). 
S3 A pragmatic argument: skepticism is unlivable in practice (500-21). 
 
 So let us start with the first task which is to examine whether this version of 
skepticism as presented by Lucretius can be related with the one developed and known in 
Epicurus’ time. As Sedley claims, usually two versions of skepticism are recognized as 
possible in Lucretius’ exposition, which he calls reflexive and non-reflexive skepticism.55 The 
first, reflexive one, is identified as ‘Socratic’ skepticism and probably ascribed to Socrates by 
Arcesilaus56, according to which “one claims to know that one knows nothing”, while the 
second is usually associated with Metrodorus’ version in which it is argued that “we literally 
know nothing”. The reflexive version of skepticism also resembles later Pyrrho’s radical 
version of skepticism, which denies any access to truth and falsehood, since everything is 
indeterminable and unknowable. After all, evidences imply that Epicurus is familiar and 
particularly interested in Pyrrho’s position (IX.64). So there are at least three possible 
versions of skepticism, ‘Socratic’, Metrodoran and Pyrrhos’, against which Lucretius is 
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arguing. Which of those versions, if any, then reflects Epicurus’ understanding of the 
skeptical challenge? 
In regards of the first skeptical version, namely ‘Socratic’ skepticism, the following 
reasons raises doubts for associating it with Epicurus. Namely, if it was formulated by 
Arcesilaus, as Long argues, then that version is clearly postdating Epicurus’ writings which 
are Lucretius’ source for the development of the self-refutation argument. Given this dating 
issue, it seems that ‘Socratic’ skepticism is not the target of Lucretius’ self-refutation 
argument. Concerning Metrodoran skepticism, Bailey57 and Burnyeat58 claim that the person 
Lucretius has in mind as the target of Epicurus’ attack is Metrodorus, because of the opening 
line of his book On Nature, where he says that “we know nothing, nor do we even know just 
this, that we know nothing”, as reported by Sextus59. But Sedley questions this proposal by 
offering a different reading of Metrodorus based on Cicero’s report from Academica, 
according to which Metrodorus said “I say that we do not know whether we know anything or 
not . . .” (II.73, transl. Sedley), from which Sedley concludes that this version “does not even 
appear to be fully skeptical, let alone vulnerable to the self-refutation argument”60. Therefore, 
the self-refutation argument obviously would not work here, and hence, Metrodoran version is 
rejected as skepticism against Lucretius counters. Finally, regarding Pyrrho’s version, Sedley 
and Vander Waerdt agree on not taking Pyrrho to be a probable skeptical target, since 
Epicurus does not recognize him to be a skeptic in the first place. Vander Waerdt on this says 
the following: 
 
It is striking that no Epicurean texts ever refers to Pyrrho as a skeptic. Epicurus plainly admires his 
way of life and his tranquility (his apragmosyne, D.L. 9.62-60; cf. frr.551, 555 Us), but may not have 
attributed this to skepticism. It was Timon, after all, who established the tradition that Pyrrho was a 
skeptic, and his tradition did not win out entirely in antiquity, for Cicero knows of Pyrrho only as a 
moralist who, like Ariston of Chios, admits no distinctions of value between virtue and vice.61   
 
Therefore, Sedley and Vander Waerdt claim that there is not enough evidence that the 
skepticism Epicurus and Lucretius countered against is Pyrrho’s. Following this 
argumentation, it seems that all three possible versions of skepticism, ‘Socratic’ advocated by 
Arcesilaus, Metrodoran and Pyrrho’s are not the one that could be connected with Epicurus’ 
skepticism. So what kind of skepticism is in question after all? And finally, does Lucretius’ 
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argumentation then reflects the skeptical debate developed by later Epicureans or still we can 
provide evidence that it is directly derived form Epicurus’ own writings?62 
 In answering the first question, I agree with Sedley that the version of Lucretius’ 
skepticism cannot be associated with one particular person, and more importantly need not to 
be. Lucretius understanding of skepticism, as Sedley writes, assumes very generally “that the 
skeptic has not stated any position on whether he does or does not know the truth of his 
skeptical claim”63. And exactly this kind of skepticism, as “the simple unrefined denial that 
anything is known”64 reflects Epicurus’ own understanding of the challenge posed by the 
skeptical challenge that proceeds from Democritean epistemology. And as we are told from 
other already mentioned sources it is true that the atomists after Democritus, namely 
Metrodorus, Anaxarcus and Nausiphanes, actually drew some serious skeptical conclusions 
from the cases of the conflict in our appearances. They probably adopted some version of 
reductionism65 claiming that sensible properties do not really exist in reality but have to be 
reduced to specific atomic configurations, the knowledge of the world thus becomes limited 
only to its basic constituents, atoms and void and by that developed the implications of 
Democritean challenge in their own way. However, it is more than plausible that Epicurus 
interpret his own version of skepticism that follows from Democritean epistemology and 
argues against it. Therefore, we can conclude, following Sedley that Epicurus’ debate reflects 
his own understanding of Democritean skepticism in general, however without any explicit 
reference to someone in particular. And exactly that debate is presented in Lucretius’ very 
general version of skepticism.  
But when it come to the second question regarding a precise origin of Lucretius’ self-
refutation argument another problem reveals, namely the lack of textual support for the use of 
the self-refutation argument against skepticism in Epicurus’ own writings. Possible solution 
for this worry, given by Burnyeat and Sedley, proposed to rely on a similarity between the 
self-refutation argument given by Lucretius against the skeptic and self-refutation argument 
used by Epicurus against determinist in On Nature. Given this, they claim that Lucretius is 
even in the refutation of skepticism strictly following Epicurus. Burnyeat assumes that there is 
enough support for the connection of Lucretius’ arguments against skepticism with Epicurus 
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original position, first because the arguments in DRN IV.469-521 follow Diogenes’ reports of 
the summary of Epicurean epistemology in passages DL X.31-32. However neither in the 
passages of Diogenes, nor in any other text on Epicurus’ epistemology, is there any evidence 
that Epicurus uses the particular self-refutation or peritrope argument strictly against 
skepticism. Nevertheless, Burnyeat offers a second solution which lies in showing that there is 
an analogy with the self-refutation argument Epicurus evidently uses against determinism. He 
clarifies the solution in the following way: 
 
How, then, would Epicurus have expressed the idea of self-refutation? By the verb perikato trepesthai, 
which means precisely to turn oneself around and upside-down. Lucretius has simply spelled out the 
meaning of Epicurus’ expression in a line-long image. 66  
 
The verb perikato trepein, Burnyeat continues, is found in Epicurus’ book On Nature where 
Epicurus shows that determinism is a self-refuting position.67 Burnyeat concludes that the fact 
that self-refutation is part of Epicurean vocabulary serves as the evidence that “Lucretius has 
simply spelled out the meaning of Epicurus’ expression in a line-long image”. However, still 
it is unclear how this can be connected with the use of this argument precisely against the 
skeptic in Epicurus’ own writings. Burnyeat’s solution seems to offer a good explanation of 
how Lucretius himself, and not Epicurus, develops an anti-skeptical argument based on an 
analogy with Epicurus’ own refutation of determinism. However, still there remains a 
plausible assumption that the argument was used by Epicurus in some unsurvived parts of his 
work On Nature.  
 Sedley’s position actually claims that the only source Lucretius had is Epicurus’ work 
On Nature. Moreover he strongly claims that Lucretius was completely ignoring 
philosophical debate of his time labeling him as an Epicurean fundamentalist, who was 
completely and exclusively focused on writings of Epicurus’ himself and three other 
important figures of Epicureanism, Metrodorus, Hemarchus and Polyaenus, known as ‘the 
Great Men’.68 Here he is relying on one important methodological characteristic of “the 
conventions of philosophical argumentation in antiquity, which generally did not allow the 
imputation of authority to anyone but the founder of one’s school and his acknowledged 
authorities”69. Another point that Sedley makes is that the self-refutation argument becomes 
useless once the reflexivity problem, that is the problem whether skeptic claims to know that 
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he knows nothing, was opened, and actually was not used as a part of anti-skeptical strategy 
against Academic skeptics at the time when Lucretius wrote his book.70 Sedley concludes his 
explanation saying that “there is therefore excellent reason to see Lucretius’ anti-skeptical 
argument as one dating back to Epicurus, rather than as reflecting the debates of his own 
time”.71 In short, the arguments for ascribing to Epicurus invention of the self-refutation 
argument against skepticims are based first, on a philological and structural analogy between 
Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ peritrope arguments, and second on the Sedley’s claim that 
Lucretius’ specific source is Epicurus’ On Nature where he actually develops peritrope 
argument against determinism.  
 However, the worry that remains is that we do not find in Epicurus’ own writings self-
refutation argument to challenge skepticism or any interest in detailed elaboration against 
skepticism, and additionally not any other ancient source besides Lucretius ascribe it 
Epicurus. This doubt raises Vander Waerdt saying the following: 
 
The parallels between DRN 4.469-521 and On Nature are not, in my opinion, close enough to sustain 
the claim that the refutation of the skeptic exactly parallels that of the ethical determinist; and we 
should not attribute to Epciurus himself an elaborate critique of skepticism merely on account of a 
verbal parallel that could just as well be explained in other ways. For instance, Lucretius’ image could 
be based on the anti-skeptical arguments of one of Epicurus’ followers, or it could be represent his 
own application of Epicurus’ argument in On Nature to the case of the skeptic. In either case, there is 
no necessity to attribute Lucretius’ entire argument at 469-521 to Epicurus himself. In fact, this 
argument may include attacks on varieties of skepticism not developed until Epicurus’ death.72  
 
In the quoted paragraph, the last sentence again invokes the problem of Lucretius’ 
target. At first, it may seem that it is inconsistent with Sedley’s view that Lucretius follows 
Epicurus in countering against very general version of atomic skepticism I endorse 
previously. But in fact, Vander Waerdt simply offers a broader explanation claiming that 
Lucretius’ argument is aimed at different varieties of skepticism. This interpretation does not 
exclude Sedley’s claim that Lucretius follows Epicurus, but just leaves open a very plausible 
reading that from Lucretius’ very general discourse it is legitimate to infer that he also has in 
mind other versions of skepticism that exceeds and postdates Epicurus’ original interest.  
On the other hand, so far it becomes more than obvious that Epicurus needs to refute 
the skeptic in order to establish his thesis that all perceptions are true, and moreover that his 
epistemology is motivated with the skeptical challenge. But if we deny the ownership of the 
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self-refutation argument to Epicurus, two questions remain. The first is the historical one, 
concerning the original author of the argument, and the second about an alternative 
explanation of Epicurus’ answer to the challenge of skepticism? The answer to the historical 
question I shall leave aside, since it is not of a crucial importance for my purposes.73 I can just 
add that it is very probable that the author of peritrope argument is Epicurus, as Burnyeat and 
Sedley argue, but nevertheless it is also possible that Lucretius mistakenly associate it with 
the present discussion about skepticism. But leaving aside these speculations, I will try to 
provide the answer why I think Epicurus does not actually use self-refutation for skepticism at 
this point.  
One possible answer is given by Vander Waredt who simply claims that Epicurus does 
not need self-refutation argument in order to establish the thesis about perceptual infallibility, 
because atomist skepticism does not call for such an argument. Instead, as Vander Waerdt 
explains, “Epicurus is able to disarm atomist skepticism simply by revising the theory of 
perception”.74 I partially agree with Vander Waerdt, but I think that Epicurus aim is o 
establish the thesis about incorrigibility if perception prior to the atomistic theory and any 
revisions in the theory of perception. As I emphasized previously atomism is established on 
perceptual knowledge, and therefore it is necessary to ascertain in advance perception as a 
secure criterion of truth in order to save not only phenomenal knowledge, but knowledge of 
atoms and void.  
From what have been said so far, it follows that Epicurus’ aim to secure the possibility 
of knowledge is formulated as a reaction primarily to the problem of the unreliability of 
perception and the consequences of that position, such as epistemological skepticism that 
undermines atomism as well. And exactly this is Epicurus’ central epistemological worry, 
namely the arguments such as ou mallon and the argument from conflicting appearances, such 
as those discussed by Democritus.75 The argument tells us that the conflict in appearances 
suggests that we should be suspicious about perceptions, since we cannot be sure which of 
them are true and which are not. To use a more technical vocabulary of the Hellenistic 
epistemology, we do not have a secure standard or a criterion to decide between them and 
ascertain the truth. In the next step, the relativity of perception might be further pushed to a 
full blown skepticism, as in the case some atomists, who infer from the conflict between our 
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appearances that the senses are fallible and consequently that knowledge about phenomenal 
properties is impossible.  
Given this, it seems that the anti-skeptical strategy must start with the adequate 
solution for the cases that imply the unreliability of sense perceptions and that means that he 
has to block the argument from conflicting appearances. Because otherwise, the possibility to 
end up in skepticism and without any knowledge remains wide open. Additionally, in order to 
prove and defend atomistic theory Epicurus definitely needs to have a secure foundation and 
starting point and that can only be reliable and trustworthy sense perception. Therefore, he 
sees the solution to this problem in the adoption of a rather controversial claim that all 
perceptions must be true, or otherwise no knowledge is possible.76 For Epicurus it seems to be 
a case of a clear ‘all or nothing’ dilemma: either all perceptions are true, or nothing is possible 
to know. What I propose is that the reconstruction of Epicurus’ anti-skeptical arguments 
should not be based on Lucretius’ report, but on Epicurus’ own texts from Kuriai Doxai 
XXIII and XXIV, for which I take, strongly reflects Epicurus’ anti-skeptical motivation. 
Taking this as a starting assumption, his anti-skeptical strategy may be reconstructed in the 
following way. 
In the reconstruction of Epicurus’ strategy I will rely on Everson’s understanding of 
Epicurus’ argument for the incorrigibility of perception. Although Everson argues against the 
idea that overall Epicurus’ epistemology is oriented against skepticism, his initial elaboration 
helps me to express my point. Everson claims that Epicurus’ argument for the truthfulness of 
all perceptions can be reconstructed as a reductio of the following form “if the consequence of 
denying that all perceptions are true is that knowledge is made impossible then, since 
knowledge obviously is possible, all perceptions must be (treated as if they are) true”77. 
Epicurus worry is to secure the possibility of knowledge but not by showing that skepticism is 
a self-refuting position, but because it is obvious that there is knowledge. Therefore, Epicurus 
has to explain and prove two things in order for the reductio to work and to refute skepticism: 
first, that knowledge is possible and second, that it is not possible to treat some perceptions as 
true and some as false, but instead that the only option is to treat them all as being true in 
order to have knowledge.  
I believe that here we find the reason why Epicurus does not employ specific anti-
skeptical arguments, such as the self-refutation argument; the reason is simply that he takes it 
as obvious that we have knowledge of the world. From this then it immediately follows that 
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skepticism is rejected. However it needs to be elaborated to what this obviousness amounts to. 
It seems that Epicurus is here driven by already indicated commonsense understanding of the 
possibility of acquiring knowledge. It seems so intuitive that we have access to the world, that 
we discover and know the things in the world. Therefore, it is absurd to suppose that there is 
no knowledge. I take it that this is the starting point of Epicurus’ reply to the challenge of 
atomist skepticism that leads him towards the thesis that all perceptions are true. Once this is 
settled as a starting point it becomes clear why Epicurus is not interested in the detailed and 
technical anti-skeptical strategy that we find in Lucretius. Simply, the idea that we have 
knowledge is so natural and obvious and further discussion about skepticism seems to be 
needless. Yet, the obviousness of knowledge is supported by another fact. 
Namely, the reason for taking the idea that we have knowledge to be part of our 
natural instinct appears to be grounded on the intuitive idea according to which the kind of the 
source of knowledge primarily we think of is perception. Therefore, the task is to explain 
what is specific about perception that it guarantees knowledge. In Letter to Herodotus 
Epicurus specifies the idea of obtaining knowledge through perception by saying, 
 
For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested (marturei) by the sense itself, and it is upon 
sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown (adela) from the known. (DL 
X.40) 
 
This passage illustrates several important points. Let us start with the most important one that 
underlies Epicurean epistemology and brings us to the core idea that perceptions play the 
main role in it. The passage expresses the strong and intuitive idea that we have knowledge of 
the existence of bodies in the external world and that the source of such knowledge is 
obviously perception. Bailey excellently points out that Epicurus, obviously contrary to all the 
skeptical inclinations of his time, “made an emphatic return to the view of common sense”78 
and proposes perceptions as the most natural cognitive method and the primary source of the 
knowledge. Epicurus’ starting point is the ordinary idea that gaining knowledge inseparably 
and naturally goes along with another commonsense intuition, that knowledge primarily 
comes through the senses, and moreover that perception in fact is already knowledge. Here 
comes another important point regarding the way perception discovers that there are bodies 
around us. In order to characterize the way perception works Epicurus uses the verb 
marturein, which we can translate as ‘to report’ or ‘to witness’. In other word, perceptions put 
us in relation with the external world as its witnesses. And this brings us to Taylor’s idea of 
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the ‘forensic analogy’ according to which perceptions play a specific role in Epicurean 
epistemology because of a distinctive characteristic: perceptions directly witness the things in 
the world and therefore have an evidential role as reliable witnesses.79 
So it is common sense which suggests that the natural starting point for obtaining 
knowledge about the things in the world is reliance on perceptions as the primary cognitive 
tool that tell as what the world, that is, give us a picture of the world in accordance with naïve 
realism. And this commonsense intuition relies on a specific characteristic perceptions seem 
to have, namely that they put us in a direct relation with the external world. Furthermore, 
common sense takes these immediate perceptual reports as truly representing the world as it is 
and therefore perception arises as a primary source of knowledge. And notice what follows 
from this line of thought: if perception puts us in a direct epistemic connection with the world, 
in such a way that it we take it that it truly reports the world as it is, we intuitively accept that 
perceptions are true in so far as we naturally accept that the objects in reality are as presented 
in perceptions. In other words, we take them to be self-evidently true. So it appears that the 
idea about the infallibility of perception is grounded in the commonsense understanding of 
perception as a cognitive method that puts us in a direct relation with the external world. 
It seems that the acceptance of the truthfulness of perception intuitively goes along 
with the commonsense assertion that perception is the most basic and reliable cognitive 
method. If we turn back to the KD XXIII, I already said that it seems that the thesis implies an 
obvious and exclusive connection between obtaining knowledge on the one side and 
perception as a reliable and self-evident method for that epistemic goal on the other. The 
commonsense assumption provides us with the initial explanation for the connection. 
Moreover, I take it that is also serves as the reason why Epicurus does not need specific 
arguments against skepticism. He is motivated by the commonsense assumption that there is 
knowledge and the commonsense assumption by itself rejects skepticism. It rejects it on the 
grounds that skepticism appears to be an absurd position given the obviousness of knowledge.  
Also it is important to stress again that skepticism here is rejected independently from 
the atomistic theory, showing that Epicurus’ strategy against atomist skepticism assumes that 
the reliability of sense reports must be secured in advance, but also that Epicurus does not 
need to apply any advanced anti-skeptical strategy, such as self-refutation argument. 
However, the rejection of skepticism does not rely on a mere stipulation that there is 
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knowledge.80 What justifies this initial assumption is another intuitive idea, namely that the 
reliable cognitive method for acquiring knowledge is perception, but it is so because of its 
specific evidential character. Therefore, the first part of a reductio is supported by 
commonsense assumptions about the possibility and nature of knowledge that primarily is 
attained through perception.  
However, the common sense assumption appears to be inappropriate for the 
justification of Epicurus’ thesis that all perceptions must be true. Indeed, the thesis that some 
perceptions are true and some false is also perfectly compatible with a common sense, even 
more than the one about perceptual incorrigibility. It might be rightly objected that Epicurus is 
now making an odd step in which he radically and surprisingly moves away from the initial 
commonsense assumption that perception is a primary source of our relation to the world, to 
an unnatural position claiming that all perceptions are true. The position is unnatural because 
it seems more than obvious and in accordance with common sense to claim that sometimes 
perception does not truly report the world as it is. So the question now is whether Epicurus 
abandons the initial commonsense assumption? And if he does, what is then Epicurus’ 
motivation for the controversial thesis that all perceptions are true? Or to put it differently, 
why does he think that knowledge is possible only if all perceptions are true?  
 My attempt is to show now that the reason for taking all perceptions as being true is 
completely grounded in commonsense explanation of perception. Epicurus is not abandoning 
his commonsense intuition, but rather we can say that he is sharpening his intuition that the 
primary source of knowledge is perception. His overall strategy aims to secure first, the 
connection between perception and knowledge of the world as the ultimate and the most 
primitive cognitive relation and also to give a reply to the major challenge for obtaining 
knowledge, namely the argument from conflicting appearances. Commonsense assumption 
provides us with a good reason to privilege perception as a source for obtaining knowledge, 
since the thesis that relying on our natural cognitive faculties, i.e. perceptions, will reveal the 
truth about the world seems more than plausible. However, the task now becomes rather odd 
requiring an explanation of the way in which a total infallibility of perception fits the common 
sense assumption.  
The explanation for the adoption of this stronger thesis that all perceptions are true is 
connected with Taylor’s ‘forensic analogy’. The ‘forensic analogy’, as Taylor points, 
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“depends on the basic character of the evidence of aistheseis”.81 I believe that deeper analysis 
of the basic character of perception will elucidate Epicurus’ assertion that all perceptions 
ultimately report the truth. Just to remind us, ‘the forensic analogy’ put forward the idea that 
perceptions have an evidential role since they accurately report or witness a state of affairs as 
they are in reality. So, what is the basic character of perception? Important evidence is given 
by Diogenes in the following passage: 
 
All sensation, he [Epicurus] says is irrational (alogos) and does not accommodate memory. For neither 
it is moved by itself, nor when moved by something else is it able to add or subtract anything. (DL 
X.31, transl. LS 16B) 
 
Diogenes introduces these characteristics of perception immediately after giving the list of 
Epicurus’ criteria, as Taylor notices82, but I believe that this point is of important relevance 
for our present purposes. Namely, at this point we are trying to elucidate the reasons for 
taking perceptions as if they all truly report reality. In the quoted passage Diogenes, 
immediately after introducing the list of criteria puts forward these characteristics that are 
common to all perceptions and which also reflect something peculiar about their nature 
because of which Epicurus takes them to be the first criterion of truth. The first sentence tells 
us that the one of the characteristics of perceptions is that they are irrational, as alogos is 
usually translated, and next that it is not capable of memory. The reason for these particular 
characterizations of perception lies in the next sentence. Namely, first, perceptions cannot be 
self-creative or self-moved since they are always moved by something else and next, that 
when moved, perceptions are incapable to intervene in the report they bring. The second 
clarification of these characteristics we find in Sextus’ report where he says: 
 
He adds that sense-perception, being capable of grasping the things that impinge on it, and neither 
taking away nor adding nor changing anything (since it is non-rational), continually tells the truth and 
grasps the thing that is, in the way in which that very thing is in its nature. (SE M VIII.9, transl. Bett) 
 
So Sextus’ explanation goes in the same line as Diogenes’, claiming that perceptions are 
irrational because they do nor add or subtract anything to the report they carry. But Sextus 
adds another important point that the report perception carries is always a grasp of the object 
in the external world, and moreover that the report is always in accordance with the true 
nature of the object.  
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 The reports from Diogenes and Sextus offer the following reading of the 
characteristics of perceptions. Namely, perceptions are alogos because they are, as Diogenes 
reports, not self-generated; they are always caused by something from the outside. Given this, 
we can say that perceptions are passive, since they originate only when stimulated by external 
causes. Furthermore, Diogenes says that perceptions do not accommodate memory, which in 
fact probably means that perceptions are not capable of storing their reports somewhere since 
they are just passive responses to the external causes and therefore they do not involve 
memory, which would require some sort of judgment, comparison or other cognitive 
processing of the original reports. From this it follows that perceptions in general are not 
capable of exercising any higher order cognitive process about what is presented to us, or as 
Diogenes and Sextus report, perceptions are not capable of adding or subtracting anything to 
the given report. Passivity is the first important characteristic and the basis for further 
conclusion that perceptions cannot add or subtract anything in the report they present since 
they just passively present the things acting upon our sense-organs, and therefore. And from 
this follows another crucial characteristic of perception, namely, that given its passivity, 
perception thus “constantly reports truly and grasps the existing object as it really is by 
nature”, as Sextus reports. In other words, perceptions are always true, since they passively 
register the things which act upon our sense organs, being just mere ‘bodily happenings’83 as 
Rist calls them, and therefore accurately depict them as they are. Therefore, this model of 
perception excludes the possibility of assessment or processing by perception itself, thus 
leaving no room for any error. This in the end guarantees their infallibility.84 It seems that 
here Epicurus argues on the following lines. 
 And this brings us again to the ‘forensic analogy’. Namely, as Taylor points, we can 
ascribe this unique characteristic of perceptions as witnesses because their reports accurately 
represent the external impact and “the accuracy of the reports is guaranteed by the fact that 
aisthesis is alogos”. Everson embraces Taylor’s view and claim that the quoted passages from 
Diogenes and Sextus elucidate the evidential character of perception. According to Everson 
“the truth of perception will be guaranteed by the processes which bring it about” and 
continue by saying that “given the total passivity of the senses, what the perception is like 
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However, even at this point, it seems to me, common sense suggests this picture of our perceptual system in 
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must be determined by the nature of what brings it about”.85 Given that perceptions, being 
always caused by something external and not capable of processing and assessment, we can 
conclude that the main characteristic of their nature is a passive response to the external 
stimulus and a direct presentation of their external cause. This special nature guarantees that 
the report they give is accurate and reliable. Therefore, perceptions are true. So, how does this 
claim fit commonsense assumptions? I think it does because of the following. First, the fact 
that perception is a passive response is something that perfectly goes along with common 
sense. We naturally think of perception as something that put us in a causal connection with 
the world in such a way that the world causally affects our sense organs. Therefore, the 
characteristics Epicurus ascribes to perceptions, namely passivity in response to the external 
stimulus and mere registration of the external things as it is in reality is completely compatible 
with the commonsense assumptions. Indeed, it appears overwhelmingly probable that 
Epicurus’ method by which he formulates the thesis that all perceptions are true at this point 
simply follows commonsensical intuitions according to which for a perception to occur it is 
necessary to be caused by an object. 
But still there is an open question: are they all true? To put it differently, Epicurus still 
has to reject seemingly the most plausible position according to which some perceptions are 
true, and some are false. Diogenes continues previously quoted passage saying the following: 
 
Nor does there exist that which can refute the sensations: neither can like sense refute like, because of 
their equal validity; nor unlike unlike since they are not discriminatory of the same things; nor can 
reason, since all reason depends on the senses; nor can one individual sensation refute another, since 
they all command our attention. (DL X.32, transl. LS 16B) 
 
Here we find four arguments attempting to show that it is not possible to refute sensation. The 
first one appeals to the equal validity of perceptions coming from the same perceptual 
modality, which implies that it is not possible for the perceptions to refute each other. The 
second argument shows that it is not possible for the perceptions coming from different 
perceptual modalities to refute between themselves, since they do not report the same thing. 
The third point the supremacy of the perception over reason, and thus excludes the possibility 
that perceptions might be refuted by reason. And finally, the fourth argument indicates that 
one single perception of some object cannot refute another of the same object, again because 
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of the same validity. Three of them in fact are concerned with the equality and 
incommensurability of perceptions and one of them with the impossibility of reason to refute 
perceptions. I propose to closely analyze them in that order. 
 The equality of perceptions covers the first and the fourth argument and implies that it 
is not possible to refute perceptions in any case within the same perceptual modality. This is 
the cases such as the one in which the same thing, the honey, appears sweet to one person, but 
bitter to another. Namely, perceptions are equivalent regarding the report of the external cause 
they present and therefore it is not possible to decide between them. For the cases of the 
quarrel between the different modalities, such as vision and touch in the case of a stick that 
looks bent in the water, it is not possible to decide between them since they are in charge of 
different objects, such as colors and shapes in this case.86 In other words, as Long and Sedley 
point, perceptions are “incommensurable, since each reports different type of object”.87  
 The same explanation we find in Lucretius’ text, where he writes: 
 
Will the ear be able to convict the eye, or the touch ear? Will the taste of the mouth again refute the 
touch, will nose confound it, or eye disprove it? Not so, I think. […] For the taste of the mouth has 
power on a separate sense, smell arises for a separate sense, sound for another. Therefore it is 
necessary that one sense cannot refute another. Nor furthermore will they be able to convict 
themselves, since equal credit must always be allowed to them. (Lucretius, DRN IV.486-496, transl. 
LS 16A) 
 
 Therefore, from the fact that one perception reports that X is F, and another that X is 
not F, Epicurus first concludes that we do not have reason to refute any of them, or better to 
say we cannot determine that one of them is true and the other false. The forensic analogy 
shows that perceptions have specific nature, namely the evidential character according to 
which all perceptions accurately report the things as they are. If this is so, than one perception 
cannot refute another one due to the fact that they all carry the same evidential power. This 
point, as Striker rightly notices, Epicurus shares with the skeptics.88 The whole later skeptical 
tradition relies on the fact that due to the equality of perceptual reports (isosthenia) it is not 
possible to resolve the conflict between them and to ascertain which one of them is true, 
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which false.89 But the skeptical inclinations that go back to Democritus, as we have seen, also 
proceed from the perceptual conflict and Epicurus is aware of this problem as we have already 
seen.  
But Epicurus offers an unexpected solution to the skeptical challenge. Following 
Striker’s point90, we can say that the argument from conflicting appearance in the first, 
epistemically neutral level, just determine that we cannot resolve the conflict between 
perceptions because of their equality. However, the next step is epistemically restrictive one 
which claims that knowledge is possible if and only if all perceptions are true. And in that 
next step the skeptics conclude that, given the perceptual conflict is irresolvable, there is no 
possibility to ascertain true perceptions which are necessary for knowledge, and consequently 
infers that knowledge becomes impossible. Epicurus agrees that the conflict is irresolvable in 
terms of choosing one of the conflicting perceptions as the true one, because of their equality. 
However, unlike the skeptics, Epicurus from this does not infer that we should discredit 
perceptions in total, but just the contrary: since there is knowledge, and knowledge is 
perception, we should accept them and trust them all as equally accurate reports of the 
external stimulus, just as Lucretius concludes in the previously quoted passage, “what has 
seemed to these at any given time to be true, is true”. (Lucretius, DRN IV.497-9)  
 Another important point should be emphasized. It seems to me that the idea of equality 
of perceptions strongly relies on the forensic analogy, namely on the idea that perceptions in 
general share their specific, evidential nature. This is important because I want to claim that 
Epicurus establish the claim about perceptual infallibility on the basis of commonsense 
assumptions. At this point, in which we are trying to explain the rather controversial claim 
that perceptual conflict cannot be resolved it might appear that the discussion becomes 
severely separated from common sense. Therefore, it is necessary to have in mind that the 
starting point for the rejection of the possibility of discriminating between true and false 
perception originates from the forensic analogy, which I claim to be compatible with 
commonsense assumption and prior to atomistic theory. 
 The second point is that the argument about the impossibility of refutations of 
perceptions deals with the contribution of reason. Namely, Epicurus examines the possibility 
that there is some other standard by which we can judge perceptions and decide the conflict 
between them. If that standard cannot be perception itself for the reasons just explained, the 
only other possibility is reason. But Epicurus here adopts the idea common to all atomists, 
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namely that the primary source for all knowledge is perception and that reason relies on 
perceptual reports. Striker, for examples, takes it for granted that empiricism is strongly 
implemented and common to all Hellenistic schools.91 However, it seems to me that Epicurus 
does not take it for granted but the acceptance of the dominance of perception lies in the 
commonsense intuition regarding perception as the primary source of knowledge and also in 
the initial explanation of knowledge as basically obvious. This is indicated in the previously 
quoted passage from Diogenus, DL X.39-40, which elucidates Epicurean empiricism. There it 
becomes clear that the thesis about perceptual incorrigibility is central part of his empiricism. 
The obviousness of knowledge there is equated with perception which directly tells us that 
bodies exist and also that they move.  
Additionally the same passage also explicates the way perceptual authority extends 
over reason. In the passage Epicurus starts from the fact that we can see or touch bodies. From 
this the inference that there is void runs as follows: sense perception shows us that bodies 
exist and also that they move. Given this, it necessary follows that there must be void since if 
there were no void bodies could not move. Unless there were void the whole world would be 
solid mass and without motion. But this is directly opposed to the evidence from sense 
perception and for Epicurus must be false. This is how Epicurus infers that the second 
constituent of the nature is necessarily void. So the proof of the existence of a non-evident 
thing, void, has the following form: 
(1) If there were no void it would not be possible for bodies to move. 
(2) Perception tells us that there are bodies and that they are in motion. 
(3) Therefore, there is void. 
Epicurus concludes that although perception does not directly testifies about the existence of 
void, nevertheless reason would be completely incapable of reaching that conclusion without 
the attestation of the senses. Reason is thus completely dependent upon perception and 
therefore cannot either refute perception or, more importantly, serve as the criterion of truth. 
In this example we have just seen the way perception serve as the criterion of truth. Similarly, 
on the predominance of perception over reason in the context of the inquiry about the 
fundamental criterion of truth, Lucretius writes the following: 
 
 …from where does he get his knowledge of what knowing and not knowing are? What created his 
preconception of true and false? And what proved to him that doubtful differs from certain? You will 
find that the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted. 
For something of greater reliability must be found, something possessing the intrinsic power to convict 
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falsehoods with truths. Well, what should be considered to have greater reliability than the senses? 
Will reason have the power to contradict them, if it is itself the product of false sensation? For reason 
is in its entirety the product of the senses, so that if the senses are not true all reason becomes false as 
well. (Lucretius, DRN IV.478-485, transl. LS 16A) 
 
Reason becomes subordinate in the sense that it receives all information from perceptions. 
The rejection of the reason as the primary source of knowledge again is rooted in the 
commonsense assumption which singles out perception as the ultimate source of direct and 
accurate knowledge of the world. By this Epicurus has eliminated any possibility that there is 
some other possible criterion by which perceptions can be shown to be false, and therefore 
rejected thesis that some perceptions are false and some true. The thesis that all perceptions 
are true is finally established as “the first and fundamental principle of the Canonice”.92 
 In the end, let me briefly recap the main arguments of the chapter. I wanted to argue 
that in Epicurus’ work it is possible to reconstruct a priori arguments that led him to the thesis 
that all perceptions are true. These arguments, as I suggest, shows that he was motivated by 
the challenge of the version of Democritean skepticism and the argument about unreliability 
of percepion. Therefore, Epicurus recognizes that in order to block the skeptics he needs to 
secure a firm starting point for any further investigation and thus introduces the problem of 
the criterion of truth necessary for ascertaining knowledge into epistemological debate in 
Hellenistic philosophy. This is reflected in his claims that by rejecting perception we are 
rejecting any standard for judging. So in order to avoid impossibility of knowledge it is 
necessary to establish a firm starting point. Such a foundation must be immune to any further 
epistemological investigations. 
I proposed that Epicurus grounded his starting point for his investigation in the 
commonsense assumption, by which he emphasized the obviousness of knowledge and rejects 
skepticism in the first place. The commonsense assumption I regarded as similar to the picture 
of the world in accordance with naïve realism. I belive that this fairly reflects Epicurus’ 
intention since his aim is to secure the phenomenal knowledge of the world. In the next step, 
commonsense intuition revealed important facts about the nature of perceptions and 
established them as the secure and reliable cognitive tool. The final strategical move that 
brought him to the thesis about the infallibility of all perceptions was based first on the 
arguments that each perception is of equal validity and therefore perceptions cannot refute one 
another, and second that neither reason can refute perceptions since the validity of reason 
itself, as all atomist claimed, is derived from the senses. So in order to defend the possibility 
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of knowledge, Epicurus chooses rather peculiar position about the perceptual incorrigibility 
which establishes him as one of the most radical empiricist in the history of philosophy. These 
arguments revealed, as I claimed, the motivation for the thesis that was independent from the 
atomic theory. Now we have to see how the second line of argumentation for the 
incorrigibility of perception based on the atomistic theory. 
 
 
2.2. The external mechanism of perception 
 
So far Epicurus offers us the motivational reasons to treat sense-perceptions as the 
criterion of truth and a starting point for gaining any knowledge and thereby he obviously 
commits himself to some version of empiricism. He starts off from the natural trust in the 
senses as the only way by which it is possible to attain knowledge and to get engaged in any 
scientific investigation of the reality, since it is necessary to have a reliable starting point. 
However, his empiricism relies on the peculiar thesis about the equal cognitive status of our 
perceptions, which are established as the standard which needs to be accepted if any further 
judging is to be made. And now we the further judging runs: we are going to be told what the 
mechanism of perception is. The mechanism is provided by the atomistic theory. Exactly this 
way of reasoning is supported by Cicero’s On ends, where an advocate of Epicureanism, 
Torquatus, explains Epicurus’ strategy as follows: 
 
Besides, it is only by firmly grasping a well-established scientific system, observing the Rule or Canon 
that has fallen as it were from heaven so that all men may know it – only by making that Canon the 
test of all our judgments, that we can hope always to stand fast in our belief, unshaken by the 
eloquence of any men. On the other hand, without full understanding of the world of nature it is 
impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. (Cicero, De Fin. I.63-4, transl. Rackham) 
 
Torquatus sets forth two important parts of Epicurus’ methodology that I am trying to 
isolate. The first deals with the criterion of truth which must be accepted in advance in order 
to make any scientific discovery. Just a few lines later on in the same text, Torquatus uses the 
version of Epicurus’ argument from KD XXIII, implying that unless all perceptions are true, 
no certain knowledge will be possible. I take it that his description of the criterion “as it were 
from heaven, so that all men may know it” should imply that we do not need any particular 
argument for the reliability of the senses, because this is obvious to everybody. So the first 
point indicates the commonsense assumption. 
Nevertheless, Torquatus reveals another important point. Namely, he says that 
Epicurus realizes that it is necessary to show that perceptions are in accordance with the true 
nature of the world in order to justify the claim of perceptual infallibility. This implies that the 
acceptance of the thesis that all perceptions are true requires deeper analysis of the nature of 
perception and the way our senses are connected with the world. In other words Epicurus has 
to offer a precise analysis of the way perceptions occur and to explain why is it that they 
always match reality. At this point Epicurus’ epistemology becomes tightly connected with 
his metaphysical and scientific explanation of the nature of the external world and its basic 
constituents. Therefore, it is crucial for Epicurus in the next methodological step to defend the 
true nature of perception that is to carefully examine what exactly it means to say that 
perception is infallible because it is passive and alogos as the previous argumentation shows. 
This will also show how apparent perceptual conflict is not inconsistent with the claim that all 
perceptions are true. In order to do that he turns to the account of the physical process of 
perceiving which he takes to be grounded in the atomistic theory.  
At exactly this point Epicurus’ strategy faces a serious tension problem that implies 
serious inconsistency within his proposed methodological framework. Namely, Epicurus is 
trying to square the commonsense assumption about our natural inclination to accept 
perception as the most natural cognitive method for acquiring knowledge of the external 
world with atomism, according to which the world consists only of atoms and void. 
Moreover, Epicurus wants to make another seemingly impossible step and that is to show that 
atomism is in fact supported by sense-perception. Irwin offers a very clear formulation of this 
highly counterintuitive and problematic strategy, also including the main postulates of 
atomism, saying the following: 
 
Atomism tells us that (a1) the atoms are in constant motion, and (a2) they lack colour. The senses, 
however, tell us (b1) there are stable bodies not in constant motion, and (b2) bodies are coloured. The 
evidence of the senses, then, seems to conflict with atomism, because we cannot understand how (c1) 
apparently stable bodies are simply collections of moving constituents, or how (c2) apparently 
coloured bodies are simply collections of colourless constituents.93 
 
This is already mentioned and discussed problem that originated from Democritus 
opens the well-known philosophical problem of the gap between appearance and reality. The 
problem is particularly relevant if the atomistic explanation of reality is adopted, since the 
discrepancy between the world of appearance and the world according to atomism seems to 
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be radical. The possible solutions of this epistemological problem seem to require us to give 
up on one or other of the pictures of the world; to adopt either something we can call pure 
sensationalism and to stick with the idea that the world is as it appears to us, or to adopt 
atomism and claim that objective reality consists only of atoms and void. However, Epicurus 
chooses a third way and aims to reconcile these views in order to justify the theses (c1) and 
(c2) from Irwin’s quotation.  
 We can easily reconstruct this justificatory strategy from the Letter to Herodotus and 
the steps are the following. Epicurus there claims that in any investigation of nature we have 
to observe everything in accordance with our sense-perceptions as the criterion (DL X.38).94 
Since the claim for taking sense-perceptions as a secure starting point is proved as a part of 
his commonsense assumption, Epicurus then continues to the first argument which attempts to 
show the exact way in which the senses provide us with the evidence for the atomistic theory, 
namely the argument for the existence of void and bodies (DL X.39-40). After atomism is 
established, Epicurus is obliged to explain all objects, states of affairs and other phenomena in 
terms of the atomistic theory and therefore he proceeds to analyze the physical process of 
perception and the thesis of perceptual incorrigibility on the basis of the atomistic theory.  
 Epicurus opens the explanation of the process with the mechanism of vision, which is 
taken as a paradigm case of perception and discussed in much more detail than the other 
perceptual modalities. This is due to the fact that vision is taken to be the most informative 
sense through which the largest amount of data about the external world is gained. In other 
words, a vision presents a general framework of how perception works so that the other 
senses then followed the pattern given by this framework. Nevertheless, Epicurus offers an 
analysis of the senses of hearing and smell as well, while in Lucretius we find analysis of all 
five senses.  
Before we proceed to the examination of the perceptual mechanism, let me just briefly 
summarize some important theses of the atomistic theory, which are relevant for the physical 
analysis of perception. According to atomism there are two basic constituents of the world: 
void and atoms, and everything that exists in the world can be reduced to these fundamental 
elements. The main characteristics of the void are that it is not tangible and does not manifest 
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resistance. Because of these characteristics the main function of the void is that it makes it 
possible for the solid objects to be at some place and also allows their movement.95  
 Atoms on the other hand are solid objects containing no void and because of that they 
are indivisible and also changeless. Since they are the smallest corporeal entities they must 
have some other characteristics inherent to physical bodies, namely, shape, weight and size.96 
But besides these three qualities atoms do not share any other quality which other bodies 
possess. Therefore they are not colored, do not have smell, heat or sound97. These secondary 
qualities belong to the objects at the macroscopic level which are built up of atoms. The 
process of building up macro-objects is explained by means of another important 
characteristic of atoms. Namely, atoms are constantly moving through the void, never being at 
rest. There are two causes of their constant motion: (i) atom's weight which causes an atom to 
move downward which is inherent to the atom by its constitution, or (ii) collision with some 
other atom or atoms which is impact from the outside.98 So during the motion atoms can move 
freely because in the void there is nothing that can halt them unless they collide with other 
atoms. In the collision it is possible for them to either change their direction or to hook on to 
an other atom. The latter possibility has as a result the formation of atomic compounds which, 
if large enough to be perceptible, are in fact objects at the macroscopic level.  
The movement of atoms is particularly important for the process of perceiving. 
Namely, given the fact that atoms are in constant motion Epicurus infers that macroscopic 
bodies are constantly emitting atoms and next he asserts that specific sorts of emanations are 
responsible for the perceiving of objects. The process of perceiving occurs because 
appropriate emanations, i.e. streams of atoms, are impinging upon our sense organs producing 
in that way appearances of objects. These atomic outflows are specific to each sense organ so 
that every sense organ is receiving the appropriate sort of emanation. Those sorts of 
emanation then cause five types of sensory sensations. This is the general framework of 
Epicurus’ well-known theory of effluences according to which the activity of the senses is 
explained through a contact of the sense organ and an external stimulus impinging on it. 
Although Epicurus takes vision as the most important sensory modality, he nevertheless 
mentions others. In the Letter to Herodotus he discusses the process of hearing and smelling, 
                                                 
95 This Epicurus' view on void is rather controversial, and something that, for example Aristotle would not 
accept. Simply, if there were no void, it does not follow that the things composing the physical phenomena 
would not have a place. However, as David Sedley (1999), argues, it just seems that Epicurus did not make a 
distinction between place and void. 
96 DL X.54. 
97 Lucretius, DRN II.730-833. 
98 DL X.61. 
but detailed analysis of all five modalities we find in Lucretius. However, as we shall see 
Epicurus also takes that the mind function as the sixth sense organ, that is, on the basis organ-
stimulus pattern, but also have other functions, namely, reasoning and inferential processes. 
Therefore, Epicurus applies the same explanation of the mechanism of perceiving for certain 
cases of ‘mental vision’ such as dreams, hallucinations and illusions.  
 
2.2.1. Visual perception 
 
The process of visual perception is obtained through the films of atoms called images 
(eidola) which are released from the surface of objects due to the constant internal motions of 
atoms within objects. The theory is introduced in paragraph 46 of Letter to Herodotus where 
Epicurus before proposing the technical term, eidolon, refers to the images using the term 
‘outline’ (tupoi). Paragraphs DL X.46-7 bring information about the movement of eidola, the 
way they are emanated and also about their main characteristics, while paragraph 48 tells us 
something about the formation of eidola. Let us closely examine those passages. 
 In the opening sentence of paragraph 46 we are told that eidola are similar to the solid 
objects from which they are coming retaining the exactly the same position and the pattern of 
atomic configuration as in the object and thus representing the object’s shape.99 This 
introductory characteristic is of an essential importance and will be further elucidated, but it 
presents the key element of the whole theory of effluences and the grounds for the thesis of 
the truthfulness of perceptions. However the crucial task now is to offer the reasons for the 
acceptance of the existence of eidola and also to explain what makes the similarity between 
the eidola and the object possible. Epicurus in the Letter states that the existence of eidola is 
possible, because “it is not impossible that such emanations should arise in the space around 
us, or appropriate conditions for the production of their concavity and fineness of texture, or 
effluences preserving the same sequential arrangement and the same pattern of motion as they 
had in the solid bodies”. (DL X.46, transl. LS) 
 Although Epicurus does not further prove the existence of eidola, more developed 
discussion, supported by some vivid arguments, is found in Lucretius. Lucretius states that 
“amongst visible things many throw off bodies” (Lucretius, DRN IV.54-5) pointing to the 
examples first of inanimate things like smoke and heat being emitted from burning wood and 
                                                 
99 This is one of the cases in which vision is caused by some external object, such as a tree or house. Later on we 
shall discuss other examples of vision, namely dreams, illusions and hallucinations, and also the cases of various 
visualizations. However, in all of these cases Epicurus preserves the idea that the vision is always caused by 
something external, namely eidola. The only difference will appear in the explanation of the formation of eidola.  
second to examples among animals, like crickets and snakes which cast off their skins. Then 
he passes to the examples which are more in accordance with the core idea of the function of 
eidola, starting with the case of color, as being emanated from the surface of objects and 
finally concludes with the most persuasive example of a mirror which exactly reflects the 
images of objects and so “must consist of images thrown off from those things”. (Lucretius, 
DRN IV.101) In fact, it appears that Lucretius in the sequence of the selected examples moves 
from the analogies with the observable to an actual instance of eidola. Lucretius concludes 
that there is nothing strange about the general idea of emanation, given that we can see that 
many objects in the world throw off certain things.100 His inference is based on the usual 
Epicurean practice in scientific methodology of adducing a straightforward analogy from the 
observable to the atomic level that the same emanations are perfectly possible to exist on the 
invisible level. Only the last example of the mirror reflection is not a pure analogical one, 
since here we find an actual instance of the emanation of images, as Lucretius’ text suggests. 
Namely, the mirrors are reflecting “thin shapes and like semblances of things, which singly no 
one can perceive, yet being flung back by incessant and unremitting repulsion give back a 
vision from the surface of the mirror”. (Lucretius, DRN IV.104-7, transl. Smith) Therefore, 
vision is the result of flows of eidola, coming from the surface of objects in such a way that 
they retain the exact atomic arrangement of the object they are flowing from. 
 Next, in paragraph 47 of the Letter, Epicurus introduces characteristics of the images, 
namely that they are much finer than the atoms in the solid objects and that they travel with an 
enormous speed. With regard to the structure of the images Epicurus does not argue for their 
fineness, but appeal to the method of testing theoretical inferences according to which the 
opinions about non-evident things are true if not in conflict with sensory experience (ouk 
antimarturesis) and concludes that their specific, very fine texture is not refuted by sense-
perception, that is by anything evident (enarges). However, both of the characteristics are 
supposed to explain the key part of the theory of vision, namely the similarity between the 
images and the object from which they are thrown off. How does Epicurus accomplish this 
task? 
 Due to the fineness of their texture eidola are able to move very easily, also to 
penetrate and passing through some objects, such as windows and other transparent objects, 
with almost no collisions on their way with other atoms. Given that they suffer almost of no 
distortion and alteration of their internal structure and the pattern of the atoms they accurately 
                                                 
100 Here we see the way perception serves as the sign of what is non-evident. This is part of normal Epicurean 
method of testing beliefs, as we shall see in the last chapter. 
match the solid object and its atomic arrangement. The motion of the images is more 
important because it explains some significant facts about the way vision occurs. Namely, it is 
said in the passage (46) that eidola move very rapidly, so that they are able to “accomplish 
every comprehended length in an incomprehensible time” and in paragraph 47 Epicurus 
continues: 
 
Nor with the respect to [its] moving body does it [the eidolon] arrive at several places at once by 
reference to the times viewed by reason; for this is unthinkable. But arriving all at once in a 
perceptible time from anywhere at all in the infinite, it will not be separate from the place from which 
we comprehend the motion. For it [the quickness of the motion] will have a similarity to collision even 
if we leave the quickness of the motion without collisions up to this point” (DL X.47, trans. Asmis) 
 
 This rather complex passage on the motion of eidola follows Epicurus’ statement that 
the eidolon covers the distance that is possible to comprehend in an incomprehensibly short 
amount of time. How can we interpret this distinction between perceptible and imperceptible 
time and why is it important for the theory of images? Here I follow Asmis’ reading: she says 
first that it is obvious that here Epicurus is applying his general theory of motion of bodies, 
according to which the velocity of atoms depends upon the number of collisions they suffer 
while moving such that collisions are inversely proportional to velocity. And when this theory 
is applied to the theory of images, she proposes the following reading:  
 
…Epicurus now points out that although an eidolon travels over any perceived distance in an instance 
of perceptible time, we must not suppose that an eidolon is at several places at once. For although with 
respect to perceptible time the eidolon is simultaneously at the place at which it started and at its goal, 
time is further subdivided by reason in such a way that with respect to these subdivisions the eidolon 
occupies different places at different time.101 
 
 So the problem Epicurus recognizes is the following. When looking at some object, say a 
book, images are traveling extremely fast over the distance between me and the book, so the 
distance is clearly perceptible. However, the assumption that the speed of the coming images 
is also perceptible entails an inconsistent conclusion that the eidolon is at the same time at two 
places: on the surface of the book and on my eye. In order to avoid this unpleasant 
consequence, Epicurus introduces the distinction between perceptible and imperceptible time 
which allows the explanation that the movement of the eidolon from the surface of the book 
to my eye is so fast as to be imperceptible for me, but nonetheless is sequential. Therefore, the 
images travel enormously fast, with no or a few collisions on their way, thus reaching the 
                                                 
101 Asmis (1984), 109. 
sense organ with the same structure and positions of atoms as in the solid object or with very 
slight alterations. They preserve that structure and position for a long time, as we find out in 
the next passage of Letter.  
 Lucretius102 arguing about the velocity of the eidola in DRN IV.176-215 follows 
Epicurus’ reasoning that the great velocity of eidola is due to the fact that small and light 
things move rapidly. Besides this argument that appeals to a clear analogy with the things 
from our experience, such as sunlight, Lucretius offers another two examples. In the first he 
states that since the effluences coming from within things move swiftly in spite of the fact that 
other atoms on their path diminish their speed, the velocity of the effluences from the surface  
where there are no obstacles must be even higher. The last example is not an analogy but, as 
Bailey rightly notes103, a straightforward conclusion concerning eidola, just like the mirror 
example. Namely, Lucretius uses the example of the water reflecting the sky immediately and 
therefore concludes that this case shows clearly that the eidola coming from the sky reach the 
water at once with an extreme velocity. 
 Paragraph 48 of the Letter brings more information about the formation of the images 
and their emanation. About the formation we are told that the images are formed “as fast as 
thought” and regarding the emanation Epicurus emphasizes that “there is a continuous flow 
from the surface of bodies”. The continuous flow of atoms opens a possibility for an objection 
to he theory of images, recognized by Epicurus. Namely it might be objected, as it is pointed 
out by Bailey104, that if there is a continuous flow of atoms, we should see the objects as 
gradually shrinking. However, Epicurus immediately replies saying that the atoms from the 
surrounding environment are replacing the emitted atoms and thus filling up the loss. The 
process of filling up happens rapidly because the images are released only from the surface, 
they are two-dimensional films literally skimmed from the surface, so the solid objects are 
losing rather small amounts of atoms and “do not need to be filled out in depth”. However, as 
it is noticed by Anderson, Epicurus is not committed to the thesis that objects do not diminish 
at all, but instead he has to show that the process of losing atoms and consequent diminution 
is very slow in its nature, generally imperceptible for us and that it happens over a long period 
                                                 
102 Sedley (1998) points that Lucretius’ exposition of the characteristics of eidola (simulacra) is slightly of a 
different order than Epicurus' in the Letter to Herodotus. They both starts with the arguments for the existence of 
eidola and their fineness, but Epicurus in the Letter first exposes the arguments for the speed of their motion and 
then for the speed of their generation, while Lucretius reverse the order. Since the same, reversed order Epicurus 
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the Letter is Lucretius primary source of Epicureanism. 
103 Bailey (1947), 1203. 
104 Bailey (1928), 408. 
of time.105 This idea is supported by the examples we find in Lucretius’ text, such as the cases 
in which “the curved ploughshare of iron imperceptibly dwindles away in the field, and the 
stony pavement of the roads we see rubbed away by men’s feet” (Lucretius, DRN I.313-316) 
which support the idea that objects perish, but they do that very slowly, as is evident from 
sense perception.  
 Epicurus again in paragraph 48 emphasizes the most important part about the 
formation of eidola, namely that they keep the same position and arrangement of atoms as 
they had as a part of the solid object. Here he adds that the same structural position is 
preserved for a long time, although it might be sometimes disrupted. Later in the text we shall 
discuss these cases in which eidola get damaged, but for now let us focus on the normal cases 
in which eidola reach the sense organ perfectly unchanged. Exactly the fact that they retain 
the same position of atoms as in the solid object from which they are released is the 
foundation for the justification of the thesis about the truthfulness of perceptions. It is because 
of this, as Bailey points, that eidola are “a faithful reproduction of the surface of the body, 
simply because the atoms composing them were, in fact, themselves that surface”.106  
 Therefore, the beginning of paragraph 49 states it is only when there is “the 
impingement of something from outside that we see and think of shapes”. What exactly this 
“something from outside” is stated just a few lines later where Epicurus reveals the final 
formulation of the physical process of perception saying: 
 
For external objects would not imprint their own nature, of both colour and shape, by means of the air 
between us and them, or by means of rays or of any effluences passing from us to them, as effectively 
as they can through certain delineations penetrating us from objects, sharing their colour and shape, of 
a size to fit into our vision or thought, and traveling at high speed, with the result that their unity and 
continuity then results in the impression, and preserves their co-affection all the way from the object 
because of their uniform bombardment from it, resulting from the vibration of atoms deep in the solid. 
(DL X.49-50, trans. LS 15A) 
 
 These passages need particularly careful reading. In spite of a few repetitions of 
certain remarks about the character of the eidola that are already pointed out, Epicurus is here 
introducing several new and extremely relevant insights about the theory of vision. However, 
at this point I will focus mainly on the points relevant for the mechanism of vision. Namely, 
in the next step Epicurus claims that the vision of objects occurs due to the eidola, which once 
they reach and enter the sense organ produce a presentation or impression (phantasia).  We 
shall leave aside for now a detailed explanation of the notion of phantasia and concentrate 
                                                 
105 Anderson (http://fs6.depauw.edu:50080/~jeremyanderson/research/Epicurus.pdf), 4. 
106 Bailey (1928), 408. 
only on the mechanism of perceiving. So, the first important point Epicurus makes here is that 
the immediate cause of vision are eidola. In other words, without eidola it could not be 
possible to see objects and therefore they are the means by which vision occurs. The fact that 
exactly eidola are the immediate cause of vision for Epicurus is important because only in that 
case is it possible to preserve the idea that external objects literally ‘imprint their nature’ into 
us, and consequently to open the door for the justification of the thesis that all perceptions 
produced in such a way are necessarily true. Nevertheless this is due to the main characteristic 
of eidola, namely that they retain the same atomic structure as the solid and thus keep the 
closest possible resemblance to it. What follows from this is the following. The presentation 
produced as a result of an imprint of such a cause, without any other mediator, is the most 
probable candidate for a reliable and truthful representation of the external stimulus. 107   
This explains Epicurus’ focus in the first sentence of the quoted passage that is to 
reject other theories according to which vision occurs by means of a certain medium such as 
air or ray. In fact, the first one according to which presentation is made by means of air was 
proposed by Democritus and adopted later by Aristotle, while the second theory, which takes 
the rays to be a medium, was held by Plato. Thus, Epicurus aims to emphasize the advantage 
of his theory of vision by pointing out the main flaw of the rival theories, namely the 
introduction of a mediator, because that moves away from the ideal picture in which objects 
are literally ‘stamping’ themselves on us and opens the possibility of having unfaithful 
presentations. (Although it is not usually mentioned in the usual reading of this passage, it 
seems that Epicurus is rejecting the third possibility, namely the one in which certain 
effluences are emitted from us towards the object which faces the same problematic 
consequences as the other two theories that proposed mediators unlike objects perceived.) 
Nevertheless, the general idea of Epicurus’ eidolic theory is to remove any possibility of 
intervention in the process of the formation of the presentation from things other than the 
object perceived and the sense organ. Only in this case it is possible to achieve direct 
acquaintance and similarity with the external object and to be certain that the produced 
presentation truly matches its cause.108 
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exactly it means that perceptions are true. However, the strategy is already indicated and given by saying that 
our perceptions truly match with the solid because eidola as their objects perfectly match with solid that emits 
them.  
108 Later I will explain further the connection of perception with the world via eidola. So far let me indicate that I 
take it that the proper object of perception are eidola but because of the causal link between eidola and the 
external solid, it is not mistaken to say that they put us in connection with the objects in the world.  
After the explanation of the emanation of eidola as a specific successive flow from the 
surface of solids to the sense organ, paragraphs 49-50 tell us about the mechanism of 
reception of eidola by the sense organ. It seems that in the reception what plays a crucial role, 
as Asmis notices, is the appropriate size of eidola; they must fit the sense organ but also, the 
stream of the eidola must be commensurable with the sense organ. According to Asmis, the 
commensurability is of special importance since it has an explanatory function to “indicate 
that there is a match in size between the eidola and the physical makeup of the organ of 
perception”.109 In other words, Epicurus wants to emphasize here that the sense organ can 
receive only those particles which are appropriate for that specific organ, as eyes are able to 
receive only eidola which are fit them by size and which are commensurable with the specific 
sense organ. So, eye cannot receive eidola that is too big for the pupil, so that eidola should be 
of an appropriate size in order to penetrate the sense organ, and also it cannot receive eidola 
which is commensurable with, for example, ear, since the theory presupposes that each sense 
organ admits only those eidola appropriate for it. The same analysis, as we shall see later, is 
applied in the case of other sense organs.110  
But here the argument starts to appear as if the organs were actually made in such a 
way to fit and to be commensurable with eidola. The explanation of the mechanism of 
perception, thus, starts to strongly echo teleological explanation. Epicurus is known for his 
rejection of any teleology, claiming that mechanistic explanation only fits the atomistic theory 
and the purposes set by the moral theory (before all, the aim is to remove the fear from the 
gods). Therefore, for the Epicureans the inference from the function of some object to the 
conclusion that the objects in question is made purposively for that function is simply 
mistaken.111 Lucretius argues in the following way: 
 
One mistake in this context, which I am determined you should shun and the precautions to avoid, is 
that of supposing the clear lights of the eyes to have been created in order that we might see. […] All 
other explanations of this type which they offer are back to front, due to distorted reasoning. For 
nothing has been engendered in our body in order that we might be able to use it. It is the fact of its 
being engendered its use. (Lucretius, DRN IV.823-57, transl. LS 13E) 
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110 At this point I just want to indicate the importance of the commenusrability of perceptual particles with the 
organ itslef which shall be discussed later. Namely, this description of the specific co-ordination between the 
external impulse and the sense organ serves as a further justification of perceptual incorrigibility and of 
Diogenes’ report from X.32 on the impossibility of one perception to refute another one.  
111 This is the view advocated by Aristotel (for example, Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I.640b30-641a6) and 
the Stoics (for example, Cicero, ND II.27-6). 
So the target is clearly the argument from design. The Epicureans offer a different 
explanation: that the infinite number of atoms randomly might produce various objects, such 
as worlds or animals. In regards of animals they maintain that it is plausible to infer that only 
those which have the nature with the best advantages, that is, which are adapted the best in 
their environment, will survive.112 However, the problem with such an explanation, raised by 
their opponents, is that it is highly improbable that the random atomic collisions would 
provide such perfectly ordered universe and creatures.113 The Epicureans reply that given the 
infinity of time and number of atoms, it is conceivable that infinite numbers of atomic 
arrangements can be produced. And as far as the function of the animals and their organs, 
Epicurus maintains, as I already said that the environment would make selection among the 
animals and the functioning of their organs. The important to notice is that the process of 
selection is not purposive but a result of a random atomic collision. The same explanation 
then is applied for the sense organs and the commensurability of particles coming from 
outside that enters the sense organs and cause perception. 
Besides this problem, Epicurus’ theory about the mechanism of vision faces a 
pragmatic difficulty to explain the reception of eidola when they meet the sense organ. One 
well-known problem, among many other mechanical difficulties114, discussed by both ancient 
and modern commentators, is the following. Namely, it is natural to suppose that eidola 
skimmed and released from the surface of the book are of the same size as the book, which no 
matter how small a book you have in front of you, is far bigger than the size of human pupils. 
So the problem points to a general difficulty according to which macroscopic solid objects, 
namely the objects of our visual experience, release eidola whose dimensions are in fact 
inappropriate to be received by the sense organ. Neither Epicurus nor Lucretius elaborates on 
this issue, so we are left with Epicurus’ vague note that eidola must ‘fit’ the sense organ. 
Traditional debate on this issue is nicely summarized by Anderson, who isolates two 
possibilities for the explanation of the way eidola ‘fit’ our eyes in order to be able to enter the 
organ and produce the vision. He names them the contraction and the convergence model of 
reception.115  
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114 I will focus only on one, probably the most famous problem for Epicurus' mechanism of vision. The reason 
for avoiding some deeper analysis of the mechanism of vision is best explained by Bailey (1928) who says: “But 
the discussion of such mechanical difficulties is not perhaps profitable, as Epicurus' theory of vision could not in 
any case be now supported as even a plausible explanation. It is more worthy of observation that he has once 
again secured indirect contact between the object and the eye and that the general idea, though crude, is not after 
all so very far removed from the 'sight-wave' theory of modern science.“ ( 413)  
115 Anderson (http://fs6.depauw.edu:50080/~jeremyanderson/research/Epicurus.pdf), 17-24. 
According to the contraction model116, the eidola must be reduced to the appropriate 
size of a human pupil, in order to be able to enter the organ as a whole and thus cause the 
presentation of the object as well as the whole. According to Bailey the reduction is due to the 
external cause since eidola “in passing through the air, slight as they are, would yet be beaten 
upon all sides by a large number of atoms and loose compound bodies”.117 On the 
convergence model eidola retain the size of the solid object, so not the whole eidolon enters 
the eye, but rather particles of the eidolon, each the size of the pupil. In order to see the whole 
object the eye then must somehow gather together the fragmented peaces like a jigsaw to get 
the presentation. Anderson rightly observes that both models suffer from some serious 
difficulties. It might appears that the contraction model is more acceptable since it is simpler 
and more importantly in accordance with the main characteristic of the eidola, that they as a 
whole retain the resemblance with the solid. In the case of the convergence model, among 
some other problems, it is hard to guarantee that the eyes will gather the fragmented particles 
of the eidolon in the right way and retain the resemblance with the solid.  
So in the explanation of the external part of the mechanism of vision we arrive at the 
point at which the perceptual stream enters the organ and produces a presentation or the vision 
of the objects. In that process of emanation of eidola we can never perceive a single eidolon, 
but always our presentation is of the external object itself, as it is stressed by Lucretius in 
DRN IV.256-264. The continuous stream of eidola combined with the extreme speed of their 
motion is particularly important for the explanation of the following phenomena. First, it is 
important to emphasize that only continuous streams of atoms are capable of producing the 
presentation and not just one eidolon. Next, it is because of the continuity of the flow that our 
vision of objects is stable, because “otherwise objects would appear to flicker and our 
perception of moving objects would be choppy”.118 
 So far we have discussed the cases in which streams of eidola are coming from an 
external solid and enter the eye, i.e. the normal cases of sensory perception. However, 
Epicurus clearly says in paragraph 49 of the Letter quoted above that by impingement of 
something external we not only see, but also think. This implies first, that Epicurus 
understands that the mind (dianoia) sometimes functions in the same way as the sense organs, 
and second that any case of vision, either sense-vision or mental vision is due to an external 
cause, i.e. eidola. Now we have to explain the cases in which vision is not obtained by sense-
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organs, as is obviously the case when one is seeing non-existent objects, such as Centaurs or 
Scyllas, but also in many other cases such as dream-visions or imagination. The duality in the 
functioning of the mind is described by Asmis as follows: 
 
The term dianoia, generally translated as “mind”, refers to the activity or faculty of thinking 
(dianoeisthai) just as the term opsis, “sight”, refers to the activity or faculty of seeing (oran). In both 
cases, the activity consists in having images. Dianoia, therefore, does not imply the use of reason. The 
images that occur in thought may be rationally organized by logismos, “calculation”, but thought 
includes also such irrational processes as dreaming, daydreaming, and hallucinating.119   
 
In other words, the role of mind is not oriented exclusively on operations of reasoning, but 
sometimes mind operates in the same way as sense organs. But what is the mechanism that 
explains such irrational operations of mind? How do we see the non-existent objects? 
Epicurus starts from the assumption that the cases of mental perception share an important 
similarity with the usual cases of seeing external objects, namely that there is something, 
some outside object that is seen. Lucretius says that insofar as “what we see with the mind is 
like what we see with the eye – it must come about in a like way” (Lucretius, DRN IV.750-51, 
transl. LS). In other words, the similarity implies that it is not possible to have a vision 
without having a vision of something since in each case we encounter something. From this 
then the general rule might be inferred that for any perception, including the mental one, 
cannot be originated spontaneously, but must be caused by the object of its attention.  
In the usual cases of perception of external things the cause is a continuous flow of 
eidola released from the surface of the solid as a result of the constant internal vibration of 
atoms within the solid. In such cases only the continuous stream may cause a vision in the 
eye. In the case of mental perceptions Lucretius introduces small changes when it comes to 
the external mechanism that gives rise to mental perceptions. Namely, the mind need not be 
simulated by a constant stream of eidola, because a single eidolon might enter directly into 
the mind and produce a presentation (DRN IV.745-8).120 So just as in the case of sense vision, 
Epicurus now has to give an account of the formation of eidola which produce mental 
perception, that is, of eidola which are not coming from the surface of the existent objects. 
And second he has to explain the way the mind receives those eidola.  
In Epicurus’ writings there is no extant discussion of the formation of such eidola, but 
he mentions that “sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need 
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120 For a view that Epicurus nevertheless holds that all perceptions, including the mental ones, are caused by a 
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not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed” (DL 
X.48, trans. Hicks). We find more on this topic in Lucretius who supports the idea of the 
spontaneous formation of eidola in the air again with the examples from our experience, of 
seeing clouds gathering in the sky and forming various shapes like mountains or monsters 
(Lucretius, DRN IV.129-42). Analogously there are many floating eidola in the air released 
from various solids which might in the same way as clouds get together and form many 
different shapes. Lucretius distinguishes two possibilities of such spontaneous eidolic 
formation. First, they can be produced by a chance combination of two or more eidola coming 
from different solid objects which form a complex eidolon, for example an eidolon of a 
Centaur. Namely, in the case of a Centaur, eidola coming from a horse and a man, which are 
freely floating in the air, are accidentally combined and such a newly produced eidolon 
directly strikes the mind causing the vision of a creature half horse half human being that 
actually does not exist. In the second case Lucretius explains the formation of dreams which 
result from the continuous flow of eidola, which do not produce a single presentation but 
instead “produces the ‘cinematographic’ effect of its being the same image which is 
moving”.121  
When it comes to the reception of such eidola, Lucretius writes that the things that stir 
the mind are of much finer composition than the regular eidola and because of this 
characteristic they “penetrate through the interstices of the body, and awake the thin substance 
of the mind within, and assail the sense” (Lucretius, DRN IV.728-31). In other words, due to 
the specific and subtle texture of eidola formed in the air, only the mind is capable of 
registering and receiving such delicate stimuli. This means that although mental eidola are 
striking other parts of bodies, sense organs are too insensitive to be stimulated by such eidola 
and not commensurable with them.  
So, Epicurus’ aim is to show that there is a parallel between mental and sense 
perception. In proposing his theory of perception Epicurus is obviously guided by the 
following thought. The best way to secure the truthfulness of perception is to prove that 
perceptions are not self-moved but always caused by something external to them. In other 
words, Epicurus follows the previously emphasized commonsensical intuition that perception 
occurs only when there is an object to cause it and that even in the cases of mental visions 
there is something we encounter. That perception is relational and caused by external objects 
seems plausible for the usual cases of perceiving the macroscopic objects. What makes 
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Epicurus’ causal theory of perception specific is the fact that the causes of perception are 
eidola which always match in atomic configuration with the solid from which they are 
released. The objects from outside determines perception, and since in perceiving it is not 
possible to causally affect the nature of the cause, perception must be valid. In other words, it 
is not possible for perception not to accord with the cause or to give a mistaken report about 
its cause. But what about the cases of mental perception? For example, it seems rather strange 
to claim that in hallucination there is an external object causing the vision. Or even worse, 
does this mean that we cannot volitionally and instantaneously think of whatever we want, but 
have to wait for eidola to enter our mind? 
The cases of mental perception are therefore especially important for Epicurus, 
because it is a crucial part of his methodology to prove that all perceptions are true, including 
mental ones, since only in that case is knowledge possible. However, what is striking about 
such a theory of mind and thought, as Asmis emphasizes, is the fact that “all thought consists 
of images produced by particles entering from outside a person”122. This raises many 
problems set forth by Lucretius, of which the most important one is the explanation of the fact 
that we can think instantaneously of anything we like. That is to say, it is quite obvious that 
mind is capable of engaging in deliberate imagination and visualization in which it seems it 
does not wait to be passively stimulated. And Epicurus seems to agree, as we shall see, that 
the mind in the process of mental perception is not passive, but also actively participates in 
the process. Here we are approaching another important issue in Epicurean epistemology, 
namely the problem of focusing of mind and of other sense organs (epibole) in the process of 
formation of phantasia. To put it differently, in the next step our task is to set out in more 
detail the formation of phantasia and the specific internal role of the mind and the sense organ 
in that process. Before we continue with that discussion let me just briefly explain the external 
mechanism of other perceptual modalities.  
 
 
 
2.2.2. Hearing, smell, taste and touch 
 
 In the Letter to Herodotus Epicurus talks about hearing and smell (DL X.52-53), while 
in Lucretius we find presentation of all senses.123 In both processes, just as in vision, the 
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mechanism is explained as the impact of certain particles coming from outside on the sense 
organ. So the general framework is the same for all modalities, since there is always a certain 
emanation, but what is different is the explanation of the sort of particles that cause the 
perception and their formation. Since in Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ writings most of the debate 
is dedicated to sight, we shall follow the same pattern and briefly present the mechanism of 
the other senses. 
 In the case of hearing, there is a current (reusis) coming from the source that emits the 
particles producing the sound. However, the stream is “broken into homogeneous particles, 
which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending 
to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception or, if not, 
merely indicate the presence of the external object” (DL X.52, trans. Hicks). So hearing is 
caused by specific particles that directly strike and enter the ear causing hearing. Therefore, in 
accordance with the materialism which Epicurus adopts, the noise is explained as something 
material. The reason for pointing out that the current is split into smaller particles is to secure 
the possibilities that many people can hear the same noise at the same time. However, the 
smaller aggregates, into which the current is split, preserve the same atomic arrangement as 
the source of noise, just as the eidola in vision keep the semblance of their sender. Here, 
Epicurus also adds that they not only correspond to the source of noise, but also each of the 
broken particles are exactly the same between themselves.  
 As regards smell Epicurus asserts very generally that it is caused by appropriate 
particles that might be of a different sort, thus causing the differences in the smell from 
pleasant to unpleasant (DL X.53). In fact, the mechanical pattern of emanation and reception 
of particles is more or less similar to hearing, which is probably a reason why neither 
Epicurus nor Lucretius elaborates it at length.  
 In Lucretius we find a description of the remaining two senses, taste and touch. What 
is similar to both of them is that they are caused directly by the external object and not by 
some stream or current of particles which is released from the solid, as in the case of the other 
three senses. In the case of taste we chew the food and so “then that which we squeeze out is 
distributed abroad through all the pores and palate and the tortuous passage of the spongy 
tongue” (Lucretius, DRN IV.620-624, transl. Smith). Lucretius clarifies that the differences in 
taste, such as bitterness or sweetness, are caused by differences in the atomic shape of the 
particles. An important characteristic of both taste and smell is that they apparently seem to be 
subjective, expressing not much about the nature of the thing that causes the perception but 
rather our own and private effects in the sense organ. So the cases of the conflict between 
different taste perceptions are one of the usual objections to Epicurus’ claim that all 
perceptions are equally true.  
 The sense of touch is not separately discussed by Lucretius in the same systematic way 
as the other senses. He mentions that when we “knock a stone with a toe, we touch the very 
uppermost surface of the stone and the outermost colour, but we do not feel this by touch, but 
rather we perceive the real hardness of the stone in its depths” (Lucretius, DRN IV.265-8, 
transl. Smith). So just as in the case of taste, we are in direct contact with the object without 
any mediator. In spite of the fact that sight is taken to be the most important sense, being the 
most informative one, it is usually accepted that touch is actually used as a paradigmatic 
sense. It is paradigmatic because all other senses are in fact reduced to touch because they all 
rest on the same general rule: in order to have a perception there must be a contact between 
the organ and external stimulus. External stimulus literally always has to touch the sense 
organ in order to produce a presentation, i.e. eidola touch our eye’s membrane.124 Bailey 
rightly points that this idea is “essentially inherent in a material system”125, emphasizing 
Lucretius’ own words: “for the touch, so help me the holy power of gods, it is touch that is the 
bodily sense” (Lucretius, DRN II.434-5, transl. Smith). 
 So, generally the Epicurean view of the external mechanism that causes all perceptions 
can be explained as consisting the following four elements: (i) there is always an external 
cause, that is an appropriate atomic stream of eidola for vision or other appropriate particles 
(onkoi) for each sense organ; (ii) the cause or the stream is such that it retains a resemblance 
with the original source; (iii) there is also a causal continuity with the source, because of the 
permanent emanation; (iv) there is always a commensurability between the external stimulus 
and the sense organ, such that each sense organ admits only those particles appropriate for 
that organ and (v) that eidola must fit the organ in size. The first element, as already 
mentioned, shows the general framework of Epicurus’ theory of perception as the causal one, 
since every perception necessarily is explained by reference to its external cause. The four 
remaining elements, as we shall see in what follows, serve as necessary conditions for the 
justification of the claim that all perceptions are true, because they provide the foundation for 
the claim that perception cannot but accord with its cause and consequently they explain the 
correspondence of perceptions with external objects. 
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 However, Epicurus mentions in 50 that sometimes position and arrangement in eidola 
could be distorted, as in the case of the well-known example of a tower seen from a distance 
and from nearby discussed by Lucretius and Sextus. The possibility of disturbance is also 
mentioned in 52 in a corresponding discussion of the flow of appropriate atomic aggregates 
(ogkoi) released from the sounding object. So let us first concentrate on the mechanical 
explanation of the distorted eidolic stream and perceptions they cause, and then we shall 
examine the epistemological consequences opened up by the possibility of distortion. As 
reported by Lucretius and Sextus the example tells us that a tower seen from a distance 
appears small and round while from nearby it appears large and square because of the 
following mechanical explanation. Namely, eidola traveling a long distance from the tower to 
the sense organ get damaged because, as Lucretius reports, “while the images are rushing 
through a great space of air, the air with frequent buffetings forces it to become blunt. By this 
means when every angle at once has escaped our vision, the stone structures appear as though 
rounded on a lathe” (Lucretius, DRN IV.358-61, transl. Smith). A similar report about 
distortion of eidola is given by Sextus in M VII.208-9, who more explicitly says that 
perceptions of the tower seen from a different distance are in fact caused by different eidola, 
“because when the sense-object appears to it small and of that shape it really is small and of 
that shape, the edges of the images getting eroded as a result of their travel through air. And 
when it appears big and of another shape instead, it likewise is big and of another shape 
instead” (transl. LS 16E).  
It would seem from what has been said so far that it follows straightforwardly from the 
analysis of the mechanism of perception that the genuine objects of perception are eidola (or 
appropriate ogkoi for the sense organs other than vision)126. It is supported by what Epicurus 
says in paragraph 49, quoted above, namely that it is only by the constant impact of 
something external, namely eidola, that we see and think of objects.  
However, allowing the possibility of the distortion of eidola has serious 
epistemological consequences. Namely since perceptions might be caused by damaged eidolic 
streams, than it follows that they cannot be regarded as if they always accurately accord with 
their source, e. g. a tower, and therefore perception either turns out as an unreliable cognitive 
source, which is the skeptical solution, or it follows that only some perceptions are true. In 
addition, we have already seen that not all perceptions are caused by eidola released from the 
external solids, but can be formed freely in the air, as in the cases of mental vision, and can 
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very easily be considered as if they had a solid object as its source. Therefore, in order to 
defend the central claim that all perceptions are true, we have to see how Epicurus’ theory on 
the mechanism of perceiving explains what are usually taken to be the cases of 
misperceptions, that is, how it solves the challenge posed by the argument from conflicting 
appearances.  
 It appears that in order to solve the problem of the apparent conflict between 
perceptions it is crucial to provide an adequate answer to the central question: what are the 
proper objects of perception? In a broader epistemological context, the question about the 
objects of perception entails taking into consideration more general epistemological problems. 
Namely, in order to understand the claim that perceptions are true, we have to elucidate what 
in fact is the content of perception to which the notion of truth is ascribed. Consequently, this 
entails elucidation of the proper sense of the Greek term for ‘true’ (alethes) which by itself is 
ambiguous, meaning both real and true, implying thus two rather different interpretations of 
the claim that every aisthesis is alethes. However, the ambiguity of the claim does not depend 
only on the meaning of alethes. 
 When talking about ambiguity of the terms, the term ‘perception’ is not without 
difficulties. The first problem is that it is translation of the Greek terms aisthesis and 
phantasia, which technically are not synonyms. As Striker explains, aisthesis, “where it does 
not denote the faculty of sense-perception, is translated either as ‘sensation’ – meaning the 
process of being acted upon by a sensible object – or as ‘perception’ – meaning recognition of 
a sensible object (as in ‘I see a man’) or of an sensible fact (as in ‘I see that it’s raining’). 
Phantasia, on the other hand, is usually rendered as ‘sense impression’ or ‘presentation’, 
meaning the result of the process of perception.”127 In his writings Epicurus uses both terms, 
though regularly and frequently aisthesis when referring to the criterion of truth, but without 
any clear distinction between ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’. Phantasia is explicitly used by 
Epicurus, as in 50, to denote the result of the impingement of eidola on the sense organ, both 
for the sense and mental vision, but with a clear idea that all phantasiai are truthful. Since the 
idea as such does not appear in Epicurus writings, but is ascribed to him by other philosophers 
as a slogan of his epistemology, we have to consult other sources to determine whether his 
central thesis includes aisthesis in the narrow sense of sensation or the broader sense of 
phantasiai as alethes. Striker located three different versions of the thesis that all phantasiai 
are truthful in other sources128: (i) in which both terms are used: ‘All the impressions 
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(phantasiai) reaching us through the senses (aisthesis) are alethes’ (Plut. Adv. Col. 1109 B, 
transl. De Lacy); ‘Every aisthesis and phantasia is alethes’ (Aristocles apud Eus. Praep. Ev. 
XIV, 20, 5, transl. Taylor); (ii) using only phantasia: ‘Every phantasia is alethes’ (SE 
M.VII.203-4, 210); (iii) using the term ‘senses’ instead of the two: ‘My senses are veracious’ 
(Cicero, Luc. 25, 79, transl. Brittain).  
What can be inferred from this is that the sources do not use the terms uniformly 
which in fact reflect Epicurus’ practice of using both terms interchangeably as alethes, 
including all the cases of sense and mental perceiving as the criterion of truth, without precise 
specification of their content. The strict difference between aisthesis as a ‘sensation’ or 
‘faculty’ on one side, and ‘phantasia’ as a ‘presentation’ or ‘appearance’ was developed later 
when those terms became technical terms in Hellenistic epistemology, primarily used and 
distinguished as such by the Stoics. Epistemologically the distinction in the sense between 
aisthesis and phantasia is important because strictly speaking only phantasia, having 
propositional content, can be evaluated as true or false. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand what the proper content of aisthesis or phantasia is in order to establish it as the 
criterion of truth which is supposed to give us knowledge. This consequence is tightly 
connected with the previously mentioned two different readings of the term ‘alethes’, as ‘real’ 
and ‘true’, facing us with two rather different interpretations of what on Epicurus’ account it 
means to claim that perceptions are true. However, in order to offer a complete justification of 
the thesis that all perceptions are true first we have to examine Epicurus’ account of the 
internal role of the sense organ in the process of perceiving. 
 
2.3. Internal mechanism of perception  
  
Epicurus’ explanation of the central thesis does not end with the external account of 
the perceptual mechanism. An equally relevant part of the theory of perceiving for 
justification of the incorrigibility of perceptions and the central claim that ‘all perceptions are 
true’ is the response of the sense organ to the external stimulus and internal contribution made 
by the sense organ itself. In the case of mind, internal contribution is twofold, consisting of 
both an irrational response to the impingement of eidola and rational interpretation of what is 
reported by perception. Understanding of this inner process of formation of perceptions, 
combined with a proper understanding of the object and the content of perception should 
provide us in the end with Epicurus’ solution to the problem of conflicting appearances and 
his explanation of perceptual truth as a foundation for the criterion of truth. So, let us start 
first with the equally relevant, internal part of the mechanism of perceiving. 
One part of Epicurus’ explanation in 49-50 of the formation of phantasia, namely its 
external part consists of the constant impact of the eidolic stream on the sense organ. Epicurus 
goes on to explain the internal part in the paragraph 50 in the following way: 
 
And whatever impression (phantasian) we get by focusing (epibletikos) our thought or senses, whether 
of shape or of properties, that is the shape of the solid body, produced through the image’s 
concentrated succession or after-effect. (DL X.50, transl. LS 15A) 
 
 To start with a general remark, this sentence, as Asmis rightly points out, is considered 
as central for the understanding of Epicurean epistemology since it here Epicurus sets out “a 
criterion of truth, as he identifies a certain type of presentation [phantasia] with a certain state 
of affairs”.129 The veridicality of perception is explained in terms of a perfect correspondence 
between perception and the external reality or states of affairs, as Asmis puts it. In the 
description of the truthfulness Epicurus now introduces some new and more technical terms 
that are supposed to explain internal response of the sense-organ or mind and to reveal a 
condition for the reliability of perceptions, namely the two methods by which they are 
obtained. So, in the first sentence is introduced an important new term that characterizes the 
internal response of both the sense-organ and the mind, by saying that every perception 
(phantasia) “we get by focusing (epibletikos) our thought or senses” is true. As we shall see, 
the term epibole plays particularly important role in the explanation of attaining mental 
perceptions. And in the next sentence he specifies two methods of obtaining perceptions 
(phantasiai), that is, by a concentrated succession of eidola and by their after-effect.  
 To the list of Epicurus’ vague and ambiguous epistemological terms we can add the 
term epibole which has been subject of much debate. First it occurs in the introductory note of 
the Letter in 36 in a very general sense, where Epicurus warns his students to memorize the 
Letter, in order to be able to focus (epibole) on the facts (epi ta pragmata). More specific 
meaning occurs later in the Letter when he exposes the core demand of his epistemology, 
namely “that we should observe (terein) everything in the light of our sensations, and in 
general in the light of our present focusing whether of thought or of any of our discriminatory 
faculties” (DL X.38, transl. LS 17C), thus setting out perceptions as the main criterion against 
which everything should be tested. Similarly as in 50, epibole is used in 62 and KD XXIV 
where he in fact summarized what he takes to be the criterion of truth. In 62 Epicurus says 
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that “our canon is that direct observations by sense and direct focusing (epibole) of the mind 
are alone invariably true”, and in KD XXIV repeats almost the same in the context of 
distinguishing between formed opinion and something “what is already present through 
sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression 
(phantastike epibole tes dianoias)”. So, what in fact is epibole? 
 Interpretations of the term and of its function within Epicurus epistemology can be 
divided in two groups: in the first are those commentators who take it that epibole is a 
voluntary and active act made by the sense organ and mind and on the other those who deny 
it. The most prominent reading in the first sense is given by Bailey who claims that “the 
natural meaning of epibole used of operations of the senses or the mind is a ‘projection upon’, 
and so ‘attention to’, and, with added notion of the result, ‘apprehension’ and even ‘view’”130. 
To this he adds that those acts, both of the sense and the mind, contains of an active element 
and are opposed to mere passive response to external stimuli. Another part of his reading is 
interpretation of focusing of the mind (epibole tes dianoias), for which he takes to be “the 
immediate apprehension by an act of mental attention” and “the immediate or ‘intuitive’ 
apprehension of concepts, and in particular of the ‘clear’, i.e. self-evident concepts of 
scientific thought”131. The later part of the explanation aims to show that perceptions obtained 
by epibole tes dianoias single out specific class of perceptions which are always true for 
which Bailey takes to be supported by 38 and 62 of the Letter, and KD XXIV. Bailey thus 
introduces classification of perceptions, claiming that only those perceptions produced by 
epibole, both of aisthesis and dianoia, are without falsity: in the case of the senses epibole is 
apprehension of the ‘clear vision’ of the near objects, while in the case of the mind epibole is 
a direct mental apprehension of the ‘clear’ concepts.132  
 An interpretation of Epicurus totally opposed to Bailey’s is given by Furley. Not only 
does he criticize Bailey for taking epibole tes dianoias as picking out specific, veridical class 
of perceptions about scientific concepts, but he also challenges the suggested idea that epibole 
characterizes active engagement of the sense organ and the mind in the process of perceiving. 
The key argument, Furley maintains, is the fact that among the perceptions that are obtained 
by epibole are included dreams and all other kind of imaginary visions, for which Epicurus in 
50 claims to be alethes in the same way as all other perceptions obtained by epibole. Given 
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the fact that among epibolai we find both dreams and waking perceptions, Furley concludes 
that “we have therefore incontrovertible evidence that epibole is not necessarily an act of 
concentration or deliberate attention”133. For Furley then epibole does not have any important 
role in Epicurus’ theory, but is explained as completely passive process which just serve as an 
explanation of how illusory and dreamy perceptions are obtained. Furley establishes his 
reading on the paragraph 51, but also on Lucretius’ discussion of dreams and illusory images 
(Lucretius, DRN IV.722-76) where Lucretius defend Epicurus’ idea that all cases of 
perceptions are caused by something real, namely eidola, and thus equally trustworthy.  
 Indeed, Lucretius’ report might be helpful in settling the issue on epibole. He very 
carefully examines Epicurus’ obscure idea that even mental perceptions are also caused by 
some external stimuli, based on the principle that “insofar as what we see with the mind is 
similar to what we see with the eyes, it must come about in a similar way” (Lucretius, DRN 
IV.750-1). We have already seen Lucretius’ explanation of the external mechanism of mental 
vision consisting of much finer sorts of eidola that are floating freely around and may be 
hooked up in many various combinations, such as Centaurs or other non-existing things. 
However, Lucretius, being aware of the problems Epicurus’ theory of mental vision faces, 
presents the possible challenges to the theory and replies to them as follows: 
 
This matter raises many questions, and there is much that we must clarify if we want to expound the 
facts clearly. The first question is why each person’s mind immediately thinks of the very thing that he 
has formed a desire to think of. Do the images observe our will, so that as soon as we form the wish 
the images impinge on us, whether our desire be to think of sea, land or sky? Are assemblies, parades, 
parties and battles all created and supplied by nature on demand, and in spite of the fact that 
everything which the minds of other people in the same place thinking of is quite different? A further 
question is, what about our seeing in our dreams the images rhythmically going forward and moving 
their supple limbs, when they fluently swing their supple arms in alteration and before our very eyes 
replicate the gesture with matching foot movements? No doubt the images are steeped in technique, 
and have taken lessons in wandering to enable them to have fun at night-time! Or will this be nearer 
the truth? Because within a single period of time detectable by our senses – the time it takes to utter a 
single sound – there lie hidden many periods of time whose existence is discovered by reason, it 
follows that everywhere at every time every image is ready on the spot: so great the speed and 
availability of things. And because they are delicate the mind can only see sharply those of them 
which it strains to see. Hence the remainder all perish, beyond those for which the mind has prepared 
itself. The mind further prepares itself by hoping to see the sequel to each thing, with the result that 
this comes about. Don’t you see how eyes too, when they begin to see things which are delicate, strain 
and prepare themselves, and that there is no other way of seeing things sharply. As a matter of fact, 
even with things plain to see you can discover that the result of failing to pay attention is that it 
becomes like something separated from you by the whole of time and far away. (Lucretius, DRN 
IV.777-813, transl. LS 15D) 
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 So it is clear that Lucretius sets out an Epicurean idea that mental vision has an 
external stimulus, which Long and Sedley explains as motivated by a Platonist assumption, 
“so common in Greek thought, that if I succeed in thinking of x then x must objectively exist 
for me to think of”134. Two major challenges for the view according to Lucretius are the 
explanation of deliberate and immediate thinking of anything a person likes and the 
explanation of dreams.135 Lucretius’ reply consists of two arguments. The first argument aims 
to show that there are infinitely many eidola that might cause all kinds of possible perceptions 
by appeal to already introduced distinction between perceptible and imperceptible time. 
Namely, in any perceptible period of time “reason can distinguish many smaller periods in 
each of which ‘idols’ of all sorts are present everywhere, swiftly moving in great numbers”136. 
To put it simply, in the external world there exist not only those eidola that are immediate 
causes of our mental vision at certain moment, but enormously many eidola of all kinds, 
floating around and moving rapidly in an imperceptible period of time, that is “as fast as 
thought”, ready to be perceived. Therefore, we can think of anything we want because all 
kinds of eidola are actually floating around. The second argument explains the fact that we 
can think of anything we want is explained by the ‘preparation of the mind’. The preparation 
of the mind is explained in an analogy with seeing small things when our eyes have to strain 
to see small objects. Analogously the mind has to prepare itself or to focus on the things 
wanting to observe.  
The function of the second argument is to explain that we can think of anything 
deliberately on the grounds that there is a special ability of mind to focus voluntarily on 
certain eidola and neglect others that corresponds to Epicurus’ notion of epibole tes dianoias. 
Lucretius finds the support for this claim on an analogy with sense-experience. Namely, in the 
case of perceiving some delicate or thin object eyes have to “prepare themselves”, that is to 
ignore all other visible objects and focus on just that particular thing in order to “see it 
sharply”. From this Lucretius concludes that in all cases of perceptions both the sense organs 
and the mind have certain internal responses by which they are able to pick out and focus on 
particular eidola among an enormous number of others. This again corresponds to Epicurus’ 
text where he associates epibole with both the senses (aesthesis) and the mind (dianoia). This 
supports the idea previously mentioned that the mind in Epicurus’ theory of perception 
function in the same way as the sense organs, and just as in order to see any external object 
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with our eyes we have to pay attention to that object, in the same way in order to imagine or 
think of anything the mind has to focus on a particular object of thought. The idea that the 
mind is putting some effort in obtaining perceptions led Bailey to conclude that epibole 
indicates an active response and that the focusing of the mind guarantees veridicality of 
perceptions. He relies on Lucretius’ example of eyes’ making an effort to produce a sharp and 
clear perception of an object, claiming that in the cases of the senses epibole produces a clear 
and close view of an object as it is in reality. According to Bailey “all ‘images’ perceived by 
the sight are true, because they correspond to an external reality, but it is only the ‘clear 
image’ obtained by ‘apprehension of the senses’ [epibole tes aisthesis] which can be used as 
the basis of scientific knowledge”137. The analogy with the mind’s focusing implies that also 
‘sharp and clear’ perceptions are obtained, namely such perceptions that are always truthful as 
a result of direct intuition guaranteeing us the grasp of scientific concepts. This interpretation 
of epibole tes dianoias goes neatly with the fact that it was added as the fourth criterion of 
truth by later Epicureans. Namely, epibole tes dianoias as a result has a sort of intuitive 
knowledge of the clear concepts such as atoms and void and thus secure certainty of the main 
postulates of atomistic theory. Since these concepts are self-evident (enarges) truths, Bailey 
takes it to be a good explanation of why epibole tes dianoias is later added as the fourth 
criterion of truth. 
However, Bailey’ claim that epibole is an act that singles out specific class of 
perceptions that can be regarded as truthful seems to be directly opposed, first, to the fact that 
all perceptions are produced by focusing (epibole) of the senses or the mind and second to 
Epicurus’ central idea that unless all perceptions are accepted as equally reliable and 
trustworthy, knowledge becomes unattainable.138 As Furley notices, epibole tes phantasias is 
used in order to explain all cases of mental vision, including illusory images and dreams. The 
idea that in fact all perceptions are produced by epibole will be supported when we come to 
the explanation of the methods by which perceptions are produces in the organ.  
 But nevertheless Lucretius’ arguments indeed show that epibole refers to some kind of 
active response by the sense organ and the mind. This needs to be explained, especially since 
Epicurus establishes the truthfulness of perception on the claim that they are passive 
responses. So maybe a promising interpretation of epibole is in fact a good combination of 
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Bailey’s and Furley’s positions, namely the one offered by Asmis. She sets out her view as 
follows: 
 
It is clear from Lucretius’ discussion that the act of straining does not serve to mark off veridical from 
deceptive presentations. Rather, it serves to bring an object into focus; and the more intense the 
straining, the more distinct object. […] But we may suppose that in all cases of perception an object is 
brought into focus as the result of some straining by the perceptual organ. An epibole, “application”, 
therefore, is a response by which the perceptual organ makes an effort to bring an object into focus; 
and it is neither guarantee of a truthful presentation nor simply a passive submission to external 
influence.139 
 
 Asmis’ interpretation of epibole accepts Bailey’s reading according to which epibole 
is an active response both from the sense organ and the mind combined with Furley’s reading 
that this does not guarantee any kind of selection between perceptions such that epibole 
produces only truthful one. It seems to me that Asmis’ rightly takes over those parts of the 
two offered readings of epibole which are at best supported by the evidence. However, the 
notion of the ‘activity’ of the organ needs to be qualified more precisely. Namely, it is 
obvious from Lucretius’ examples that the sense organs and the mind make an active response 
that can be understood as focusing on a particular object of attention. Probably this just means 
that in order to see some particular object, one has to make some cognitive effort, that is, to 
focus and pick out that particular object as the object of attention and not some other present 
in the extremely rich visual field. But how does the fact that Epicurus recognizes this active 
element square with his view that senses are just passively responding to external stimuli? It 
seems to me that there is no inconsistency in Epicurus’ view because the ability of the sense 
organs and the mind to focus is rather limited action. Namely, an act of focusing should be 
understood just as the ability of the sense organ and the mind to receive external stimulus, but 
does not imply that in that process they are engaged in any other cognitive process or 
operation with the stimuli. At the beginning of 49 Epicurus maintains that external stimuli are 
‘coming in’ (epeiseimi) from the external object so the activity of the sense organs is 
supposed to be understood, I suggest, only in as much as they let in some of the stimuli. In 
addition, the activity of the organ is further qualified by the fact that each sense organ ‘let in’ 
only those stimuli that are commensurate with the organ and appropriate in size. From this it 
follows that the focusing of the sense organ and the mind is an ability to give attention to the 
fitting objects.140 And as Asmis concludes, focusing (epibole) of the sense organ and the mind 
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when functioning as the sense organ is a response that is not volitional but an automatic, 
passive response and receiving of external stimuli that results in obtaining a perception 
(phantasia). This idea can be traced in Furley’s definition of epibletikos as the “process by 
which the mind or the sense ‘get hold of’ something”141. 
 Let me just briefly turn to the problem of epibole tes dianoias as the fourth criterion. 
In Bailey’s, rather problematic view, it is clear that it is taken as the criterion since it produces 
only veridical perceptions, namely scientific truths. The fact that later Epicureans added it as 
the independent criterion of truth might reflect the following. Since aisthesis in Hellenistic 
epistemology, especially under Stoic’s influence, was not used to denote all kinds of 
perceptions, but those produced by the senses, maybe the addition of epibole tes dianoias was 
supposed to emphasize Epicurus’ idea that all perceptions, including mental ones, are the 
criterion of truth. This can be further supported if we consider two methods by which 
perceptions are obtained. 
 Within the internal mechanism of obtaining perceptions Epicurus recognizes two 
methods by which perception is produced after an external object affect the organ, namely 
concentrated succession and remaining. The first one, concentrated succession (puknoma tou 
eidolou) clearly indicates the continuous stream of eidola released from the surface of the 
solid and when the contact with the sense organ is made, perception is produced. As already 
emphasized, Epicurus maintains that no single eidolon can ever produce a perception but only 
a constant stream coming from the solid’s surface.  
However, the second method of after-effect or residue of eidola (egkataleimma tou 
eidolou) is more problematic for interpretation. The common understanding of the method is 
that it applies strictly to mental perceptions, obtained by the impact of the very fine eidola 
which, instead of impacting on the eye, penetrate straight through to the mind. Among 
proponents of this reading is Bailey who claims that “it may be sometimes that the single 
‘idol’ will penetrate through the pores of the body to the mind itself”.142 What happens when 
such an eidolon impacts on the mind is elucidated by Furley who claims that such eidola 
passes through the mind, but leave some mark on the soul and that the ‘remaining effect’ 
(egkataleimma) is “a pattern left behind as a memory of a previous sense-experience”.143 The 
function of the remaining effect is probably to secure an explanation of the way memory 
works since Epicurus, to emphasize again, claims that not any perception is self-moved. The 
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similarity between true and allegedly false perception lies in the fact that they are produced in 
the same way. Thus the function of epibole tes dianoias is to explain the way the mind acts as 
if it were a sixth sense organ. 
What is more important about the sentence in which Epicurus introduces two methods 
of obtaining of perception is the explanation of what makes a true perception, that is, he gives 
the condition of the truthfulness and explanation of the perception as the criterion of truth. Let 
me repeat the quote again. Epicurus maintains that “whatever impression (phantasian) we get 
by focusing (epibletikos) our thought or senses, whether of shape or of properties, that is the 
shape of the solid body, produced through the image’s concentrated succession or after-
effect”. In other words, every perception produced by the two methods is true because it 
accurately corresponds to its cause and truly represents the shape and other properties of an 
object. Accuracy of the perception is thus grounded in the two methods. This is so because 
Epicurus maintains that the eidola is an identical replica of the solid released from its surface 
and retains the same atomic arrangement as in the solid.  
In order to stress the perfect correspondence between eidola and the solid Epicurus 
says about eidola that “their unity and continuity then results in the impression, and preserves 
their co-affection (sumpatheia) all the way from the object because of their uniform 
bombardment from it”. (DL X.50, transl. LS 15A) The co-affection or sympathy is a relation 
between the eidola themselves and the external object from which they are emitted and it 
plays a crucial role in securing the truthfulness of perceptions. This is the reason why we have 
a perception of “the single and continuous object”, because sympathy works as the condition 
that secures perceptual unity and immediate awareness of an external object. The fact that in 
perception we are immediately aware of an external object is emphasized by Epicurus who 
claims that perception is “of the solid body” or even clearly in Lucretius who maintains that 
“one thing in this matter which should not be thought puzzling is why, although the images 
which strike the eyes cannot be seen individually, the objects themselves are perceived”. 
(Lucretius, DRN IV.256-8, transl. LS 15C) Asmis describes Epicurus’ strategy in the 
following way: 
 
Accordingly, in the sentence on the form of the solid, Epicurus is proposing a single criterion of 
perceptible reality: the direct response of the perceptual organ to particles that have entered from 
outside. Instead of drawing distinction between truthful and deceptive presentation, he eliminates this 
distinction by identifying the external object of perception with the content of a perception.144  
 
                                                 
144 Asmis (1984), 139. 
 I agree with Asmis’ explanation that includes all the main conditions for the 
truthfulness of perception, namely (i) the direct response of the organ (epibole), (ii) external 
cause (eidola), to which we should add, the third crucial thing, namely (iii) sympathy 
(sumpatheia), that is, the correspondence between eidola and the source from which the unity 
of perception arises, as we are told in 50. And I agree with Asmis that Epicurus’ solution is to 
deny the distinction between true and false perception on the basis of identifying the content 
of perception with the external cause, since in that case perception is true because simply the 
truthfulness of perception consists in the exact correspondence between perception and its 
cause and there is nothing else to which it can correspond. But what is not clear from Asmis’ 
elaboration is what in fact the proper object of perception is. And that seems to be crucial part 
of the justification of the claim about perceptual incorrigibility, as we shall see. 
However, it seems that both Epicurus and Lucretius clearly point out the possible 
candidates for the proper cause: eidola, which are immediate causes, the external solid as the 
object of which we are aware in our perception and properties of the object, such as shape or 
colour of a solid. What is also clear from Epicurus’ theory is that he wants to preserve the 
intuitive idea that our perception is always perception of external objects, such as towers or 
honey, and that such a perception is the one that is always true. This intuition leads to the 
conclusion proposed by some commentators that it is more than clear that the proper object of 
perception have to be external objects. But this reading, no matter how tempting and intuitive 
seems to be, faces the serious problem, namely it is challenged by the argument from 
conflicting appearances. The tower seen from afar produces a different perception from the 
one seen form a nearby. If the object of perception is the tower, than perceptions are reporting 
two different contents of the same object and one of them is clearly false.  
In order to solve the problem that I have just indicated and to justify the thesis that ‘all 
perceptions are true’, Epicurus has to reply to the argument from conflicting appearances and 
to explain the source of the error. The solution lies in providing an answer to the question first 
about the proper objects of perception in order to determine the content of what we are 
ascribing as true or false, and second in determining the sense of alethes, that is to decide 
whether it should be understood as ‘real’ or ‘true’. So let us closely examine the cases that are 
usually taken to be misperceptions.  
 
 
2.4 Justification of the thesis ‘all perceptions are true’ 
 
Epicurus’ account of the mechanism of vision, according to which perception is a 
result of the impact of eidola on the sense organ and the internal, passive response of the 
sense organ, is supposed to grant that the content of perception is entirely determined by the 
external cause. Since all external objects are emanating eidola which preserve the same 
atomic configuration as the solid from which they are released they are exact replicas of the 
solid, being of the same shape and colour as the solid and thus are truly reporting the nature of 
the solid. Two things are important to emphasize: first, given such mechanism of perceiving, 
it is obvious that the solid does not affect the sense organ directly, but via eidola, and second, 
it is important that eidola in an ideal situation preserve all the properties of the solid on the 
basis of which it is possible to maintain that perceptions correctly report the solid as it is.  
In the ideal situation, the eidola perfectly match the solid, and we feel that there is 
nothing wrong in such a case to say that the perception truthfully report the object as it is and 
consequently that the object of perception is the external solid. In other words, here we find a 
perfect correspondence between perception and the object, representing the nature of the thing 
as it really is.  Because of this we can say that perceptions reveal the truth about the external 
objects and when they report, say a tower to be square, their report is accurate since the eidola 
affecting them preserve the exact structure and the properties of the tower from which they 
are emitted, i.e. the eidola are square, revealing thus the true nature of the tower. The 
justification of the incorrigibility of perception in that case follows directly from the physical 
mechanism of perceiving as we are told in the previously quoted passage 50 of the Letter. So 
in this ideal cases of perceiving the intuitive idea that the proper object of perception is an 
external solid, i.e. a tower, seems to be perfectly plausible and clearly emphasized by 
Lucretius that in the process of perceiving we never perceive the eidola but always an external 
solid. This aim clearly follows from Epicurus’ overall epistemological project that attempts to 
secure knowledge about the world by providing a standard by which knowledge can be 
gained. Thus, in order for perceptions to play the role of the epistemic standard of that kind, it 
is necessary for them to reveal the truth about the external objects, e.g. towers, oars and the 
like, and to objectively represent their nature.  
But what about the cases when perceptions do not represent an actual state of affair, as 
in the case of seeing a tower as round or an oar in the water as bent, or even worse in the cases 
of ‘seeing’ Centaurs or Scylla, and of dreams. If the truth of all perceptions should be 
understood, as for instance Bailey claims, in the sense of the ‘truth’ as an exact 
correspondence between the content of perception and the external solids as the objects of 
perception, the examples set forth show that this is simply false and easily refute that 
interpretation of the truthfulness of perceptions. Bailey’s solution for the cases of 
misperception, such as a tower seen from a distance or an oar submerged in water, suggests 
distinguishing between the cases of “‘the clear images’ obtained by the ‘attention of the 
senses’ (epibole ton aistheterion) which alone is of scientific value” and all others, although a 
few lines later in the text he states that “all ‘images’ perceived by the sight are true, because 
they correspond to an external reality, but it is only ‘the clear image’ obtained by 
‘apprehension of the senses’ which can be used as the basis of scientific knowledge”145. What 
is unclear from Bailey’s interpretation is why not all perceptions are used as a foundation for 
knowledge, if as he says, all perceptions are ‘true’. The problem lies in the fact that he 
ascribes truthfulness to all perceptions, but nevertheless picks out only the ‘clear images’ as a 
basis for knowledge. This anyhow implies that only the latter sort of perceptions are the kind 
that should be considered as ‘true’ in the sense of the criterion which Epicurus seeks to 
establish. DeWitt follows Bailey’s idea that Epicurus distinguishes between the classes of 
perception, but makes a step further in interpretation claiming that it is totally mistaken to 
ascribe to Epicurus the thesis about the truthfulness of all perceptions, because Epicurus 
“clearly indicated by the terminology he employed the difference between true and false 
presentations. A true presentation is phantasia or a phantastike epibole while all others are 
styled phantasmata or phantasmoi”.146 So the first problem we have to deal with is the 
interpretation of the thesis that ‘all perceptions are aletheis’ if as Bailey and DeWitt suggest 
Epicurus distinguishes between true and false perceptions. 
Some scholars suggest that the solution for the problem, as previously mentioned, is to 
be found in a different interpretation of ‘true’ (alethes) in the thesis that ‘all perceptions are 
true (alethes)’, namely in the sense of ‘real’. The main evidence for this reading are the 
passages from Sextus M VIII 9, where he says that for Epicurus there is no difference between 
saying that a thing is ‘true’ and ‘real’ and the passage DL X 32 where Diogenes reports the 
Epicurean position saying that “the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our 
senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain” (transl. Hicks). Also in the last 
sentence of Diogenes’ passage ‘truthfulness’ of perceptions in the case of madmen and in 
dreams is elucidated by the fact that in those cases some movement occurs, that is to say that 
misperceptions are just as real as normal perceptions in as much as they show that something 
appears to us. The ‘realistic’ reading is here supported particularly by the fact that alethes of 
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misperceptions is contrasted and opposed to ‘what does not exist’ (to me on) implying that 
alethes is then synonymous to ‘exist’ (to on).  
One of the first among scholars who offered the ‘realistic’ reading of alethes is DeWitt 
who suggests that ‘true’ (alethes) should be taken to denoting “to on or to huparchon, self-
existent or arising from self-existent”, claiming that only in this sense all perceptions are 
‘true’, i.e. real or existent because all perceptions have material cause. This reading according 
to DeWitt is supposed to save Epicurus’ central thesis that ‘all perceptions are true’ from 
being notoriously absurd by showing that Epicurus attribute alethes to all perceptions only 
because “false presentations also register themselves; they are alethes, ‘real’, but they are not 
true as a phantasia is real and true”.147 Therefore, DeWitt’s main argument is that this reading 
is supported by Epicurus’ own terminology used to indicate the distinction between true and 
false perceptions, taking it that true perceptions are called phantasia or phantastike epibole, 
while false ones are phantasmata or phantasmoi. So in the case of perceptual errors, 
phantasmata of a madman are not characterized as alethes in order to denote their 
truthfulness, but mere existence of a perceptual state of a madman, while truthfulness is 
reserved only for phantasiai. Thus, DeWitt concludes that Epicurus in fact did not hold at all 
that all perceptions are equal in trustworthiness, as the long tradition of his rather hostile 
critics accused him of.  
Long establishes his reading of alethes as ‘real’ on the analogy between perceptions 
and pain from Diogenes’ passage where he claims that perceptions are alethes in the same 
sense as pleasure and pain are.148 From this Long infers the following: 
 
If we consider the truth to be only a function of propositions and translate alethes by ‘true’, Epicurus’ 
usage will seem illegitimate. A headache is not something true or false. In Greek, however, alethes is 
regularly used to designate what is real or actual as well as the truth of statements. Epicurus’ 
applications is perfectly intelligible if we take him to be saying that these notions give us perch on 
certain facts, namely: that of which they are awareness.149 
 
Long suggests similarly as DeWitt that perceptions should not be taken as ‘true’ in the 
usual, propositional sense, but only as a ‘real’ state of awareness just as a headache is.150 
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Namely, the force of the comparison with the headache consists in questioning of the 
possibility that perceptions are the sort of things that can evaluated as true or false in the same 
way as opinions if they are taken to be alethes in the same sense as pleasure and pain. Since it 
seems rather implausible to claim that headache is ‘true’, preferable reading of alethes turns 
out to be ‘real’. Rist continues in the same direction claiming that “what Epicurus means 
when he says that all sensations are true is that a real event takes place in the act of 
sensing”151. He establishes his reading on the fact that Epicurus takes perceptions to be 
irrational (alogos) and impossible to refute (DL X.31-32). The irrefutability of perceptions 
Rist interprets in the following way: 
 
There is nothing to refute; sensations do not involve any reasoning of any kind, either true or false. 
They are simply what happens to the atomic components of the sense-organs of the body, and in 
Epicurus’ view all reasoning depends on them. How he interprets these bodily happenings is another 
matter; the happenings themselves are true in the sense of being actual data through which we obtain 
contact with the external world.152  
 
 It seems that Rist’s reading thus suggests that the fact that perceptions are alogos 
implies that ‘truth’ should not be understand in the same sense as ‘truth’ ascribed to 
propositions because perceptions, being alogos, do not have such a content that can be 
characterized as true or false being just “bodily happenings”. Recently the same interpretation 
according to which alogos means that perceptions have no content is offered by O’Keefe.153 
In his view perceptions as non-propositional and always alethes are contrasted to opinions 
which are propositional and therefore eligible for evaluating as true or false which is 
supported by Epicurean theory of distinguishing between two kinds of movements that 
happens in the act of perceiving and judging. (DL X.51) To this important difference between 
perception and opinion we shall return again later in the discussion, but let me now sum up 
the main points of the ‘realistic’ reading of alethes.  
The main motivation for this reading is to solve the difficulties and the absurdity that 
come out of the claim that all perceptions are equal in trustworthiness which seems to be 
simply false because of many cases of perceptual error. By taking alethes as ‘real’ it becomes 
more plausible to claim first, that the illusory perceptions of a madman and dream visions are 
‘true’, that is, ‘real’ events in one’s perceptual sensory organs; second, the ‘realistic’ reading 
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fits better with the comparison of perceptions with pain and pleasure, as a kind of states which 
cannot be characterized as ‘true’ having no content to which the truthfulness in a 
propositional sense can be ascribed; and finally the third, namely that the comparison with the 
bodily states accords with the characterization of perception as alogos, because of which 
perception, just like a headache, cannot be evaluated as true or false, having no propositional 
content. Therefore, according to this reading only opinions can be taken as true and false 
simpliciter, while perceptual ‘truthfulness’ consist only in being a real event, i.e. the sense 
organ being stimulated by real, existing eidola. 
 In spite of the fact that it seems that some passages suggest plausibility of the 
‘realistic’ reading of alethes, this interpretation faces some serious difficulties. First of all, if 
the textual support is considered closely, it rather begins to speak against the theory. We can 
start with Epicurus’ own writings from the Letter where he says the following: 
 
But falsehood and error are always located in the opinion which we add. For the portrait-like 
resemblance of the impressions which we gain either in sleep or in certain other focusings of thought 
or of the other discriminatory faculties, to the things we call existent and true [tois ousi te kai alethesi], 
would not exist if the things with which we come into contact were not themselves something. And 
error would not exist if we did not also get a certain other process within ourselves, one which, 
although causally connected, possesses differentiation. (DL X.50-51, transl. LS 15A) 
 
 This passage comes right after the explanation of the main conditions for the 
truthfulness of perceptions in 50, explaining now the source of error and thus broadening his 
explanation of the theory of perceptions as the reliable basis for obtaining knowledge. 
Epicurus does that by introducing within the theory a sharp distinction between opinions and 
perceptions through which his view of the role of perceptions as the criterion of truth finally 
becomes fully explained and justified. But since our present focus of interest is finding out the 
genuine sense of the term ‘true’ (alethes) let us examine first whether the quoted paragraph 
support the ‘realistic’ reading of the term. 
 The general point Epicurus wants to stress in the paragraph is that the veridicality of 
perceptions is opposed to opinions which, unlike perceptions, sometimes are false. Therefore, 
the first sentence explains the error in cognition that lies in the judgment. But the second 
sentence where Epicurus speaks about the alleged misperceptions and their resemblance to 
“the things we call existent and true” is crucial for the understanding of the sense of alethes. 
Although commentators do not take this passage into consideration for the present issue, it 
seems to me that Epicurus in the passage makes a rather important emphasis by using the 
words ‘existent’ (ousi) and ‘true’ (alethes). I suppose he does that not accidentally, but in 
order to illustrate what he takes to be a reliable perception, by both words. I take it that this 
suggests that we should at least be cautious and not rush into the conclusion that he just 
carelessly repeats synonymous words (if we take alethes to mean ‘real’ or ‘existent’) at the 
crucial paragraph on the distinction between the truth and the falsehood. It appears that 
Epicurus in fact wants to establish the truthfulness of perceptions on a close connection with 
the reality, that is, to keep the commonsensical understanding of truth of perceptions as the 
exact correspondence of perception with what it presents. This is supported with Sextus’ 
report from M VIII 9 that for Epicurus ‘true’ is “which is in the state in which it is said to be” 
and ‘false’ is “that which is not in the state in which it is said to be”. In other words, it seems 
that Epicurus holds that the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are necessarily paired though not as 
a synonyms but as necessary conditions for building the argument about trustworthiness of 
perceptions. The reason for their inseparability lies in fact that, as Striker maintains, Epicurus 
“seems to use the undoubted reality of our impressions as an argument for their 
correctness”154 Sextus in fact in the passage speaks about the objects of perception being true, 
and given that, he does not make distinction between true and real. Nevertheless for 
perception Sextus says that da it is aletheuein kai houto to on lambanein hos eiche phuseos 
auto ekeino, which means that perception both tells the truth and “grasp the things that is, in 
the way in which that the very things is in its nature” (transl. Grgić). It seems to me that this 
suggests and opens another reading according to which Epicurus ascribes to perceptions the 
same function of truthfulness as to opinions, since to perceptions are characterized as 
aletheuein, that is, in a different sense that the objects of perception.155 Further evidence for 
this interpretation is the next Sextus’ report where he says: 
 
The peculiar function of sensation is to apprehend only that which is present to it and moves it, such as 
colour, not to make the distinction that the object here is a different one from the object there. Hence 
for this reason all perceptions are true. Opinions, on the other hand, are not all true but admit of some 
difference. Some of them are true, some false, since they are judgments which we make on the basis of 
our impressions, and we judge some things correctly, but some incorrectly, either by adding and 
appending something to our impressions or by subtracting something from them, and in general 
falsifying irrational sensation. (M VII 210, transl. LS 16E = Usener 247, part) 
 
 It seems that Sextus here stresses the fact that Epicurus uses the notion ‘true’ (alethes) 
in the same sense both for perceptions and opinion. What does that mean exactly? Well it 
means that the truthfulness of both perceptions and opinions consists in “the systematic 
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correlation between a true report and the reality of what it reports”156, that is in the fact that 
perceptions always perfectly accord with its cause and thus cannot be mistaken in 
representing it, while opinions bring both accurate and false reports. But if the term alethes 
denotes different meanings when applied to perceptions and opinions as the ‘realistic’ reading 
suggests, then it cannot explain this essential distinction between perceptions and opinions. 
The absurdity of the ‘realistic’ view Everson explains by saying that “the contrast between 
perceptions and beliefs will be that whereas all perceptions are real (or involve awareness of 
something real), some beliefs are real while others are not (or do not involve awareness of 
something real)”157. Therefore, the advantage of the ‘truistic’ reading is that it preserves the 
epistemological relevance of the claim that all perceptions are true by taking that perceptual 
truth is the correspondence between perception and the object it represents, which follows 
from the fact that every perceptions has a real, external cause. And this is exactly the way 
Sextus reports that:  
 
For, the Epicureans say, if an appearance is said to be true whenever it comes about from a real thing 
and in accordance with just that real thing, and every appearance is produced from a real thing that 
appears and in accordance with the very thing that appears, necessarily every appearance is true. (M 
VII.205, transl. Bett) 
 
That all perceptions are alethes, that is, that every perceptual report perfectly accord 
with its cause, is guaranteed by the characteristic of perceptions which are, unlike opinions, 
irrational (alogos) and passive responses and totally incapable of any intervention in the 
content of what they represent. On the other hand opinions are such that they involve 
interpretation of perceptual reports, thus opening a possibility for the falsity. The worry that 
the ‘truistic’ interpretation has to solve is to show that perception being alogos is compatible 
with the propositional reading of ‘true’. Namely, the holders of the ‘realistic’ theory used this 
point as the strongest argument, in my opinion, to prove that perceptions because alogos have 
no propositional content (just like a headache) and therefore cannot be evaluated as ‘true’ 
simpliciter, but only as a real and existent event. So, how does the irrationality (alogos) fit the 
propositional reading of ‘true’?  
 On this issue Taylor writes as follows: 
 
The special status of aisthesis as witnesses is due to the fact that the reports which aisthesis gives 
represent that physical stimulation with perfect accuracy. And the accuracy of those reports is 
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guaranteed by the fact that aisthesis is alogos. What this seems to mean is that aisthesis lacks the 
capacity to form any judgment about the pattern of stimulation presented to it; its function is restricted 
to representing as it is. But that representation has a content to which truth and falsity are applicable; 
the special feature of that representation is that in fact it always true.158 
 
 Taylor also stresses that the perceptual truth is based on the contrast between 
perceptions and opinions according to which only perceptions are always true. Namely, on the 
one hand we have irrational perceptions, which are true in virtue of being incapable to make 
any changes in the report they passively receive. On the other hand, the truthfulness of 
opinion is vulnerable exactly because in the process of making judgments one starts to 
interpret, infer or classify perceptual reports and that process is not error-free. In other words, 
the point is that the contrast between opinion and perception, which is without doubt part of 
Epicurus’ explanation of perceptual truth, cannot be set out if the notion of truth is not in the 
same way ascribed to both perceptions and opinions. Therefore, this implies that the 
truthfulness of perceptions is ascribed to certain content as it is in the case of opinions. But as 
it is previously pointed out, the fact that perceptions are entirely affected by some external 
cause and totally passive in that process, enables them to truly report and represent the real 
cause that produces them. Namely, this is the condition that allows perceptions to serve as the 
criterion of truth. By taking alethes to mean ‘real’ the importance of perceptions and their 
major epistemological functions in securing us first, with a reliable connection with the world, 
and consequently providing us with a foundation of knowledge, is dangerously weakened. 
Thus the key part of Epicurean epistemology is to establish perceptions as the kind of things 
that have a content to which the notion of truth is applicable. Speaking in the language of 
contemporary epistemology, it is perfectly legitimate to characterize Epicurean perceptions as 
having a content, because they without doubt concerns the external world and “to say that any 
state has content is just to say that it represents the world as being a certain way“.159  
Striker and Everson also argue that there is in fact no difficulty in regarding sense-
perceptions as ‘true’ in the usual, propositional sense of the word. Everson thus claims that 
“perceptions, like propositions, are concerned with states of affairs in the world and so are 
quite properly judged whether the world is such as it is represented or reported as being by the 
perception. This should be apparent if we accept that the proper way to describe perceptions is 
by reference to their content propositionally expressed”.160 Striker maintains that the 
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incorrigibility of perceptions should be understood as the claim that “all propositions 
expressing no more nor less than the content of a given sense impressions are true”.161 
Therefore, this reading suggests contrary to the ‘realistic’ one, that Epicurean perceptions do 
have a content to which truthfulness can be ascribed. Before we continue with the more 
precise account of the content, we should first determine whether Epicurus treats all 
perceptions equally in regards of epistemic trustworthiness of their content.  
The strongest evidence in Epicurus’ writings comes in 50 where he writes about the so 
called misperceptions and dreams as the cases of perceptions that he considers to be ‘true’ 
(alethes) in the same way as all ‘normal’ cases of perceptions. This reflects his rather 
optimistic epistemological ambition to secure the truthfulness of all perceptions without 
exceptions and shows that any reading that introduces discrimination between true and false 
perception does not have textual support. The part of the argumentation about the truthfulness 
of perception in 50 is based on the specific relation, namely on the ‘resemblance’ between the 
alleged misperceptions and their objects. Epicurus builds the argument about the correctness 
of such perceptions in the following way. In the first step he claims that in all cases of 
perception there is an underlying object of perception and second that perception always 
accord with that object. The evidence for the claim that all perceptions are caused by 
something real is built on the fact that in all cases of visual perceptions it appears as if one 
perceives a real, physical object. In other words, just as in the cases of normal perceptions 
where there is an underlying external solid from which eidola are emitted causing perception, 
all other cases of vision also have their underlying object. Namely, Epicurus writes that there 
is “the portrait-like resemblance of the impressions which we gain either in sleep or in certain 
other focusings of thought or of the other discriminatory faculties, to the things we call 
existent and true [tois ousi te kai alethesi]”. This means that just as in the case of other 
perceptions, here there is also a cause, namely the object of perception, which he calls 
“existent and true”, to which perception in sleep and in all other focusing of mind perfectly 
match. The causal theory of perception explained by mediation of eidola simply is adopted for 
all cases of perceiving.  We can conclude from this that Epicurus does not introduce any 
classification of perception but treats them all equally: they are produced in the same way, 
namely by the physical impact coming from outside. However, are they actually all equally 
trustworthy?  
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The argument about the equal trustworthiness of all perceptions brings us back to the 
previous chapter and a priori arguments for establishing perceptions as the criterion of truth. 
What is now added to the a priori argument is the fact that the eidolic theory of vision reveals 
the real and existent cause of perception and the way perception is produced, by which the a 
priori argumentation for the establishing perceptions as the criterion becomes supported by 
the atomistic theory. His strategy reveals the way purely epistemological arguments are now 
combined and supported by metaphysical ones. Again, this reflects what was previously 
stated about Epicurus’ specific usage of alethes as ‘true’ and ‘real’ in order to indicate 
inseparable connection between a true perception and the reality of the external object it 
presents. The following Plutarch’s report captures the idea in which the equal trustworthiness 
lies in the fact that they all have an underlying object. After giving a list of examples of 
misperceptions, such as Orestes’ vision of the Furies, Plutarch interprets Epicurean position in 
the following way: 
 
Things that no artful joiner, puppet-maker, or painter ever ventured to combine for our entertainment 
into a likeness to deceive the eye, these they seriously suppose to exist, or rather they assert that, if 
these did not exist, there would be an end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth. 
(Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1123 C, transl. De Lacy) 
 
According to Plutarch Epicureans consider all perceptions as equal in trustworthiness, that is, 
even those perceptions which are normally considered as false, and they do that precisely in 
order to establish perceptions as the criterion of truth because “otherwise there would be an 
end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth”. The basis for the equality of 
perceptions is the resemblance between perceptions which apparently have no underlying 
object and those which have, which is explained on the basis of same physical explanation of 
their origin. In the quoted Plutarch’s passage the reality (huparchon)162, that is, the necessity 
of a physical object for occurrence of perceptions is inseparable from the truthfulness. So the 
epistemological role of perceptions for Epicureans, as Plutarch reports, is to serve as the 
criterion of truth which actually indicate that alethes is supposed to denote much stronger and 
normative epistemological usage than that as a real cause or a real event. So, the main 
argument for the taking all perceptions as equally true is the one already explored as the a 
priori argument: unless all perceptions are taken to equally guarantee truth, all knowledge is 
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impossible.163 What is added to the a priori argument is the explanation of the resemblance 
between perceptions on the basis of the atomistic theory by specifying the objects which 
causes all perceptions. Therefore, all perceptions are similar in two aspects: in regard to their 
origin and in regard to their trustworthiness.164 
Finally, the ‘realistic’ reading, as Striker points out, “goes against the entire tradition – 
not just hostile authors like Cicero and Plutarch, but also Lucretius, and Sextus, who seems to 
be rather impartial in this case, take Epicurus to be asserting something about the truth as 
opposed to falsity of our impressions, rather than about “truth” as opposed to 
nonexistence”.165 And it is not ad hominem to take very seriously the fact that the authors 
without exceptions ascribe to Epicurus this odd, absurd and almost indefensible 
epistemological thesis according to which he treats the figments of madmen, dreaming and all 
other cases of misperception as true. Therefore, it seems that this clearly shows that Epicurus, 
first, does not make any differences between perceptions, second, that ‘true’ (alethes) is used 
in a propositional sense and attributed to perceptual content and third that alogos is 
compatible with propositional reading since alogos denotes passivity of perception. After 
establishing the ‘truistic’ reading of alethes, the next step is to explain what perceptions are 
true of.  
Epicurus, as Sextus reports, takes that ‘true’ is defined as “that which is as it is said to 
be” which reflects already emphasized correlation between perceptual representations and the 
things represented. Therefore, Epicurus’ account of perceptual truth can be characterized as a 
version of the correspondence theory of truth of the Aristotelian kind.166 In Epicurus’ version 
correspondence consists in the fact that perception as a passive response to the external 
impact is entirely determined by its cause and thus necessarily corresponds with it. However, 
the full explanation of the correspondence now requires determining of the truth-bearers of 
perceptions. So far I have argued that perceptual truth consists in the fact that perceptions 
being irrational (alogos) are not able to represent differently objects they are about, because 
they cannot interpret and think of what is given in the report. Having set things in this way, 
the crucial task becomes to determine the proper object of perception or as Everson 
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formulates it “to identify which object it is to which it [perception] needs to be similar”167 in 
order to be true.  
Epicurean identification of the proper object of perceptions is guided primarily by the 
common sense and explanation of the perception as the fundamental cognitive link with the 
external world. In other words, perception accurately represents states of affairs and objects in 
the world. This is the basis for the very common reading that attributes to Epicurus a view 
that the proper object of perception cannot be other but an external object, from which it 
follows that the truthfulness of perception of a tower as square consists in the fact that the 
tower actually is square and thus perceptual representation of the tower accurately represents 
its properties. Of course, this will work in the case of normal perceptions, but as we have 
seen, Epicurus wants to apply the same account of trustworthiness to all perceptions, that is, 
to the cases of dreams, illusions, hallucinations, day-dreams and all kind of visions. So the 
question then is: if perceptions are true of external objects in the sense that they correspond to 
the external solid representing its properties, what are misperceptions true of? Plutarch report 
offers some elucidation, although we have to bear in mind that the following text is rather 
hostile criticism of Epicurean epistemology in which Plutarch tends to equate Epicurean 
position with the position of the Cyrenaic subjectivism. Plutarch writes the following: 
 
For the school that asserts that when a round film (eidolon) impinges on us, or in another case a bent 
one, the imprint is truly received by the sense, but refuses to allow us to go further and affirm that the 
tower is round or that oar is bent, maintains the truth of its experiences and sense impressions, but will 
not admit that external objects correspond; and as surely as that other school must speak of ‘being 
horsed’ and ‘walled’, but not of horse or wall, so this school of theirs is under the necessity of saying 
that the eye is rounded or be-angled, and not that the oar is bent or the tower round, for it is the film 
(eidolon) producing the effect in the eye that is bent, whereas the oar is not bent from which the film 
proceeded. (Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1121 AB, transl. De Lacy) 
 
Here Plutarch refers to the fact that Epicureans are cautious when it comes to making 
judgments about external objects in circumstances where the judgment might turn out to be 
false. The two most usual examples of this are an oar appearing bent when half-submerged in 
water and a square tower appearing round from a distance. In such circumstances the 
Epicureans according to Plutarch restrict themselves to judgments about the way eidola 
impact the eye so as to bring about the perception, which is the foundation of Plutarch’s 
criticism of Epicurean epistemology as being committed to a form of subjectivism, just as 
Cyrenaics are. Leaving aside for a moment Plutarch’s criticism, let us concentrate on his 
interpretation of the Epicurean position. Namely, Plutarch here follows the Epicurean 
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distinction between perceptions and opinions. The crucial point is that the distinction in the 
examples can be established only if we take the proper objects of perceptions to be eidola, and 
the objects of opinions external solids. What we have learned previously is that the 
truthfulness of perceptions is guaranteed by the way perceptions are produced and therefore 
they are true in regards to their objects. Now we can finally specify the objects of which 
perceptions are true, namely eidola.  
In the case of a tower appearing round from a distance, eidola that stimulate sense 
organ are in fact round and thus perceptions accurately report the cause in the moment it 
impinges on the eyes. That is to say they are not accurate of the tower itself, as an external 
solid, but accurate in respect of its immediate physical stimulus, the eidolon, which we can 
illustrate as ‘the eidolon of a far-off tower’. On the other hand, opinion ‘A tower is round’ as 
its object has a tower itself, and therefore is false, because does not capture the real property 
of the object in question. The distinction will be more precisely illustrated later but for now 
we can use the specification of the content suggested by Striker. The explanation of the 
difference goes as follows: in the case of perception the content is not expressed only by 
saying that it includes just the external solid and specific property, but also the distance and 
perspective at which perception is produced. As Long and Sedley maintains, “since the 
vision’s province is to report not actual bodily shape, but ‘shape at a distance’, we feel no 
conflict between the far-off and close-up views of the same square tower: naturally we expect 
a far-off tower to look different from a near-by tower, since they constitute different objects 
of sensation”.168 Therefore, according to Epicurus, the conflict in perceptions is just apparent 
one, because perceptions in those cases have different objects, ‘a far-off eidolon’ and ‘close-
up eidolon’. Their contents thus truly report ‘no more nor less then it is given in perception’ 
because perceptions are alogos, that is, not capable of interpretation or inference and thus 
equally trustworthy in representing their objects. Taylor thus argues that “aisthesis faithfully 
reproduces the actual state of the eidola when they reach the eye, but it is not part of the 
business of aisthesis to distinguish the small round eidolon which you get when you look at 
the tower from here (i.e. from a distance) from the large rectangular one which you get when 
you look at it from here (i.e. from close up). That is the work of opinion, not of he alogos 
aisthesis.”169 Similarly in Everson’s view “the objects of perception, then, to which the 
perceptions must accord if they are to be true, are not solid objects but the film of atoms 
which strikes the senses. Moreover, it is only if the objects of perceptions are eidola rather 
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than the solid object themselves that the claim that all perceptions are true could stand a 
chance of being plausible”.170 
 Plutarch’s report is often cited together with Sextus’ outline of Epicurus’ error-theory 
where Sextus presents the Epicurean position as follows: 
 
Some people are deceived by the difference among impressions seeming to reach us from the same 
sense-object, for example a visible object, such that the object appears to be of a different colour or 
shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, when impressions differ and conflict 
in this way, one of them must be true and the opposing false. This is simple-minded, and characteristic 
of those who are blind to the real nature of things. For it is not the whole solid body that is seen – to 
take the example of visible things – but the colour of the solid body. And of colour, some is right on 
the solid body, as in the case of things seen from close up or from a moderate distance, but some is 
outside the solid body and is objectively located in the space adjacent to it, as in the case of things 
seen from a great distance. This colour is altered in the intervening space, and takes on a peculiar 
shape. But the impression which it imparts corresponds to what is its own true objective state.” (SE M 
VII.205-7, transl. LS 16E = Usener 247, part) 
 
 Sextus’ report follows very closely Plutarch’s interpretation and support the reading 
according to which the proper objects of perceptions are eidola, and not external objects. As 
Sextus states, the difference between perceptions can be explained only if we take that in 
perception “it is not the whole solid body that is seen – to take the example of visible things – 
but the colour of the solid body”. In other words, this reading suggests that since every 
perception has a different immediate cause, every perception in fact presents a different state 
of affairs. This means that the state of affairs does not refer exclusively to the external object 
as such and its real nature, but directly to eidola, which capture a richer, contextual 
presentation of a different state of affairs. In Everson’ view, Sextus’ report explains another 
important feature of perceptions, namely the fact that perceptions are mutually irrefutable.171 
The argument according to which one perception cannot refute another one because they 
discriminate different objects was previously explored as a part of the a priori argumentation 
for establishing the truthfulness of perception within the commonsense understanding. There I 
argued that Epicurus follows the commonsense idea according to which hearing cannot refute 
sight because only sight discriminates colours, that is, that irrefutability of perception is 
established on idea that perceptual modalities are in charge of different properties, specific for 
each modality. But now, this argument gets fuller justification and explains the reply to the 
argument from conflicting appearances. As Everson argues, Epicurus can successfully reply 
and block the argument from conflicting appearances only if an explanation of the conflict 
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between perceptions of different senses concerning the same property is provided, as in the 
case of an oar half-emerged in the water when perceived by sight and touch. In order to argue 
that such a conflict is apparent, Everson maintains, “Epicurus’ point must be not merely that 
there are some objects which cannot be perceived by more than one sense but that there are no 
objects which more than one sense can perceive”. Therefore, by taking the eidola as the 
objects of perceptions, Epicurus secures a justification for the general claim that each sense 
discriminates its specific objects, because only specific type of atomic effluences are 
commensurable with each sense organ. In addition, in the case of the one and the same 
perceptual modality, as in the case of seeing a tower from different distances, perceptions 
cannot refute each other simply because those two perceptions are not perceptions of the same 
state of affairs being produced by different physical stimuli.  
 This interpretation is promising in explanation of the truthfulness of vision of non-
existing objects, as in the example of Orestes’ seeing the Furies, and other cases of 
hallucinations and dreams, namely the cases in which there is no external solid from which 
eidola are released. Sextus reports the following account of the truthfulness of Orestes’ 
perception: 
 
At any rate, in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being affected by 
the eidola, was true, in that the eidola objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies 
were solid bodies, held a false opinions. (SE M VIII.63, transl. LS 16F = Usener 253, part) 
 
According to Sextus’ report, Epicurus in the case of all perceptions, including hallucinations 
and dreams, appeals to the same explanation: the truthfulness of sense-perceptions is related 
to their immediate cause, i.e. the eidola. That is, in all cases the equal trustworthiness of 
perceptions is established on the fact that perceptions always accurately report the state of the 
impacting eidola. Taylor’s forensic analogy is now fully explained. Even in the cases where 
eidola are in fact emitted from an underlying external solid, the proper object of perception is 
not a solid but eidola.  
 However, this reading is not without difficulties. One of the major objections is raised 
by Plutarch in the previously quoted passage where he accuses Epicureans of holding a form 
of subjectivism that leads to a skepticism regarding the knowledge of external world. 
According to Plutarch, the explanation of the trustworthiness of perceptions by the eidola as 
their objects directly opens the problem of the way in which the representational content of 
perceptions can ever secure us with objective information about the external world. Namely, 
perceptions in that case do not provide an epistemic link with the objective reality because 
their truthfulness refers only to themselves. In other words, just as in the Cyrenaic position, 
knowledge becomes limited only to knowledge of one’s internal and subjective awareness of 
being in a certain perceptual state. Therefore, as Striker suggests, although the suggested 
reading of the eidola as the objects of perception is appealing because it smoothly solves the 
problem of perceptual conflict, the cost is too high – it leads to a total inconsistency of 
Epicurean position and the loss of knowledge of the external world.172 Nevertheless, a closer 
examination of Plutarch’s argument shows that the identification of the Epicurean position 
with the form of subjectivism and skepticism seems rather unfair and not textually supported, 
which opens thus a possibility for a reply to Striker’s worry that is to give an account of the 
way in which representational content relates us to the external world. This is the problem that 
is also immanent to any representational theory of perception and empiricism as well, because 
our knowledge seems to become limited only on the awareness of an internal appearance. 
 The commentators take that the main argument against Plutarch’s interpretation is the 
fact that Epicurean perceptions are not reports of internal mental awareness of a subject, but 
of external reality. Taylor explains it in the following way: 
 
 For the sceptic’s starting point (and his finishing-point too, for that matter) is knowledge of one’s own 
perceptual states, ‘perceptual sweetening’ etc., whereas the Epicurean starts from direct acquaintance 
with the physical objects impinging on the senses. The sceptics declare insoluble the problem of 
justifying the inference from descriptions of perceptual states to statements about external objects. For 
the Epicurean, on the other hand, descriptions of perceptual states are already descriptions of a 
percipient in contact with the physical world.173 
 
Similarly Glidden argues that “by restricting one’s sensory self-awareness to the feelings of 
pleasure and pain, Epicurus made his materialism compatible with his foundationalist theory 
of knowledge, since the evidence of perceptual appearances (phantasiai) was not to be 
identified with the subject’s inner sensory states”174. What follows from this is the fact that 
such an epistemology and the justification of the thesis that ‘all perceptions are true’ is 
inseparable from materialism or, in the Epicurean case, from the atomistic theory. Therefore 
the crucial difference between Cyrenaics and Epicureans, as Tsouna points out, is “that the 
knowledge of aesthesis is already knowledge of something physical with which perceiver is in 
contact, whereas in knowing pathe the perceiver is only in contact with himself”.175 
Nevertheless what still need to be justified is the way “the inference from descriptions of 
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eidola to descriptions of their causes”176 is made. This step is crucial in order for perceptions 
to be established as the criterion of truth, because the truth and knowledge Epicurus aims to 
secure is knowledge of the physical world and objects in it. 
 I agree with Everson who argues that it is mistaken “to think that if the objects of 
perception are eidola rather than solid objects then perception will not report on the external 
world” since “all perceptions report the nature of external objects because all report the nature 
of eidola and these are as external as anything else”.177 Therefore, when eidola are coming 
from an external solid they do represent their cause, before all because they secure the same 
atomic arrangement as in the solid from which they are released. Nevertheless perceptions do 
differ in the amount of information they carry about the object and the role of the opining is to 
determine and interpret the relevant information about certain object. In the case of 
perceptions of a tower seen from a distant and close-up view, perceptions are causally related 
to a tower but they are not informative in the same way about it. This does not mean that they 
are not telling the truth about it, but again, the truthfulness of those perceptions refers to two 
different contents: a) ‘perceiving of a round tower from this position’ and b) ‘perceiving of a 
square tower from this position’. Again, it is not a job of perception to infer that the real 
nature of a tower, because perceptions, just like photographs “do provide genuine evidence, 
which properly handled can lead to true judgments about external reality”.178 
 Perception thus does bear a relation to the external world and it has content that is 
factive and informative about the world. In that way perception of the tower, although having 
eidola as its object, nevertheless is about the tower, just like opinion. The difference between 
perception and opinions consists in the fact that their contents are different. In order to 
elucidate the difference between the contents, I will introduce the notion of nonconceptual 
content in order to specify the special feature of perceptual content in contrast to content of 
opinion which is conceptual. Recently the need for the specification of the content of 
perception is noticed by Everson who suggests, very briefly in a footnote, a guideline for 
possible thinking on the issue. After accepting that the truthfulness of perception is due to 
their content that and as such can be qualified as ‘true’ in a propositional sense, Everson in a 
footnote makes a following comment: 
 
It should be noted that Epicurus is in good company here, both ancient and modern. Aristotle, for 
instance, talks happily of perceptions being true. More recent support comes from Christopher 
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Peacocke, who claims that the ‘representational content [of perceptions] concerns the world external to 
the experiencer, and as such is assessable as true or false’ [Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, 
Thought, and their Relations, Oxford, 1983.]179 
 
I find that Everson’s suggestion indicates that Epicurean perceptual content might be 
interpreted as a part of a larger framework fixed around the debate about the notion of 
‘nonconceptual content’. In what follows I will try to argue that the modern notion of 
nonconceptual content can be helpful for the clarification of the following issues in Epicurean 
epistemology: (i) for the specification of the Epicurean content and its objects; (ii) for the 
understanding of the truthfulness that is ascribed to the content; (iii) for the explanation of the 
difference between perception and opinion. Namely, the biggest problem I find in 
understanding Epicurean texts is the clear difference between perception and opinion and I do 
not find any satisfactory explanation in offered interpretations. Namely, what seems to be 
particularly puzzling is the fact that both perception and opinion are true in the same way, as I 
argued so far. However, when it comes then to the clarification of the exact difference 
between the two, scholars usually appeal to the fact that perception is about eidola, while 
opinions are about external solids. But I find that solution inappropriate since after all, direct 
causes of perception are eidola, but they are also about the external objects. That is, 
perception of a tower seen from afar seems to be false because eidola are distracted, but 
nevertheless, as I argued, still there is a causal link to the object, a tower, and in that sense, 
perceptions are also about external objects. What seems to be at stake is that the content of 
perception seems to be different since it captures the distance, the place from which a tower is 
observed, namely, the pure fact that it is seen from a distance. Exactly this is missing in the 
belief ‘the tower is round’.  
 Therefore, the motivation for introducing the idea of nonconceptual perceptual content 
in modern epistemology lies in an aspiration to explain the intuition that there is something 
intrinsically different between perceptual content on the one side and perceptual beliefs on the 
other, and that that difference follows from the fact that perception is in some sense 
independent from opinion. Namely, one thing about perception that seems to be 
uncontroversial is that perception just like belief represents the world to be a certain way 
which is enough to consider it as having content. However, the question of dispute is whether 
the content of perception is of the same kind or structure as that of belief. Traditionally it is 
taken that “the representational content of perceptual experience has to be given by a 
proposition, or set of propositions, which specifies the way the experience represents the 
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world to be”180. This could mean that perception of some thing x, as F (for example, 
perceiving an apple as red) has to be given in the propositional form ‘that x is F’, because of 
which perception becomes dependent upon the perceiver’s ability to employ conceptual 
capacities. Form this it follows that the content of perception understood in that way is then 
determined by the concepts ‘x’ and ‘F’, that is, we could not see that an apple is red unless we 
have the concepts ‘apple’ and ‘red’. However, advocates of nonconceptualist content argue 
that although perceptions inform us about the world and thus certainly have representational 
content just like beliefs, the content of perception differ from the content of belief and need 
not be characterized as conceptual. They claim that we should be cautious in specifying the 
content of such representations as purely propositional and conceptual because it will appear 
to be too restrictive for the content of perception. To put it simply, the question to be 
answered is whether perceptual representation of the world is conceptualized, that is, whether 
seeing a certain thing as having a triangular shape requires that one has the concept of 
triangularity.  
In the literature various arguments are offered to express the difference between the 
representational content of perception and judgment and some aim to show that perception is 
independent from being conceptualized. For the purposes of this work let us focus on what 
seem to be the two main arguments: the richness argument and the fine-grained argument.181 
According to the richness argument the content of perceptual experience carries much more 
information about the objects in the external world, the properties they have and the relations 
between them than does the content of opinion. My present perception of the view from a 
window carries so much information about different objects (such as the trees, the leaves, the 
tree bark, their shapes, colours, relations between them, between me and each object) and 
therefore is so full of information that it seems to be impossible that in order to have that 
representation I need to have all those concepts for each thing represented (objects, properties, 
relations and so on). The fine-grained argument is usually explained through the example that 
we can perceive and distinguish many more colour shades than we have concepts for. For 
example, I can experience many different shades of red, without having a specific concept of 
each shade and therefore, this implies that the content of perception has a specific feature, 
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namely fineness of grain, in contrast to opinions, and thus implies a resistance to calling it 
conceptual.  
So, both arguments show that although there is something similar between perception 
and opinion, namely that they represent the world and thus have content, in some respect their 
contents are rather different. The difference indicated in both of them is nicely illustrated by 
Dretske who says: 
 
Suppose a cup has coffee in it, and we want to communicate this piece of information. If I simply tell 
you, “The cup has coffee in it”, this (acoustic) signal carries the information that the cup has coffee in 
digital form. No more specific information is supplied about the cup (or the coffee) than that there is 
some coffee in the cup. You are not told how much coffee there is in the cup, how large the cup is, 
how dark the coffee is, what the shape and orientation of the cup are, and so on. If, on the other hand, I 
photograph the scene and show you the picture, the information that the cup has coffee in it is 
conveyed in analog form. The picture tells you that there is some coffee in the cup by telling you, 
roughly, how much coffee is in the cup, the shape, size, and color of the cup, and so on.182 
 
This passage presents Dretske’s famous distinction between two sorts of information, digital 
and analog. The main difference is that information that x is F in analog form has richer and 
finer content, whereas information in digital form carries just some of the information that is 
already present in analog form and sorted out from it. From this Dretske concludes that 
perceptual experience, i.e. sensory presentation, always comes in analog form, and “until 
information has been extracted from this sensory structure (digitalization), nothing 
corresponding to recognition, classification, identification, or judgment has occurred – 
nothing, that is, of any conceptual or cognitive significance”183. The process of perceiving, 
such as seeing, hearing or smelling, is the process in which we simply receive sensory 
information about x as F without being able to conceptually understand that x is F. The 
sensory system, says Dretske is like the postal system: it delivers information by means of a 
causal mechanism, just like a thermometer or camera.  
Similarly to Dretske Evans grounds his explanation of nonconceptual content and its 
distinctive informational character on the analogy with photography. On the grounds of the 
analogy, Evans emphasizes as a relevant characteristic of such content that it is causally 
dependent upon the objects it represents, in the sense that “the properties that figure in the 
content of its output are (to a degree determined by the accuracy of the mechanism) the 
properties possessed by the objects which are the input to it”184. In other words, the content of 
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perception understood as an informational state is fixed by the objects that information is 
about in such a way that informational content that x is F would not occur if x were not F.  
From this rather oversimplified explanation of the representational character of 
perception we can extract three main features on the grounds of which such content can be 
characterized as nonconceptual: (i) the content of perception is replete and has fineness of 
grain in the sense that perceptual representation carries information about properties, but also 
about position, relations of objects presented to other objects and to the perceiver; (ii) the 
representational content of perception causally depends upon the objects it represents; (iii) 
due to the fact that perception cannot carry information that x is F unless x is F, perceptual 
content has specific primitive certainty and is veridical by definition.185 The veridicality 
condition requires special attention.  
What lies behind the third condition is the naturalistic and commonsense intuition 
according to which it seems normal to say that the content of perception usually accurately 
represents how things are in the world because it is determined by its external cause. 
Explained in such a way perception is characterized primarily as the matter of a relation 
between the perceiver and the object perceived. However, this does not imply that in modern 
discussion all representational contents are veridical. Perceptual error is usually understood as 
the case in which the content of representation does not correspond with the way things 
actually are in the world, as in the case of illusions and hallucinations. Since in those cases 
representational content fails to correspond with the way things really are, the modern 
discussion is concerned with securing the so called ‘accuracy conditions’ under which 
perceptual content is veridical. So in what sense is the nonconceptual content veridical? This 
question is largely debatable but I want to concentrate on the formulation of veridicality of the 
nonconceptual content that seems to be useful for elucidating the Epicurean content of 
perception. What appears to be crucial for the explanation of the primitive certainty of 
informational content is the fact that in order to properly grasp it, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the relevant features of information, namely its repleteness and fineness of 
grain. Given this, the notion of veridicality thus will include an extensive understanding of the 
counterfactual supporting evidence (namely, that the informational content would have been 
different if the information were different) in the way that will make perceptual content more 
sensitive to the possible different states of the environment. Tye illustrates this point with the 
following example:  
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 The coin looks round. It also looks tilted—some parts of its facing surface look nearer than other parts 
of that surface. The experience thus represents the coin as round, as tilted, and so forth. The coin held 
perpendicular to the line of sight does not look tilted, however. Therefore, an immediate 
representational difference exists between the two cases. Furthermore, the tilted coin also looks 
elliptical from the given viewing position. Here the represented feature is that of having a shape that 
would be occluded by an ellipse placed in a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. Again the 
representational is nonconceptual. And again, no illusion is present. The experience is veridical on all 
levels: the facing surface of the coin really is elliptical from here; the coin really is circular.186  
 
If we go back to the initial characterization of the veridicality condition which says that 
perception cannot carry information that x is F unless x is F, in the case of perceiving the coin 
as elliptical veridicality is guaranteed only if the main features of the information are 
considered: the causal trace and the proper relation between perceiver and the object 
perceived. One more general point that follows from such a proposal is that perception, as 
Noë puts it, “is a way of keeping track of how things are, but it is also a way of keeping track 
of one’s relation to how things are”, which means that the causal explanation of the origin of 
perceptual content is one aspect of perception which he names ‘factual’ and which tells us 
how things are in the world, that needs to be supplemented by the second one, the 
‘perspectival’ aspect that includes the relations to how things are from the point of the 
perceiver.187 Noë points out that the veridicality of the content can be maintained along both 
aspects, factual and perspectival, which need not to coincide. This would mean that the 
representation of the coin as elliptical is veridical from the perspectival aspect, but not from 
the factual simply because the object in question is not elliptical. We shall return to this 
distinction again, because I believe it will be helpful in explaining veridicality of the 
Epicurean content. 
After the veridicality feature is explained in more detail, we can conclude by saying 
that since (i), (ii) and (iii) features of perception cannot be accommodated by conceptual 
content of judgment it follows that they are two distinct sorts of contents: nonconceptual 
content of perception in the judgment is interpreted, identified and structured under the 
concepts, however with an inevitable loss of information. So how does this help us to 
understand Epicurean content and truthfulness of perceptions? In what follows I will try to 
show that Epicurean perceptual content meets all of the three features sketched above. 
 We can start with the fact that in explanation of Epicurus’ account of the truthfulness 
of perception commentators often employ the strategy of illustrating the perceptual system as 
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a recording device or a camera or by the analogy of photography, as in the case of the 
information delivery systems. So Taylor writes: 
 
The analogy of the camera is, though anachronistic, quite an apt expression of the Epicurean view. 
Their thought seems to have been that, like the camera, aisthesis cannot lie, since aisthesis puts no 
construction on what it ‘sees’ nor compares it with what it remembers (DL, loc. cit. mnēmēs oudemias 
dektikē), but, like the camera, merely records what is before it. But it is precisely this passivity in the 
face of stimulation which gives aisthesis its evidential value.188 
 
What does this tell us about the content of perception and the way it should be specified? One 
crucial part of the analogy with the camera is the fact that perception “is irrational and does 
not accommodate memory” because “neither is it moved by itself, nor when moved by 
something else is it able to add or subtract anything” (DL X.32, transl. LS). In other words, 
perceptual content originates as a totally passive response to external stimuli that is not 
capable of making any intervention on the stimuli. So perception gathers information in the 
same way as the informational systems described by Dretske and Evans, being causally 
dependent upon the objects it presents. In the case of Epicurean perceptions those objects, as 
we have seen, are eidola and therefore for a perceptual content to be veridical in the 
Epicurean case means that the representational content has to accord with the information 
carried by the eidola. That is, in the case of seeing the tower as round, the content of 
perception is trustworthy in spite of the fact that the tower itself is square because it 
accurately represents state of affairs, that is, the information about objects in the world carried 
by the eidola. But what is in fact the information carried by the eidola? Does the content of 
perception refer to the state of affairs that can be captured and exhausted by saying only that 
the tower is round? Obviously not. 
 In explaining the accuracy and the reliability of perception the content of perception 
refers to the state of affairs that includes roundness as a property, and the tower to which the 
property is ascribed, but also the relation between the perceiver and the object perceived, that 
is, the point of view from which the tower is observed. Having that in mind, the content of 
perception in the case of perceiving the tower as round has different content from the one that 
represents the tower as square, but the crucial point is that the contents are not conflicted. 
They are not in conflict simply because they are about different states of affairs although are 
causally connected with the same object, the tower. However, the causal history of 
information includes much more than the object and the relevant property of the object in 
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question as expressed in a proposition ‘that the tower is round’. We can say that both 
perceptions of the tower are truthful representations of states of affairs but only because the 
content of perception is expanded in order to include all information carried by eidola. Thus 
the content of Epicurean perception necessarily includes objects, properties and relations, just 
as a photograph does, as Dretske claims, which indicates that the representational content of 
Epicurean perception is rich and replete in a different way than opinions are, as pointed out in 
the first feature of nonconceptual content. Or to put it in Noë’s terms, the content of 
perception is related to states of affairs, since eidola are parts of the world and not some 
mental entities, and has a factual aspect. I believe that the evidence for ascribing to Epicurus 
this distinction between the factual and perspectival dimensions of perception is to be found 
in the Letter to Pythocles 91 where Epicurus says the following: 
 
The size of the sun and the other heavenly bodies relative to us is just as big as it appears. But relative 
to itself it is either bigger or a bit smaller than it is seen as being, or just the same size. For in our 
experience too fire-signals, when seen from a distance, are observed in this way by our sense 
perceptions. 
 
Here Epicurus introduces the difference between what is relative to us (to pros hemas) and 
what is relative to itself (to kath auto). Namely, on the one hand the sun perceived relative to 
us is seen as small and Epicurus claims that “it is just as big as it appears”. On the other hand, 
the sun relative to itself, that is, as a matter of fact can be of a different size. The first 
construction to pros hemas can be taken as the perspectival, because it is relative to the 
perceiver, while the other, to kath auto, since it refers to the factual state of affairs and the 
way things are in the environment, resembles Noë’s factual aspect. Since we have already 
seen that the mechanism of vision is based on the eidolic theory, therefore eidola are the 
objects that carry information that include specific distance and relation between the perceiver 
and the object perceived, but also the factual information about the way things are. So, let us 
see how the Epicurean content meets the veridicality condition.  
From the perspectival aspect it is rather clear that the representation of the tower as 
round or the sun from afar is veridical because it traces the truth about the relative point of 
view of the perceiver. But the crucial point is that the content of the things seen from afar is 
veridical from the factual aspect because the object that the content has to accord with are 
eidola and not the tower itself. Exactly because of this condition, namely because eidola and 
not the external solids are proper objects of perception, it is possible to explain the 
truthfulness of all perceptions. Similarly, in the case of hallucinations and all other cases 
which are normally understood as misperceptions, both aspects of the content of perception 
will be veridical since all cases of perception have to match with eidola as their objects. This 
reflects the way Epicurus’ epistemology is totally intertwined with his metaphysics: the 
eidolic theory guarantees that perception cannot but accord with its objects and therefore 
perceptions are always true.  
What particularly allows proposed interpretation of the content of perception in 
Epicurean epistemology is the fact that perception totally passively receives and delivers 
information, making no room for any intervention or interpretation of the information 
received. Exactly this point allows an explanation of the difference between perception and 
opinion and their contents in the way that perceptual is nonconceptual. Perception is, says 
Epicurus, alogos and does not accommodate memory, which I take to rather strongly indicate 
that perception is a cognitive ability that does not consist in exercising any conceptualization. 
This means that perception cannot recognize or interpret or structure information in the form 
of ‘that tower is round’ because being able to do that necessarily involves sorting out of the 
input and employing concepts of ‘tower’ and ‘roundness’. That goes beyond perceptual ability 
because it includes at least the ability to recognize an object as such and such and to conjoin it 
with the right preconception stored in a memory. So, as Dretske suggests, the Epicurean 
representational content of perception can be characterized as analog, which in the process of 
judgment becomes structured and conceptualized or digital.  
Finally what does it mean to say that such content of perception is true? What kind of 
attitude is that? Does it differ from the truthfulness of opinions? Everson explains this issue in 
the following way: 
 
Just as the statement ‘It is raining’ will be true if and only if it is raining, so the perception that it is 
raining will be true iff it is raining. It is not necessary to postulate propositional items over and above 
the perception itself for the appraisal of perceptions as true or false to be appropriate.189 
 
I take it that according to Everson it is not necessary to say that perception needs to have 
traditionally understood propositional content, probably consisting of concepts, in order to be 
characterized as having content that can be evaluated as true or false. The content of 
perception, as we have seen, can represent the world and it is true, both factually and 
perspectively, iff it accurately reports the state of affairs. The truthfulness of content of both 
opinion and perceptions consists in their accurately representing the states of affairs, that is, 
the external environment. However, it is important that both perception and opinion reveal the 
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truth about the same object in the external world although the proper objects of perception are 
eidola. This is due to the fact that eidola inform us about the world because they are causally 
related with the solids from which they are released. In other words, eidola are in fact parts of 
the solids that, once skimmed off its surface, start to travel to the sensory organ. So, although 
the proper objects of perception are eidola of the tower (in the sense that physical contact of 
eidola and eye produces perception), the content of perception captures the whole causal 
history of the eidola and since the causal chain traces back to an external solid, i.e. the tower, 
eidola thus represent the tower, just as the factual and perspectival aspects of the content 
explains.  
To conclude, the difference between the contents of perception and opinions in 
representation of the world consists in the fact that perception represents the world in a 
nonconceptual way, serving as a tribunal of the way things are passively given in perception 
without any intervention upon stimuli. I believe that taken this way the content of perception 
can be characterized as purely factual. Exactly the feature of passivity and givenness enables 
perception to serve as the foundation of cognition, to be self-evident and the criterion of truth. 
Namely in perceiving subject is not able to intervene in the process, but is passively 
stimulated from outside, which in the end guarantees validity of all perceptions. In Epicurean 
terms, the eidolic theory excludes a possibility of any intervention in perceptual content, for 
which I argued, is the starting point for reading that such content is nonconceptual.  
From this we can infer that the opinions will be true if they correctly extract and 
structure information delivered through the sensory organs by applying correct concepts in 
order to classify, structure and express the content of perception. The concepts that are 
applied are Epicurean preconceptions. This reading I believe serves as a good ground for 
understanding why preconceptions are necessary as the second criterion of truth. Namely, 
preconceptions originate from a memory of what is often perceived (DL X.33) and enable us 
to articulate what we see in the form of judgment. Therefore, in order to be able to judge 
reality, besides perceptions, preconceptions are necessary as the second criterion of truth. In 
taking that the content of perception is nonconceptual, introduction of preconceptions will 
thus explain their peculiar function in the Epicurean epistemology which indicates the way 
conceptualization works in such a system. I believe that this provides a good understanding of 
the difference between perception and belief, but also leaves a room for preconceptions to 
explain the link that connects perception and belief.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. EPICUREAN CRITERIA: PRECONCEPTIONS 
 
Preconception (prolepsis) is the second key notion of Epicurean epistemology. The 
sources suggest190 that the term was coined and introduced into Hellenistic epistemology by 
Epicurus himself and after it was taken up by the Stoics it became a standard technical notion 
of the epistemological debate in that period.  However, in spite of the undoubted fact that 
preconceptions take a significant role in Epicurean epistemology, surviving evidence in 
Epicurus’ own writings is rather short and not very informative when it comes to the 
explanation of what they are and what their precise function is. Because of this it is necessary 
to start with the secondary sources instead of Epicurus’ own texts. As Diogenes and Cicero 
report191 Epicurus lists preconceptions among the criteria of truth, from which we can infer 
that the main epistemological role of preconceptions is the criterial one: they are supposed to 
serve, together with perceptions and feelings, as standards for testing the truth of beliefs. But 
why would Epicurus demand another criterion in addition to perceptions, which as we have 
seen so far, provide us with incorrigible information about the external world? From what has 
been said so far about perceptions, it appears that pure appeal to them alone can provide us 
                                                 
190 Cicero, ND, I.44. 
191 DL X.31; Cicero, Luc. 46, 142. 
with a sufficient standard for acquiring knowledge. So, what is, if there is any, the unique role 
of preconceptions which makes them a separate criterion of truth? In the discussion I will 
follow what is taken to be a standard interpretation, according to which preconceptions are 
derived from perceptions, that is, they are formed empirically. I will argue that to this 
empiricist reading of the formation of preconception is added a specific epistemological role. 
Namely, preconceptions serve as an independent criterion of truth because they are the means 
by which we recognize types of object and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ account of 
how we gain knowledge of things. Preconceptions are thus criterion for determining what 
type of thing a particular object is. So in the first part of the chapter I will show the empirical 
origin of preconceptions and in the second part the analysis of their epistemological function.  
 
 
3.1. Origin and formation of preconceptions 
 
 In order to understand what kind of things in the first place preconceptions are and the 
way they are established as the criteria of truth, we shall start with Diogenes’ report, mostly 
recognized among scholars192 as the principal source which provides us with trustworthy 
summary of Epicurean understanding of preconceptions. Diogenes writes as follows: 
 
Preconception, they [Epicureans] say, is as it were a cognition [katalepsis], or correct opinion, or 
conception, or universal ‘stored notion’ (i.e. memory), of that which has frequently become evident 
externally: e.g. ‘Such and such a kind of thing is a man.’ For as soon as the word ‘man’ is uttered, 
immediately its delineation also comes to mind by means of preconception, since the sense give the 
lead. Thus what primarily underlies each name is something self-evident. And what we inquire about 
we would not have inquired about if we had not had prior knowledge of it. For example: ‘Is what’s 
standing over there a horse or a cow?’ For one must at some time have come to know the form of a 
horse or that of a cow by means of preconception. Thus preconceptions are self-evident [enarges], 
which is our point of reference when we say, e.g., ‘How do we know if this is a man?’ (DL X.33, 
transl. LS 17E, with a small change) 
 
 The report as such at first sight seems not to be very helpful, since Diogenes very 
loosely defines prolepsis through the comparison with rather different kinds of things: a 
perception (katalepsis), a correct opinion (doxa) and a conception (ennoia) or a universal 
stored notion (katholike noesis). As Glidden notices, it seems that Diogenes in his report is 
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“painfully groping, looking for the right expression to describe the device”. Another thing that 
is usually objected to Diogenes’ presentation is that it is highly influenced by Stoic 
vocabulary and thus offers a reconstruction of Epicurean theory of preconceptions through 
Stoic spectacles. Nevertheless, from the passage above we can extract three elements that 
provide us with a good guidance towards proper interpretation of Epicurean prolepsis: first, 
Diogenes aims to define what prolepsis is, than there is an account of the way prolepsis is 
formed and finally, we get an explanation of the epistemic function. In the quoted passage 
prolepsis is defined through identification with “a perception [katalepsis], or correct opinion, 
or conception, or universal ‘stored notion’ (i.e. memory), of that which has frequently become 
evident externally”. From the word choice it is evident that Diogenes uses terminology which 
is not a standard Epicurean epistemological term. However, the term needs not to be totally 
misleading. Namely, katalepsis is a common philosophical term used by different schools 
which indicates an incorrigible mental grasp. In the Stoicism it became a part of a technical 
terminology that, again, stands for a cognitive state in which the object of cognition is firmly 
grasped, so that a subject, once in a state of cognition, simply cannot be wrong about its 
object.193 Diogenes probably uses this the term in its general sense to indicate specific 
characteristic of Epicureans preconceptions, namely that they denote what is necessarily real, 
external and evident, that is, an actual thing. To take the example from Diogenes, this means 
that preconception man necessarily grasp a real shape of a man. This is one of the 
characteristics preconceptions share with perceptions, for as we have seen previously, 
perceptions always have a real and external cause, and more importantly, they always 
accurately represent an external thing. So one possible reading of the passage is to say that 
Diogenes by using the term katalepsis wants to indicate specific features of preconceptions, 
implied by the meaning of katalepsis that became a standard notion in Hellenistic 
epistemology: first, that they are firm grasps of actual, external things, and second, that they 
are true and evident.194 In other words, the preconception man has a real and external cause, 
the actual shape of a man, which cannot differ from the one given by preconception. 
Therefore, the common features of preconceptions and perceptions are that they present 
external world just as it is and they are necessarily related to physical reality. These 
characteristics, as we shall see later, will be crucial if preconceptions are supposed to have a 
criterial role in Epicurean epistemology.  
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 The criterial role of is indicated by Diogenes comparison of preconceptions with a 
correct belief. Asmis maintains that by using this expression Diogenes relates Epicurean 
epistemology now with both Platonic and again Stoic epistemology, in order to emphasize the 
specific feature of Epicurean epistemology, namely that there is no higher level in cognition 
than true belief and by that places it within the general context of Greek philosophy. Asmis 
thus points out that “what makes the description of presumptions [preconceptions] as a right 
opinion appropriate in the general context of Greek philosophy is that a presumption is a 
belief that is verified by empirical observation and is not an insight into some general truth 
that transcends the evidence of perception”195. This indicates that just as in the case of 
perceptions, preconceptions are candidates for self-evidently true things because of their 
empirical origin. Important point is that the self-evident truth of preconceptions is grounded in 
the sense-experience and does not go beyond it. And exactly this point is further emphasized 
in the last expression to which Diogenes identifies preconceptions, namely a conception or a 
universal stored notion.  
 This last comparison of preconceptions with universally stored notion reveals the real 
origin of preconceptions and establishes a reading according to which prolepsis is formed in a 
pure empirical way. In the quoted passage Diogenes states that preconception is a “‘stored 
notion’ (i.e. memory), of that which has frequently become evident externally: e.g. ‘Such and 
such a kind of thing is a man.’” So according to Diogenes’ report Epicurean theory states that 
preconceptions are formed through repeated perceptions of individual instances of a particular 
type of thing. If we take Diogenes’ example, this would simply mean that the preconception 
‘man’ will develop in the mind after many observed instances of men.  
 The way preconceptions are formed is very similar to that of formation of perceptions. 
In both cases necessarily are included external objects which cause formation of perceptions 
and preconceptions. The causal relation is of a great importance because, as in the case of 
perceptions, it serves to secure the truthfulness of preconceptions as well and make them 
evident (enarges). Namely, the causal relation puts preconceptions in a correspondence with 
the external world and commits them to objective reality. So, one of the reasons for taking 
preconceptions to be self-evidently true is that they are caused by something external and real. 
However, another important element that secures self-evidence of preconceptions is that they 
are memories of what is seen, that is, they arise from perceptions of the external reality, which 
themselves are self-evident and true. The empirical origin of preconceptions thus implies that 
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they are dependent upon perceptions. In the following passage Cicero nicely captures the idea 
of preconceptions being dependant upon perceptions: 
 
For the mind, which is the source of the senses and is even itself identical to the senses, has a natural 
power it directs at the things by which it is moved. Thus it seizes on some impressions for its 
immediate use, while storing away others as the source of memory; but it organizes the rest of our 
impressions by their similarities – and these give rise to our conceptions of things (which the Greeks 
sometimes call ennoiai and sometimes prolepsis [‘pre-conceptions’]). (Cicero, Acad. II.30, transl. 
Brittain) 
 
 From Cicero’s report we can extract two things. First, we learn that preconceptions are 
a product of perceptions, and second we learn that the mind has two distinct roles in the 
process of the formation preconceptions. Before we engage in a discussion of the role of the 
mind as a processor of perceptions, it is important to point out that here again the mind has a 
role as if it were the sixth organ. This is so because Epicurus has the same explanation of the 
formation of preconceptions such as ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ or ‘centaur’. In all cases preconceptions 
are created after many individual and similar perceptions of objects of the same class, 
received via eidola which come from outside and strike in the same way both the sense organs 
and the mind. Without such emanations which produce perceptions, the process of memory 
could not even start. As Long emphasizes, “to have a prolepsis of p one must have previously 
had p-type sensations or feelings and remembered them”.196 Simply, preconceptions are 
identified with the memory of perceptions of external objects. Therefore, the initial 
explanation of the formation of preconceptions goes along with Epicurus’ empiristic 
epistemology: preconceptions are built upon direct and immediate perception of external 
reality. However, within that process the mind has an important role that is not present in the 
process of perceiving things, that needs to be further explained. 
On the grounds of the exact correspondence with the external reality, obtained and 
guaranteed by perceptions, preconceptions a candidate for the criterion of truth. However, if 
in preconceptions there is nothing over and above perceptions, what is the reason for naming 
them the second criterion of truth? In other words, what is the difference between 
epistemological and criterial role of preconceptions and perceptions? Or as Asmis puts it, “if a 
preconception is nothing more than a memory, what does the mind contribute to the 
concept”?197 
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 Scholars diverge at the answer to this question: on the one side there are those who 
claim that in fact there is no difference between perceptions and preconceptions because of 
which preconceptions strictly speaking cannot be taken as the criterion of truth. The most 
radical stance takes Furley who claims that “the elevation of prolepsis to the position of a 
third criterion along with sensation and feeling is the work of doxographers, who liked to 
make systematic lists of terms. Epicurus himself used the word simply to refer to the function 
of the retained sense image in comparison with new sense perception”.198 Glidden claims that 
according to Diogenes’ report “prolepsis is just the memory of those similar experiences, 
leading to the recognition of natural kinds. And Epicurean prolepsis becomes an extended 
form of habitual perception, of the sort the empirics later called empeiria”.199 However, he 
concludes saying that preconceptions and perceptions work together, but as a twofold process 
of the same mental activity – perceiving. In that process, according to Glidden, neither 
perceptions nor preconceptions give cognitive interpretation of what is seen and 
preconceptions are just perceptions that have left an imprint, so it appears that there is no 
apparent difference between the two of them.200 Rist maintains that in spite of the fact that 
preconceptions are directly derived from perceptions and are some kind of a form of 
perceptions, “there is one way in which a general concept [preconception] is a criterion of 
‘truth’ in a different sense from that which applies to sensations”.201 The difference pointed 
out by Rist is that “while sensations record the existence of objects, general concepts are 
primarily useful for evaluating the truth of propositions about such existents”.202   
‘The evaluation of the truth of propositions about existents’, as Rist puts it, points to a 
different interpretation of the function of preconceptions, in which preconceptions are seen as 
having rather distinctive features and consequently a different epistemological role from 
perceptions as the criterion of truth. This difference is explained through the interpretation of 
the formation of preconceptions in which the mind has a more active role of a processor of 
perceptions. In other words, the basis is the same, namely repeated perceptions coming from 
the observed things from the outside, but according to this interpretation not everything is said 
about the origin of preconceptions if they are simply identified with repeated perceptions of 
the same sort of things. In Diogenes’ passage 33 we are told that universal stored notion 
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develops in the mind from a memory of what is often perceived from outside. I suggest that 
the fact that memory plays a role is a clue for understanding the strict difference between 
perceptions and preconceptions. In the previous chapter we have seen that one of the 
characteristics of perceptions that make them incorrigible was that they are alogos, that is, 
incapable of memory. I argued that this primarily means that they are incapable to engage in 
any kind of interpretation of information carried by eidola. In contrast to perceptions now we 
find that the main feature of preconceptions is that they are connected with memory. This 
would imply than that they have, unlike perceptions, a feature of being logikos. But what kind 
of feature is that? We can start elucidation with Bailey’s composite metaphor which he 
elaborates in the following way: 
 
Thus an act of memory is the momentary attention of the mind to an ‘image’ so preserved in itself, and 
a mental comparison is the apprehension by the mind of two or more such images side by side. But 
this is not all, for when, as the result of many individual perceptions of objects of the same class, a 
series of similar images, is, as it were, heaped one upon another in the mind, the result is a kind of 
‘composite photograph’ of the genus or species: the dissimilarities of the individual images have 
disappeared, and that which is common to all is retained in what is in fact a ‘general concept’.203  
 
The crucial words in Bailey’s metaphor are memory and attention, since in order to get 
a ‘composite photograph’ or preconception, these are the necessary conditions for ‘storing’ 
preconceptions. As I already pointed out, I take it that the identification of preconception with 
memory implies that reason is somehow involved in that process of the formation of 
preconceptions. The attention in Bailey’s passage is the key word to explain what kind of 
‘reasoning’ Epicurus has in mind, implying that there is an active process of the mind in 
addition to the passive response to the external stimuli in perceiving. The main idea of 
Bailey’s metaphor is that during the process of perceiving we are able to focus and select 
images from the continuous flow of eidola on the basis of their similarity and produce a 
‘composite photograph’. The production of a composite photograph is equivalent to the 
production of a preconception that gathers all repeated perceptions into a universal picture. 
This is in accordance with Diogenes’ passage where he describes preconception as ‘universal’ 
thought (katholike noesis). The point of Bailey’s metaphor, as I see it, is to highlight the 
process of generalization, that is, the process in which common features of entities of the 
same type are recognized and labeled. That general label we attach to them is preconception. 
However, as Asmis points out, we need to be cautious and not identify Epicurean 
preconceptions with Aristotelian recognition of the essence of the things or “indeed any type 
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of universal entity which is not an accumulation of individual perceptual impressions”.204 This 
is important because Epicurus’ preconceptions are in spite of their generality, still only 
memories of perceptions coming from outside. Given this it is in accordance with Epicurus’ 
theory to claim that we can have preconception of any entity which is built upon gathered 
individual perceptions of such an entity, for example, Plato, and not only some typical general 
notions such as man or cow. Again, this suggests that Epicurus is consistent in his empirical 
tendencies to secure a direct connection with the external reality and, more importantly, an 
exact match of preconceptions with the things to which they refer. Sedley takes this to be a 
fundamental principle for the Epicureans: “the preconception (prolepsis, ‘notities’) of a thing 
cannot exist unless the thing already exists”.205 This, of course, does not commit Epicurus to 
the claim that there is an existing entity of every preconception we could possibly think of, 
such as centaur or the Furies. As we have previously seen, Epicurus’ theory of perception 
explains that eidola, i.e. the immediate causes of perception, need not to be formed only in the 
process of skimming of the surface of solids, but also in the mid-air and as such they enter the 
mind directly, which in that case acts as a sense organ. A frequent perception of a centaur 
results with a preconception, which correspond to the external reality (eidola are parts of 
external world of which perceptions are true), but this does not imply that centaur necessarily 
exists.206 Another important part of Epicurus’ epistemology is a sharp distinction of the 
content of preconceptions from the added judgment which is not anymore a preconception, 
but simply a false belief.207 The similar strategy Epicurus adopts for perceptions, claiming that 
the apparent illusions expressed in a propositional attitude do not express perceptual content 
but has an added element of interpretation that forms a false belief. The distinction between 
preconceptions and perceptions from false beliefs we shall leave for a separate chapter 
dedicated to Epicurus’ methodology of testing beliefs.  
So Epicurus’ explanation of the empirical origin of preconception reflects his affinity 
towards a naturalistic approach of cognitive achievements that he has in common with 
Aristotle and the Stoics.208  But as Asmis observes, there is a significant difference between 
Epicurus and their views. Asmis explains the difference in the following way: 
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Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished memory from concept formation as a prior stage of cognition. 
According to them, memory precedes experience (empeiria), which consists of a multitude of 
memories of the same type, and experience in turn precedes the formation of a single, universal 
concept out of this multitude memories.209 
 
So the difference pointed out in the quoted passage is that, while Aristotle and the 
Stoics distinguished two stages of cognition (experience and concept formation), Epicurus 
looped them together and recognize only one universal stage. To put it simply, Aristotle and 
the Stoics recognize in the process of conceptualization initial stage within which similar 
perceptions are accumulated and the second phase, the stage of recognition of the universal 
truths. What correspond to the second stage in Epicurus’ view is attention of the mind to the 
specific eidola of such and such kind (e.g. of a horse; the simple process of perceiving), then a 
successive selection and recognition of similarities within perceived instances (after the 
process of receiving of many individual perceptions of a horse follows recognition of a 
similar pattern in their content), gathering and storing of recollected similarities as similarities 
of a certain general type to which all these perceived instances belong (a stage of formation of 
a preconception ‘horse’ on the basis of fixed pattern all perceptions of horses has in common; 
this is what Bailey recognizes as the creation of ‘the genus or species’ in the ‘composite 
metaphor’). So, in Aristotle and the Stoics the levels of formation of concepts is distinguished 
from the level of gathering of memories of perceived particular objects because in the former 
there is an element of reasoning that reflects recognition of specific universal elements and 
patterns in what is observed. In other words, that stage goes beyond pure empirical framework 
based only on what is perceived. However, in Epicurus’ view these levels are not separated. 
Nevertheless, evidences strongly suggests that in the process of formation of preconceptions 
the mind is active both as the sixth sense organ, but also in the process of reflection upon the 
perceptions. As Asmis points out, “on the Epicurean view, the mind remembers not only just 
many similarities of the same type, but complex relationships of similarities and differences; 
and this awareness results in the formation of a single concept”.210 So from what has been said 
it appears that the role of the mind in the formation of preconception is rather emphatic.  
The element of inference in the formation of preconceptions is reported by other 
ancient writers. The first hint, as I already pointed out, was given by Diogenes’ text that the 
memory is logos, as opposed to alogos perceptions. Next, Clement reports that preconception 
is “a focusing (epibole) to something evident (enarges)”,211 and Cicero, explaining the 
                                                 
209 Asmis (2009), 89. 
210 Asmis (2009), 89. 
211 Clem. Alex. Strom. II.4 (Us. 255) 
formation of preconception of god, says that “our mind, when its attention (focusing, intenta) 
is fixed on these forms, conceives the divine nature to be happy and eternal”212 [that is the 
content of preconception of god]. What we find here is that the main thought process with 
which preconceptions are associated is focusing of the mind (epibole tes dianoias). Previously 
we have shown that epibole is not only associated with the mind but also with the sense 
organs (epibole ton aistheterion) and it served for the explanation of the activity of the sense 
organ or the mind (when it function as the sense organ) in the internal process of perception, 
namely in the concentration upon particular eidola among an infinite numbers of other. But 
here we see that epibole has another function particularly for the role of the mind. Sedley 
claims that “the chief function of the epibole tes dianoias must be in the field of memory”, but 
also adds that the objectivity of the empirical foundation of knowledge is “rescued by the 
assurance that the mind, like the sense-organs, draws its images from outside”. From the 
perspective of the atomistic theory, Sedley continues his explanation saying that “the images 
of memory have easier access to the mind, and thus occur to it with greater clarity and 
consistency, than those of mere imagination; and perhaps also that the original visual image of 
an object imprints its pattern in the atoms of the mind in such a way that memory-images of 
the same object immediately ‘lock in’ to it and are thus identified”.213 
Although Sedley is not directly talking about preconceptions here, I take it that these 
modifications of the atoms in the mind which become ‘locked in’ imprints are in fact 
preconceptions explained within atomistic framework.214 But in order to be able to do that, as 
Glidden emphasizes, “epibole tes dianoias and prolepsis seem to require something more than 
just the passive presentation of fantastic material – namely they both seem to require the 
organization of that material into something recognizable, organization achieved by the active 
intervention of the mind”.215 The problem that Epicurus’ theory is facing now that it found 
itself on the seesaw between rationalism and empiricism, more precisely at the point in which 
it appears that the apprehension of the universality of certain patterns in cognition cannot be 
explained in a purely empiricist way.216 Epicurus’ theory thus has to resolve the general 
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problem: an apparent tension between these two conflicting directions, empiricist and 
rationalist, in the explanation of the formation of preconceptions.  
Epicurean technical term for this kind of the epistemological process in which the 
mind is engaged in an interpretative intervention upon raw perceptual material that yields 
preconception is called epilogismos, which Sedley translates as ‘empirical reasoning’.217 It is 
important to notice Sedley’s emphasis in translation that the inferential process is empirical 
one, which signifies the solution of the apparent conflict between empiricism and rationalism 
in Epicurus’ theory. The reason for taking epilogismos to be empirical reasoning Asmis 
explains as follows: 
 
The act of epilogismos, ‘calculation’ of the phenomena, it turns out, is nothing other than the act of 
attending to the differences and similarities among the appearances. It consists of taking account of 
what appears from outside, just as a calculator or computer or accountant would do. There is an act of 
inference; but it consists of simply recognizing connections that are given.218  
 
 Epicurus’ empiricism is grounded on the fact that the starting point of the formation of 
preconceptions is memory, which in the atomistic framework works as a process of a 
systematic and continuous flow of eidola leaving successive imprints, that is, atomic 
modifications in the mind. The memory, however, includes process of sorting out perceptual 
information, epilogismos, which results with the stage of general recognition of similar 
patterns in perceptions. But the level of generality does not go beyond what is given in 
perceptual content which means, as Asmis puts it, that “there is no universal entity distinct 
from the many particulars that have appeared”.219 So it seems that unlike Aristotle, Epicurus 
wants to preserve the idea that the process of the formation of preconceptions is the natural 
process based purely on sensory experience and memory, and to avoid introducing some 
specific cognitive capacity for grasping universal truths and principles (nous in Aristotle). He 
wants to claim that epibole tes dianoia is an activity of mind, but in contrast to nous, it works 
as an mechanical operator upon the sensory material without any additional insights besides 
the general characteristics of particular type of an entity that are perceived as similar from one 
instance to another. So for Epicurus these proleptic generalizations are acquired in an 
essentially automatic and natural process in which we produce general ‘outlines’ (tupoi) or 
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‘sketches’ (hupographe)220 of the perceived things from outside. The process of derivation of 
preconceptions from perceptions consists of “incidence [periptosin, actual contact, 
encountering], analogy, similarity, and combination, with some contribution by calculation 
[logosmou]”. (DL X.32, transl. Asmis) This way of fourfold analysis of the formation of 
conception, as Asmis points out, is not originally Epicurean, but they “seem to have borrowed 
their analysis from other philosophers”.221 She supports her interpretation by Sextus’ report in 
which he maintains that every conception (epinoias) must be preceded by the sense 
experience so “generally it is impossible to find anything to do with conception that one does 
not have for oneself as something known by way of experience”. 222 (SE M VIII.60, transl. 
Bett) Examples Sextus provides us with are the following: for an actual contact we acquire 
preconceptions of all properties of bodies, such as white, black, sweet and bitter; through 
analogy with observable objects we think of Cyclops (by mental enlargement of human being) 
or pigmy (by mental diminution of human being); through similarity with already observed 
things, such as Socrates, we think of him when he is not present; and by composition or 
combination of perceived objects we form a preconception of centaur.  
 The fourfold division of the formation of preconceptions strongly suggests another 
important difference between perceptions and preconceptions, namely unlike perceptions, 
preconceptions differs in respect of their complexity. In Epicurus own writings we do not find 
much on the formation of preconceptions, but from a quite detailed metaphysical analysis of 
the properties, of which some are essential to the body (sumbebekota) and some belong to the 
body accidentally (sumptomata), we may conclude that preconceptions of properties are the 
most basic ones. (DL X.68-70)  
The metaphysical analysis of the properties starts from the fact that properties are 
observed, which is closely related to the explanation of the origin of preconceptions as purely 
empirical generalizations of things perceived from outside. In the opening sentence of the 
passage 68 of the Letter to Herodotus Epicurus specifies first type of the properties, namely 
permanent properties, such as size, shape, weight and color. These properties are essential to 
body as such, being necessary accompaniments of it, as opposed to accidental properties 
which are characteristics a body just happens to have, but separable from the body itself 
without danger for the body to lose its permanent nature. As it is explained later in the text, 
the criterion for distinguishing between the two types of properties is the following: a 
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property is permanent or essential or inseparable property of the body if we cannot conceive 
the body without it, and accidental if body is conceivable without it, or as Glidden puts it, 
“Epicurus is saying […] that for something to be the thing it naturally is certain sorts of 
properties must belong to it, all of which together give that body its abiding nature”.223 Given 
this, the epistemological function of preconceptions is already indicated: they help us to 
identify and to taxonomize bodies as such and such body.  
 In Epicurus’ view we acquire the body’s own and permanent nature through its 
properties, which are directly accessible to us, both through the process of sense perception 
for observable bodies, and through analogy with observable bodies in the case of the nature of 
invisible things, i.e. atoms and void. Properties are conceived of because, as Epicurus explains 
they “have all their own individual ways of being focused on (epibolas) and distinguished, yet 
with the whole complex accompanying them and at no point separated from them, but with 
the body receiving its predication according to the complex conception”. (DL X.69, transl. 
LS) Perception tells us that fire is hot, or that a certain visible body, say an apple is red. What 
we get here is the explanation of preconception as “a generic notion of any type of object of 
experience” which is “synthesized out of repeated experiences of something external”.224 In 
that process we recognize properties as properties of bodies, hotness belonging to the fire, as 
well as color to the apple, in the sense that they are inseparable from the body, as body’s 
necessary accompaniments. This means that if we remove such a property from the body, it 
no longer will remain the same body, loosing its own permanent nature. For Epicurus fire 
without hotness is no longer fire, just like apple without color is no longer a visible body. 
Leaving aside more complex analysis of the metaphysics of properties, the point I want to 
make is the following. Preconceptions of properties are straightforwardly formed through 
sense perceptions by an act of focusing (epibole). In addition to this direct response to 
observations, preconceptions of properties reflect recognition of certain regularities in 
observed phenomena obtained by an additional act of the mind. That is, in the next step we 
observe that hotness always accompanies fire, on the basis of which we form the 
preconception of fire. Exactly this is what makes a difference between perceptions and 
preconceptions, providing us with a direction towards the main epistemological function of 
prolepseis. In my view, their function is to organize and conceptualize unsorted and raw 
perceptual content, which as I previously argued, is nonconceptual. So if we take the example 
of perceiving someone, to say “This is man” is to interpret perceptual content by classifying it 
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under particular preconception, man. In other words, formation of belief is a joint act of 
perception and application of preconception in which perception supplies us with the material 
that becomes organized by preconceptions. Although Glidden does not advocate this kind of a 
difference, specifically arguing that there is no any cognitive element neither in perceptions 
nor in preconceptions, he claims the following: 
 
Prolēpsis would then seem to organize phainomena in two different ways, depending on whether the 
phainomena observed are sumbebēkota or sumptomata. The one yields prolēpsis of natural kinds. The 
other yields prolēpsis of encompassing persistent conditions, regularities pervading the phainomena 
without coming to identify at the level of appearances natural sorts of atomic conglomerates.225  
 
 So what is puzzling is that Glidden is also talking about certain generalizations that 
come out of from one perceived instance to another, but he is not willing to accept that this is 
a cognitive process. But that prolepsis have cognitive aspect seems to be indicated by the fact 
that Epicurus coined the term prolepsis which etymological root, as Furley points out, is the 
word lepsis meaning “conception” or “comprehension”.226 Asmis writes that “literally, a 
prolepsis is a ‘grasp’ that has been obtained before an inquiry”.227 In Asmis’ quotation is 
indicated Epicurus’ motivation for introducing prolepsis as the second criterion of truth, 
which shall be further discussed in a chapter that follows. For the present purposes it is 
enough to say that in Epicurus’ view a preconception is an epistemological requirement for an 
inquiry and as such need to be a generalization or an abstraction derived from perceptual 
experience. In my opinion the fact, upon all scholars agree, that the formation of 
preconceptions is a result of a mental process of finding out connections and regular patterns 
within the content of perception, indicates that this is a higher level of cognition than the one 
we have in perceiving, precisely because of recognition of general features of perceived 
entities. This is what makes preconceptions different from perceptions and the reason why 
perceptions are alogos and preconception logos.  
So if we go back to the analysis of properties, this would mean that the basic grasp we 
get by preconceptions are those of properties because they are formed through the direct 
contact with the external reality. Next, on the basis of repeated perceptions of specific 
property, accompanied by certain shape, such as ‘hot’ and ‘fire-shape’, we form a 
preconception of a natural kind, fire. I agree with Asmis228 who maintains that there are 
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different groups of preconceptions ranging from the basic one, such as preconceptions of 
properties, to the more complex of natural kinds, such as ‘horse’, ‘man’, ‘cow’229, to the most 
complex such as ‘justice’230, ‘cause’231 and ‘god’232. Asmis concludes the analysis saying the 
following: 
 
The mind forms a preconception by gathering similar appearances; and this process seems 
increasingly complex. To sort out the salient features of ‘cow’ for example, the mind gathers a 
selected number of perceived similarities into a single conception. In the last group, the mind draws 
connections involving several preconceptions. The preconception of ‘justice’, for example, is ‘what is 
beneficial in communal dealings with one another’; and this is an evaluative judgment involving at 
least the preconceptions of benefit and community.233 
 
 The complexity of the last group of preconceptions, such as ‘justice’, opens a question 
of what kind of things then preconceptions are. Namely, are they mental pictures or outlines 
(tupoi), as it is suggested by Diogenes in 33, or they should be considered as certain 
propositions? Diogenes’ suggestions is more compatible with pure empiristic tendencies in 
Epicurean understanding of the formation of preconceptions, so it fits rather nicely to think of 
preconception of natural kinds as ‘outlines’ or ‘images’ automatically formed through 
systematically repeated perceptions as imprints in the mind. The problem appears with more 
complex preconceptions, such as justice, to which we cannot associate some mental image. 
But the reason for this is exactly the fact that preconception ‘justice’ is not formed, as we 
have seen, through direct observation and focusing of mind (epibole), as in the case of basic 
prolepsis, but is developed through a more complex process of linking together other 
preconceptions, and as such appears to be closer to a judgment with the propositional content 
‘justice is the utility of social relationships’.234 So the difference in their formation suggests 
that all preconceptions need not be understood in the same way, exclusively either as images 
or propositions. Striker similarly maintains that “insofar as prolepseis are ‘seen’, it is natural 
to conceive of them as images; but insofar as they can be described as demonstrated or 
indemonstrable, we have to understand them as propositions”.235 The incorrigibility of 
preconceptions as propositions is guaranteed by the fact that they are all derived from 
perceptions. And in that sense all preconceptions, being derivates of perceptions, are 
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dependant upon them and secondary criterion of truth, which in the end grants that in their 
content there is nothing over and above what is given in perception and thus secures them 
empirical origin.  
An obvious objection to the proposed reading questions the empirical origin of 
preconceptions on the grounds that the amount of reasoning within the process of their 
formation highly exceeds the role of the senses. Epicurus is facing a general problem of any 
empiricist theory of the concept formation: how much of reasoning is too much for 
empiricism? Epicureans, as any other empiricist, in their response do not have a lot of space 
for maneuvering, but to claim that in the process of delivering of complex preconception the 
reason necessarily relies upon sense experience and therefore, technically there is no any 
genuine direct and independent insight of reason within the preconception formation. The idea 
of the reason being subordinated to perception is well established in Epicurean thought and 
supported by different sources and it was part of the argument for the claim that there is no 
criterion higher than perceptions. Next, the Epicurean understanding of human cognition is 
deeply naturalistic, so the process of preconception formation should be seen as an automatic 
response to external outcomes and natural cognitive process of finding regularities within 
observable features of the world. In that sense all prolepses, even ‘justice’, are formed by 
experience where the act of the mind is reduced to the already quoted Asmis’ metaphor of “a 
calculator or a computer or accountant”. In my opinion the metaphor works because there is 
no rationally causal demonstration of the development of preconception that actually exceeds 
what is given in perception. Any such inferential process would be a serious threat for using 
preconceptions as the criterion of truth.  
 However, the most serious objection for the empirical reading of the preconception 
formation is the preconception of ‘god’. This preconception is discussed in Epicurus’ own 
writings, but the text that has produced the most puzzlement is Cicero’s report in On nature of 
gods. Although this is primarily argument for the existence of gods, the report is relevant for 
our purposes: it puts in doubt the empirical interpretation of the origin of preconception in two 
aspects. First, Cicero says that the preconception of the god is innata, which translated 
literally as ‘innate’ directly contradict empirical reading; and second, the formation of the 
preconception of the god in Cicero’s report suggests that the preconception, as innata, is just a 
thought or mental construction not originated from an existing object, which again override 
empirical interpretation for the sake of rationalism.  
Cicero reports Epicurus’ position through the mouth of the Epicurean spokesman 
Velleius, in the following way: 
 For he [Epicurus] alone saw, first, that the gods existed, because nature herself had imprinted the 
conception of them in all men’s minds. For what human nation or race does not have, without 
instruction, some preconception of the gods? Epicurus’ word for this is prolēpsis, that is what we may 
call delineation of a thing, preconceived by the mind, without which understanding, inquiry and 
discussion are impossible. The power and value of this reasoning we have learnt from Epicurus’ 
heaven-sent book on the yardstick and criterion. Thus you see the foundation of this inquiry admirably 
laid. For since the belief has not been established by any convention, custom or law, and retains 
unanimous consent, it must necessarily be understood that there are gods, given that we have 
ingrained, or rather innate knowledge of them. But that on which all men’s nature agrees must 
necessarily be true. Therefore it must be conceded that there are gods. Since this is agreed among 
virtually all – the uneducated, as well as philosophers – let us allow the following to be agreed: that 
what I called our preconception, or prenotion, of the gods (for new things require new names, just as 
Epicurus himself gave prolēpsis its name, a name which no one had previously applied to it) is such 
that we think the gods blessed and immortal. For as well as giving us delineation of the gods 
themselves, nature has also engraved on our minds the view of them as everlasting and blessed. 
Therefore Epicurus’ well-known maxim [= Key doctrine I] outs it rightly: ‘That which is blessed and 
imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by 
favour. For all such things are marks of weakness.’ […] …the force and nature of the gods is of such a 
kind that it is, primarily viewed not by sensation but by the mind, possessing neither the kind of 
solidity nor the numerical distinctness of those things which because of their concreteness he calls 
steremnia; but as we apprehend images by their similarity and by a process of transition, since an 
endless series of extremely similar images arises from the countless atoms and flows to the gods, and 
that our mind, by focusing intently on those images with the greatest feelings of pleasure, gains an 
understanding of what a blessed and everlasting nature is. (ND I.43-9, transl. LS 23E) 
 
 The first controversy with Cicero’s report is that he says that the knowledge of 
preconceptions is innate (innata). DeWitt proposes this translation and uses it as one of the 
main arguments in order to show that Epicurus is not an empiricist.236 He writes that the major 
confusion for a proper understanding of the formation of preconceptions is produced by 
Diogenes whose report he completely disregard as “a hodgepodge of Epicurean and Stoic 
terminology and doctrine”. He claims that preconceptions are anticipations, and “if an idea 
precedes or anticipates something, this can hardly be anything but experience. The said idea 
must therefore be innate.” However, DeWitt’s position nowadays is completely abandoned 
and scholars agree that Cicero’s usage of innata should not be taken to stand for the innate 
origin of preconceptions. The reason for this lies in the fact that Vellius in Cicero’s report 
presents formation of the preconception of god through dichotomy between nature and 
convention (or teaching), as we can see form the first two sentences of the quoted passage. 
With regard to this distinction, preconceptions are innata in the sense that they are produced 
empirically, but through the process of a repeated impact of the external objects. This reflects 
one important feature of Epicurean epistemology indicated by Valleius’ claim that “all people 
have some preconception of god”, namely naturalism. The kind of naturalism we can ascribe 
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to Epicurus starts from the fact that the process of preconception formation is seen as a part of 
our natural cognitive make up, which Asmis explains as “a response of human nature [to the 
external environment], developed from within an individual”237, that is, preconceptions “are 
naturally implemented from outside; and this is what distinguishes them from customs, 
conventions, and laws, which are taught”.238 So the first controversy is solved. The 
preconceptions of the gods are not innate. However, the second controversy is a more 
complex one, since the textual evidence of the process of how we acquire the preconception 
of god opens two equally possible explanations: either it is obtained through accumulation of 
the same perceptions of actually existing gods or through some other inferential process 
which need not to start from the real god figures. The second explanation then opens the 
problem whether the preconception of the gods is a mental construct, and as such 
incompatible with the empiricist reading I advocated so far. 
 According to the first, more traditional reading239, the preconception of the gods is 
formed through the repeated perceptions of the external things, in the same manner as 
reported by Diogenes. According to this interpretation, the mind receives images (eidola) in 
sleep by focusing (epibole), because the gods are made of the atoms of an exceptional 
fineness which normally cannot strike the other sense organs.240 The reading is supported by 
Lucretius who writes that “the races of mortal men used to see with waking mind, and even 
more so in their dreams, figures of gods, of marvelous appearance and prodigious size”.241 
However, this alone is not enough to form a full preconception of the gods as blessed and 
immortal, so Lucretius then explains that attributes are formed on the basis of inferences: first, 
from the constant supply of similar images they infer to the gods’ immortality, and second, 
from the fact that the gods show no fear and perform marvelous acts, the gods are blessed. 
Lucretius’ report seems rather dubious. O’Keefe lists two groups of possible objection to this 
kind of reading he labels ‘realist’: (i) according to atomistic theory, all compound bodies will 
eventually apart because they have void in it; (ii) god having human shape is incompatible 
with Epicurus’ claim that they live in outer space, because human shape is a product of the 
adoption in the specific environment.242 
On a different reading, proposed by Long and Sedley, the preconceptions of the gods 
are not formed by repeated mind perceptions of images of gods, but of humans. According to 
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their view we move from the impressions of human being to the impression of god by a 
process of transition (metabasis), as mentioned in the cited Cicero’s passage. Helpful 
evidence in favor of their view comes from Sextus who explains Epicurean position in the 
following way: 
 
The same reply can be made to Epicurus’ belief that the idea of gods arose from dream impressions of 
human-shaped images. […] And it will be possible to reply to all the doctrines we have listed that 
man’s idea of god is not based on mere largeness in human-shaped anima, but includes his being 
blessed and imperishable and wielding the greatest power in the world. But from what origin, or how, 
these thoughts occurred among the first men to draw a conception of god, is not explained by those 
who attribute the cause to dream impressions and to the orderly motion of the heavenly bodies. To this 
they reply that the idea of god’s existence originated from appearances in dreams, or from the world 
phenomena, but that the idea of god’s being everlasting and imperishable and perfect in happiness 
arose through a process of transition from men. For just as we acquired the idea of a Cyclops . . . by 
enlarging the common man in our impression of him, so too we have started with the idea of a happy 
man, blessed with his full complement of goods, then intensified these features into the idea of god, 
their supreme fulfillment. (SE, M IX.43-7, transl. LS 36C) 
 
 Long and Sedley take that ‘human-shaped images’ from the first sentence of the 
quoted passage are not images coming  from the actually existing gods, but of human beings. 
The explanation of preconception-formation then runs as follows: the preconception of the 
gods is formed through the process of transition from an idealized human being, as ‘happy 
man, blessed with his full complement of goods’ to whom those attributes are enlarged to the 
maximum. Therefore, “gods, like giants, are thought construct”243, formed in the same way: a 
giant through the process of intensifying the notion of human being and gods by enlarging the 
notion of a perfectly happy and blessed man. The gods are then not solids, but thought 
construction of the intensified idea of the ideally happy man that live endlessly long. Two 
things are important to emphasize. First, this process of inference (transition, metabasis) is 
automatic and natural and as such perfectly compatible with empiricist reading I advocated so 
far. Namely, in the process of transition there is no causal chain of demonstration from 
specific premises to the conclusion, but the process of intensifying happens rather instantly as 
a part of our natural and inevitable process of cognition. Second, we need to keep in mind that 
the labeling of the preconception of the gods as a ‘thought construction’ does not imply 
idealism, but just the opposite: images of gods formed in this way are normal way of 
production of images in dreams, which are again atomic bodies, but unlike horses and cows, 
gods are not emitted from the surface of the solid objects.244 According to Epicurus’ account 
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of perception, as we have seen, the mind functions also as the sixth sense organ producing 
images in dreams and receives these effluences, which produces true perceptions exactly 
because they have an external corporeal cause, atomic image (eidolon) to which they perfectly 
match. However, Asmis poses an interesting question: how do the perceptions of the gods 
differ from mental appearances of Centaurs, flying horses, of Furies? One answer is they do 
not, because a perception of Centaur as we have seen is true, as it accurately represents its 
cause – eidolon of Centaur. However, the puzzling part is the evidence that Epicurus 
maintains the god’s existence in much stronger way than that of Centaur, namely in a literal 
sense of ‘exist’, and not as in the case of Centaur in which he refers only to existence of the 
Centaur-shaped eidola. Asmis claims that the actual existence of the gods is indicated by what 
Epicurus takes to be ‘common notion’ god, saying the following: 
 
There is some evidence that common preconceptions may be relied upon to show objective existence. 
In the Letter to Menoeceus (123), Epicurus demands that one must think of god just as is shown by 
‘common notion’. One must preserve this conception without adding incompatible attributes; ‘for gods 
exist; for knowledge of them is evident (enarges)’. It seems implausible to take ‘exist’ in anything but 
the ordinary sense of ‘exist’ – that is, the gods exist not just in our minds, but objectively.245 
 
 However, Asmis’ explanation is not very convincing. It is true that we can take this as 
a traditional realist interpretation and claim that the existence in question is literal existence so 
that the gods are in fact solids (steremnia), which consequently opens a problem for Long and 
Sedley’s interpretation. However, Epicurus’ claim that the knowledge of the gods is evident 
(enarges) is perfectly compatible with the reading according to which the gods are in fact 
products of streams of images, just as the perception of Centaur is as much as enarges as 
perception of a solid body. In regards of the preconception of the god as a ‘common notion’, 
as Rist points out, “we mean not a concept held by all, but a concept of the most basic features 
of the objects conceived”.246 And that is what is conceived through the process of transition 
from idealized human being to the preconception of the god. Finally, Epicurus’ pushing to the 
side of a literal god’s existence should be considered, as Long and Sedley put it, through the 
fact that “even within Epicurus’ own society it was normal practice for intellectuals to accept 
the teachings of traditional religion as symbolic rather than literal truths”. 
 Therefore, we can conclude the analysis of the origin of the preconception in the 
following way. Preconceptions are formed empirically, through accumulation of similar 
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perceptions. That process can be direct, from perception to preconception, based only on 
repeated perceptions, as in the case of the most basic preconceptions, such as preconceptions 
of properties. Formation of the more complex preconceptions involves the process in which 
the mind has more emphatic function, that is, the process of ‘direct contact, analogy, 
similarity, and combination’. All these process are inferential, but we need not to be reluctant 
to accept it as a part of empiricist reading of the origin of the preconceptions. This is so, 
because Epicurus does not recognize any purely rational causal explanations in such processes 
but rather takes them to be automatic responses of our cognitive nature to the external stimuli. 
The inferential process proceeds from what is evident, and thus guarantees the truth of 
preconceptions. This brings us to the analysis of the epistemological function of prolepsis. So 
far we have seen that the function is based on a distinctive character of preconceptions as 
memories of what is perceived from outside and tat it consists in the identifications of 
regularities in the content of perception. I labeled this as a conceptualization of the 
nonconceptual content of perception. The second epistemological role of preconception is to 
serve as the criterion of truth. In the next section we shall discuss these functions more 
carefully.  
 
3.2 The role of preconceptions 
 
 The first epistemological role of preconceptions becomes apparent through the 
explanation of their origin. As I have argued, the empirical origin of preconceptions shows 
that for Epicurus prolepseis are fixed patterns of the external things, imprinted and processed 
by the mind. From the origin we infer that the main function of preconceptions is to classify 
and identify perceptual content, which is widely accepted among the scholars as an 
uncontroversial interpretation. In this manner Bailey maintains that “we are not left with the 
series of detached unmeaning sensations, but are enabled to correlate them, to identify and 
distinguish”.247 Long says that “one visual sensation, however clear, cannot by itself establish 
what something is”.248 In other words, in order to say ‘that tower is square or round’, we 
already need to have preconceptions of ‘tower’, ‘round’ and ‘square’ to which we can 
associate present perceptual content and by that arrange ‘detached unmeaning sensations’. 
However, I argued that exactly this suggests that preconceptions are involved in 
conceptualization of nonconceptual perceptual content. My previous argumentation was based 
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on the secondary sources, because Epicurus’ own writings are not helpful for the explanation 
of the way preconceptions are formed. But we find enough evidence for the elucidation of the 
epistemological function Epicurus assigned to them. The key evidence is Epicurus text from 
the Letter to Herodotus in which he says the following:  
 
First, Herodotus, we must grasp [eilephenai] the things which underlie words [ta hypotetagmena tois 
phtongois], so that we may have them as a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, 
inquiry and puzzlement, and not have everything undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite 
chains of proofs, or have words which are empty. For the primary concept corresponding to each word 
must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are going to have a reference point for matters of 
inquiry, puzzlement and opinion. (DL X 37, transl LS 17C) 
 
 The passage is extremely difficult and the first obstacle is the fact that Epicurus does 
not mention prolepsis in it. So the first task is to determine whether the passage is about 
preconceptions. Scholars are almost unified over the fact that there is a firm ground for 
assuming that Epicurus in the passage talks about preconceptions because of the linguistic 
parallelism with Diogenes report in 33.249 The parallelism consists of the following elements: 
(i) in 33 Diogenes says that prolepsis underlies utterances, and here we find that there are 
‘things which underlie language; (ii) in 33 we are told that prolepsis primarily underlies 
utterances, and in her in 37 Epicurus called the concepts ‘primary’; (iii) in the quoted passage 
above Epicurus says that preconceptions must be ‘seen’ (blepesthai) which is the same verb 
used in 72 with preconception. So, we can rather firmly conclude that ‘things which underlie 
words’ (ta hypotetagmena tois phtongois) are preconceptions.  
 Nevertheless, the proper understanding of the expression ‘things which underlie 
words’ still is vague. Namely, what exactly does Epicurus mean when he says the prolepses 
are subordinated to the utterances? The general impression we get at the first glance from the 
quoted passage is that Epicurus takes that the ‘things which underlie words’ are some kind of 
prerequisite and starting point for the understanding and judging. Otherwise everything will 
remain unknown because first, the demonstration will go endlessly and second, we will have 
‘empty words’. So it is clear that Epicurus is trying to block some kind of regress argument by 
postulating something that is prior to any cognition, ascribing thus to prolepsis both a 
function of a starting point in an inquiry and the criterial function. But the fact that the failure 
of grasping preconceptions as a result has the ‘empty words’ is particularly significant. Striker 
clarifies the emptiness of words saying that “if we have not grasped the meanings of the 
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words we use, we do not know what we are talking about and thus utter only meaningless 
words or involve ourselves in contradiction”250. Striker finds it quite uncontroversial to 
associate preconceptions with the meanings of the words, which in the end perfectly makes 
sense of the expression with which we start, ‘things which underlie words’. Things that are 
subordinated to our utterances are meanings, which must be grasped in advance if any judging 
or inquiry is to be made.  Although I completely agree with commentators who take that the 
most natural reading is to say that preconceptions are meanings of the words we use, this 
interpretation is not without problems.  
The problem for this reading arises from the fact that the secondary sources 
unambiguously attribute to Epicurus a theory of meaning which consists of only of two 
elements: the word and the external thing to which the word refer. In the following passage 
Sextus explains Epicurus’ position by contrasting it to that of the Stoics: 
 
And the Stoics stood for the first opinion, saying that three things were connected with one another, 
the thing signified, the signifier and the object. Of these the signifier is the utterance (for example, the 
utterance “Dion”), the things signified is the actual state of affairs revealed by it, and which we 
apprehend as it subsist in our thought, and which foreigners do not understand even though they hear 
the utterance; and the object is the externally existing thing (for example, Dion himself). […] But 
Epicurus and Strato the physicist accept only two of these, the signifier and the object. (SE M VIII.11-
13, transl. Bett) 
 
Similarly Epicurus’ position explains Plutarch who considers this to be a great problem for 
the Epicureans. He writes the following: 
 
Who is more in error than you [the Epicureans] about language? You completely abolish the class of 
sayables, to which discourse owes its existence, leaving only words and name-bearers, and denying 
the very existence of the intermediate states of affairs signified, by means of which learning, teaching, 
preconceptions, thoughts, impulses and assents come about. (Plut. Col. 1119F  = LS 19K) 
 
 Basically, although the most plausible way to understand preconceptions is to take 
them to be some kind of meanings, the problem arises from the fact that the secondary sources 
unambiguously object to Epicurus that he exactly misses to see this point, namely that there 
must be something intermediary between the external object and the utterance – something 
that describes all particular objects of some kind and is always associated with the uttered 
word. It naturally follows from the way they are formed to understand them as meanings, 
since they represent some kind of very basic abstraction which enables us to recognize an 
object as a specific instance of a type. We are able to do that because we have stored 
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memories of perceptions of similar objects from which certain level of generalization is 
achieved, namely preconceptions is formed. And the best way to understand this process is to 
say that preconceptions are in fact the meanings which ‘underlie our words’. However, 
Epicurus’ position is contrasted with that of the Stoics, who contrary to Epicurus introduce 
mid-term, the thing signified (lekton), which has a function of meaning: if one hears some 
language she do not understand, she will hear utterances (the signifier), maybe later observe 
things to which the utterances refer, but will not understand ‘the thing signified’ in the 
moment of hearing the utterance for the first time. In the Stoic’s theory of language, the 
difference between lekton and two other elements is even more sharpened by the fact that 
lekton is not corporeal while the object and the signifier are corporeal. In spite of the 
differences the ontological aspect is of a great relevance for the Epicureans’ understanding of 
preconceptions and their function as well. 
 In the atomistic Epicurean world there is no room for non-corporeal entities, such as 
Stoic’s lekton. Introducing into epistemological explanation such purely mental items for 
Epicurus opens a deep problem of objectivity. As we have seen previously, truthfulness of 
perception is granted with the fact that they accurately match the external reality exactly 
because there is no medium between perceptions and the world. For Epicurus thus 
epistemological objectivity lies in the external reality to which we need to be firmly attached. 
So in our approach to the understanding of preconceptions we need to carefully pay attention 
to this condition. However, as some scholars rightly observe, in Epicurus’ theory there is 
enough evidence to support two different readings. The first one is indicated by the expression 
‘things which underlies words’ which appears both in Epicurus’ own text and in Diogenes’ 
report, which suggests that preconceptions should be understood as something essentially 
internal to the mind which can be associated with the meaning of words. On the other side, the 
second interpretation rightly insists that Epicurus’ canonic generally does not support 
introduction of any kind of mental entities, so preconceptions has to be understood in purely 
materialistic terms which is the only explanation allowed within atomistic theory. Exactly this 
interpretation is supported by Sextus’ and Plutarch’s reports which clearly emphasizes a direct 
correlation between words and external reality. And such interpretation of Epicurean 
epistemology for sure is not a false one since it is clear that Epicurus’ main epistemological 
aim is to exclude any mediator between perceptions and preconceptions on the one side, and 
the physical reality on the other. For Epicurus this is the only path for ascertaining the truth. 
So the problem for the Epicureans is to explain the way preconceptions, which apparently 
carry the characteristic of intensions, fits to an overall Epicurean epistemological dependence 
upon atomism and avoidance of internal entities of mind.  
 A major work on a detailed scrutiny of this tension is done by Glidden. According to 
his reading the difference in interpretations is in the following: 
 
On the former interpretation it is ‘conception of the things which underlie our utterances’ which is all 
determining. On the latter interpretation it is rather the world which triggers our recognition. It is a 
difference between de dicto and de re. It is also the difference between a psychological reading of the 
line, concerned with the way in which the subject represents the world to himself, and an ontological 
reading, concerned with the state of the world which we happen to recognize.251  
 
The problem is that, as Glidden point out, there is a competition between 
understanding prolepsis as purely intensional or extensional devices, where ‘intensional’ 
captures the traditional Fregean notion ‘sense’, while extensional referrers to the set of objects 
that the word stands for. Diogenes’ report and identification of prolepsis with “perception, or 
correct opinion, or conception, or universal ‘stored notion’” and the example of the 
preconception of the men supports both of detected interpretations suggesting at the same 
time that preconceptions are meanings as intensions, but also that they are identified with 
extensions of terms. As Glidden notes, ‘man’ “signifies some conception of man, enabling us 
to make sense of the sounds we speak”, but also ‘man’ “names some perceived form, some 
sort of thing which we have found in the world and which our speech then names”.252 The 
former is the intensional, while the latter the extensional reading. Just to compare, in the 
Stoic’s epistemology lekton is clearly intensional, having representational, propositional 
content that can be true or false and as such is sharply separated from the uttered words or the 
object signified.253  
 One possible solution is given by Long who claims the following: 
 
If this function of prolepsis [the function of mediator between words and things] is overlooked we 
saddle Epicurus with an extremely crude theory of meaning, whereby a word means the actual thing, 
i.e. physical object, about which someone is speaking. On such a theory it would be impossible for 
Epicurus to speak of the false beliefs which people have concerning, say, the gods. There is no 
external reality or fact corresponding to the words ‘the gods are malevolent’, but Epicurus clearly 
thought that people could utter this sentence meaningfully. The postulation of prolepsis as 
intermediate between words and things takes account of many false and mistaken assertions, and 
assertions about that which does not exist.254 
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 So for Long Epicurean preconceptions are meanings in the same sense as the Stoic’s 
lekta, because without them in Epicurus’ epistemology false beliefs could not be expressed. 
Nevertheless, Long’s explanation is not satisfying. First, in Epicurean epistemology false 
beliefs are distinguished from preconceptions, just as in the case of perceptions. So the 
example Long provides us with, ‘the gods are malevolent’ is an example of a false belief 
which is perfectly meaningful because to the content of preconception there is an added 
belief. Second, there is no evidence in any of the Epicurean sources which indicates that 
Epicurus postulates some kind of mental entity, purely internal to the mind that would 
correspond to the Stoics’ lekta, but just the contrary. As Asmis rightly emphasizes, “Epicurus’ 
physical theory provides confirmation that he did not admit meanings intermediate between 
sounds and physical reality.”255 Therefore, the explanation of preconceptions should be 
established exclusively on the firm and direct correlation with the external reality. 
Consequently, it follows that what is subordinated to our utterances are in fact physical 
objects. This, nonetheless, opens the question whether such reading necessarily excludes the 
possibility for prolepsis to have a function of the meaning which underlies words. Glidden 
opts for that solution according to which preconceptions are purely extensional, that is, an 
interpretation in which the explanation of the function of preconceptions emphasizes 
inseparability of Epicurus’ epistemology from ontology in order to secure the objectivity of 
preconceptions but also their role as the criteria of truth. The link is such that preconceptions 
are directly attached to external reality, so that they literally grasps of portions of reality.256 
Asmis’ solution goes in the same direction, but in addition she offers a clearer view on the 
semantic status of preconceptions by saying the following: 
 
Granted that Epicurus correlated utterances directly with physical things, it is reasonable to suppose 
that he called the latter “subordinate” to the former. But where does this leave the primary concepts, or 
thoughts, that correspond to sounds? They do not form a separate semantic category, I suggest, 
because they present physical reality just as it is. Epicurus held an analogous position concerning 
perception: what is presented in perception, he maintained, is in reality just as it appears, without there 
being any possibility of distortion or misrepresentation. […] It makes no difference, therefore, whether 
we view the thought of the physical thing or the physical thing itself as subordinate to the utterance: in 
either case what is associated with the utterance is the physical thing as it really is.257 
 
 I completely agree with Asmis’ interpretation, but however, I believe that 
preconceptions explained in such a way do have a semantic role – namely, they are meanings 
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of words. This does not imply intensional reading and is perfectly compatible with the fact 
that there is no difference between the ‘thought of the physical thing and the physical thing 
itself’ if we take that a ‘thought’ here stands for a psychological state of grasping of the 
meaning of the word. At the mental level, Epicurus as a consistent materialist takes that all 
mental occurrences are explicable in terms of rearrangements of atoms. In regards of their 
semantic function, in my view Epicurus’ theory here resembles to some extant the basic idea 
of the theory of meaning suggested by Putnam and introduced in one of his early though very 
influential article “The meaning of meaning”.258 Putnam maintains that the ‘meaning is not in 
the head’ because the key element of the meaning is extension. In other words, Putnam claims 
that the meaning of the word is specified by its referent and not by a psychological state of a 
subject who grasp the meaning of the word, that is, by intension. In that sense, Epicurean 
preconceptions that underlie our utterances are similar to my oversimplified Putnamian 
understanding of meaning. Given this postulating of an entity analogous to the Stoics’ lekton 
for Epicureans seems to be redundant since what determines our utterance is not a separate 
mental entity or state but the external referent. For Epicureans prolepsis is always a 
movement of thought that necessarily implies the existence of something external by which 
the ‘thought is moved’ and more importantly, with which prolepsis is identified on the atomic 
level. This ontological commitment is the guidance both for the understanding of perceptions 
and preconceptions. And just as in the case of perceptions Epicurus avoids postulating 
awareness of inner mental entity, he follows the same economical pattern indebted in the 
atomistic theory, for preconceptions as well. Nevertheless, preconceptions understood 
primarily as extensions can serve as meanings of the words: they specify the set of things the 
preconception is true of.259 What we have in the mind are outlines (tupoi) which can be either 
an image, as in the case of basic preconceptions such as ‘red’ or ‘horse’, or a more complex 
outline (hupographe) “which will form a correct basis for the completion of the concept and 
the filling in of details later”.260 We can conclude saying that this specific function of 
prolepsis as meaning is indicated in the first sentence of passage 37 and it serves as a basis for 
a unique epistemological function of prolepsis, namely as the criterion of truth.261 So we can 
say that the analysis of the phrase ‘things which underlies utterances’ shows that the reading 
according to which Epicurus indicates meanings with the phrase is proved to be admissible.  
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Let me briefly run again through the key passage. At the beginning of passage 37 
Epicurus says that we need to have prolepsis “so that we may have them as a reference point 
against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlement, and not have everything 
undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs, or have words which are 
empty”. In other words, we need to have prior understanding of the words we utter in order to 
avoid infinite regress in demonstration and utterances which are empty. As far as empty 
words are concerned it is quite clear that Epicurus aims to establish utterances which are 
attached to the external reality, so the emptiness of the words as I understand it refers then to 
those cases in which there is no such a connection.262 We can turn again to Striker’s point 
who, as I previously quoted, takes this in order to support the reading according to which 
grasping of prolepsis is necessary for avoiding meaningless word. So in order to know 
whether a thing subjects confronts with is a tower or not, one needs to know the meaning of 
the word ‘tower’, that is the prolepsis must be grasped prior in order to enable a subject to 
understand and answer the question. And I add to this reading that the meaning of ‘tower’ is 
fixed and identified with the extension of the word, that is, the class of towers. Striker 
continues saying that “in this sense having prolepseis is a precondition for the evaluation of 
opinions, etc., though not sufficient for determining their truth or falsehood: to understand a 
judgment is not yet to know whether it is true or false.”263 To put it differently, to understand 
a judgment that ‘a tower is round’ does not yet say anything about the truth of the judgment 
itself. But prolepsis tower is necessary for the basic understanding of the judgment. Before I 
consider the second harmful consequence of the failure in grasping preconceptions, let me add 
another important point related to the function of preconceptions as the necessary condition 
for the understanding the words.  
 In antiquity Epicurus was accused of abolishing the definitions. We do not find 
explicit rejection in Epicurus’ own texts, but the position is attributed to Epicurus by different 
ancient sources. In Cicero’s On Ends, Torquatus, an Epicurean advocate, starts his discussion 
on the key notions in Epicurean ethics, pleasure and pain, by asking “who needs a definition 
to assist him to understand it [pleasure]?”264 The question implies that the definition of 
pleasure is completely redundant, since “our proleptic understanding of a certain term, ‘x’, is 
sufficient, and nothing is gained by asking the question, ‘what is x?’, because to understand 
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the question is to answer it”.265 So definitions are abandoned simply because they are 
unnecessary, given that preconceptions provide us with a basic understanding of term, they 
simply do not require any further defining. This is exactly in accordance with what Epicurus’ 
demands in 37, namely that an inquiry must start with already grasped meanings of words, 
that is with prior understanding of what is about to be investigated.266 Therefore, the complex 
preconceptions, like ‘god is an immortal and blessed creature’ or ‘justice is what is beneficial 
in communal dealings with one another’ are not definitions, but outlines or sketches 
(hupographai).  
For Epicurus, as Long and Sedley point out, this is not “the end-product of a 
dialectical investigation, as a definition should be, but an initial listing of the contents of the 
relevant preconception”.267 Asmis also notes that the term hupographe is a technical notion in 
Hellenistic philosophy used for specific descriptions “that brings to mind the ordinary, 
empirically acquired concept of a thing by stating certain prominent features that are obvious 
to everyone”268 and as such is differentiated from the standard term for definitions ‘horos’. 
For Epicureans definitions cannot be starting point for inquiry because they already require 
knowing the meaning of words, that is, proleptic knowledge. Another Epicurus’ requirement 
is that proleptic knowledge has to be self-evident in order to serve as the referential point 
against which truth and falsehood are judged. This brings us to the second problem that 
follows from a failure of grasping preconceptions: we will “have everything undiscriminated 
for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs”. 
The remaining question we have to answer concerns the kind of infinite regress and 
demonstration (apodeiknuein, apodeixis) Epicurus has in mind that is related to the criterial 
role of preconceptions. We have seen that preconceptions are supposed to serve as the starting 
point in inquiry which enables the inquirer to recognize and identify objects of inquiry, that is, 
to specify what something is in perceptual content. Commentators agree that Epicurus here is 
offering a solution to the well known ancient dilemma, known as Meno’s paradox. According 
to the paradox, presented in Plato’s Meno (80d5-e5), inquiry is impossible whether you know 
or do not know what you inquire. In the first case, if you know then it is unnecessary to 
inquire since you already know the subject of the inquiry, and in the second case, if you do 
not know what you inquire, you cannot even start, simply because you do not what is the 
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subject you are supposed to inquire. As Grgić observes, the most plausible and widely 
accepted solution of the paradox in ancient times was to assume that there is some prior 
knowledge with which we start an inquiry. Thereby the Stoics and Epicureans “suppose that 
the required antecedent knowledge is embodied in the inquirer’s possession of a certain class 
of concepts – ‘natural concepts’ (the Stoics) or ‘preconceptions’ (the Epicureans).269 They 
agreed to some modified version of the principle of epistemic priority, postulated by Socrates 
in Meno, where he says in 71b that we cannot know what an object is like without knowing 
what it is.270  
Besides this, Epicurus also dedicate to preconceptions a function of the criterion of 
truth and demands that therefore they “must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are 
going to have a reference point for matters of inquiry, puzzlement and opinion”. It is obvious 
that Epicurus here is trying to block an infinite regress in demonstration. The quoted part of 
the sentence of passage 38 gives the explanation of the demonstration Epicurus has in mind 
and the ad infinitum argument which has to be blocked. Namely, if preconceptions are to 
serve as standards against which we judge opinions, then they themselves need to be self-
evident, that is, such that requires no demonstration or any additional clarification. If on the 
other hand they would require proof, we would end up in an infinite regress of demonstration 
and be left without a firm starting point for any inquiry and also without a possibility for 
testing and justifying judgments. As Striker points out, to demand a proof for criteria “would 
require still other criteria, and to argue for them would require yet more, and so forth – in 
short, this demand would result in an infinite regress”.271 Therefore, preconceptions are ‘seen’ 
(blepesthai), which means that they are both literally seen, for those basic preconceptions 
which are like images, but that they are also presented in the mind immediately and grasped 
directly without any additional demonstration. Therefore, preconceptions are self-evident 
(enarges), which is a technical term both in Hellenistic philosophy, but more importantly in 
Epicurean epistemology, meaning “not requiring demonstration”272.  
It is widely accepted among commentators273 that Epicurus adapts this argument from 
Aristotle’s discussion in Posterior Analytics (I.3), where Aristotle argues that the starting 
premise of a demonstrative syllogism are such that requires no further proof. Namely, 
                                                 
269 Grgić (2008), 4-5. 
270 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between the principle of epistemic priority and preconceptions 
in the Epicureans and the Stoics see Goggins (2007). 
271 Striker (1996), 40. 
272 Asmis (1984), 36. The term is in the same sense used for preconceptions indicating their self-evidence 
because they directly match with its cause, and thus can serve as the crieterion of truth.  
273 Asmis (1984), LS (1987), Scott (1995), Striker (1996). 
Aristotle holds that all knowledge is established on demonstration since in order to know 
something we need to be able to explain why is that so, that is, we need to find a cause, which 
for Aristotle is presented in the form of a demonstrative syllogism. But if in the explanation of 
the premises in the syllogism we would continue infinitely long in explanation, the result 
would be an infinite regress of demonstration and consequently, impossibility of knowledge. 
Therefore, Aristotle resolves the regress by postulating that the first premises, which he calls 
first principles, require no proof. Epicurus’ preconceptions correspond to Aristotle’s first 
principles, in having the same function. However, the difference between the two is that for 
Aristotle the first principles are comprehended by nous (some kind of inner intuition) and they 
are definitions (horoi) that in conceiving go beyond memory of what is perceived. Unlike this 
for Epicurus preconceptions are generic presentations or propositions (but not definitions) that 
do not exceed in their content entirely empirical origin, guaranteed by the fact that all 
preconceptions are formed through the routine process in which environment causally act 
upon human nature. 
We can conclude analysis of prolepsis saying that preconceptions for Epicurus are 
self-evident truths that together with perceptions serve as the criteria of truth. They are 
completely derived from perceptions and in that sense, being perceptual derivatives, they are 
not independent criterion. Nevertheless, they cannot be merely reduced to perceptions because 
their function ensures them a unique place in Epicurean epistemology. Epicurus in the Letter 
to Herodotus 37-8 assigned them three main functions: (i) to give meanings to our utterances; 
(ii) to serve as a starting point in inquiry and (iii) to serve as the criterion of truth against 
which opinions are tested. In regards to their function of meanings I argued that we should 
understand them as extensions of the term because Epicurus’ conception of truth is 
established on the exact correspondence with the external reality. Preconceptions are thus 
generic notions that stand for a class of things given in our experience. Although this indicates 
the importance of preconceptions for the development of language, their epistemological role 
is that they serve as a cognitive tool for organization and identification of perceptual material. 
In other words, perceived objects have their organization in virtue of preconceptions. 
Therefore, preconceptions are necessary condition for conceptualization of nonconceptual 
content of perception and for formation of propositional attitudes. As such, they are 
prerequisite in any inquiry and the reference point for judging things in the world. This is 
what makes them a separate criterion of truth and inevitable cognitive tool for acquiring 
knowledge of the world.  
And now when we are equipped with the criteria of truth, preconceptions and 
perceptions, we are left to see in what way Epicurus applied the criteria when testing beliefs. 
In particular, Epicurus is interested in evaluation of judgments about what is unobserved 
(adela) on which the whole atomistic theory rests.  
 
 
4. EPICUREAN SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY: EVALUATION OF BELIEFS 
 
 The central idea of Epicurean methodology by which we evaluate beliefs as true or 
false is based on previously mentioned sharp distinction between perception and 
preconceptions on the one side and beliefs on the other. The basic idea is that the criteria of 
truth have to be true themselves and only as such can serve for testing of beliefs. The 
incorrigibility of both criteria of truth is established solely on the veridicality of perceptual 
report, since as we have seen, preconceptions are derived from perceptions. Epicurus thus 
equipped us with the fundamental elements for the formation and validation of beliefs. Beliefs 
about objects in the world are formed on the basis of perceptual report. The content delivered 
by perception, as I have argued, is non-conceptual, that is, it is not classified and structured. 
The process of classification is the one in which preconceptions are formed. Perceptions and 
preconceptions are thus prerequisite for belief formation. I take it that the initial process of 
belief-formation is something that can be explained as consisting of the following elements: 
perception coming from without and preconception coming from within. This kind of process 
DeWitt calls recognition, but he wrongly, in my view, takes that this is an act of true 
perception.274 However, perceptions and preconceptions are not only prerequisite for the 
formation of beliefs, but also they serve as the standards against which beliefs are testified.  
In this final chapter I shall present the way criteria, perceptions and preconceptions, 
are used and applied in practice. The most important part of the practical application considers 
justification of beliefs about things that are not observable or non-evident things (adela), such 
as atoms. This is particularly important for Epicurus because it reflects his main 
epistemological quest: to justify the truthfulness of atomism on the basis of sense evidence 
and to show inseparability of the atomistic theory from sense experience. In other words, the 
upshot of Epicurean scientific methodology is to assure that the argument for atomism can be 
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established only if the phenomenal world is saved, and equivalently, that the phenomenal 
reality can be accounted for only on the grounds of atomism. Therefore, Epicurean scientific 
methodology will show us a distinctive and rather rigorous character of Epicurean empiristic 
epistemology and the extent to which the Epicureans are ready to go in pursuit of 
foundationalist theory of justification established on sense experience.  
In contrast to the absolute incorrigibility of the criteria, beliefs are opened to falsehood 
because the formation of belief is the process of interpretation of perceptual report by use of 
preconceptions. This is the cornerstone of Epicurean error theory which in the Letter to 
Herodotus Epicurus explains in the following way: 
 
And error would not exist if we did not also got a certain other process within ourselves, one which, 
although causally connected, posses differentiation (dialepsis). It is through this that, if it is unattested 
or contested, falsehood arises, and if attested or uncontested, truth. (DL X.51, transl. LS 15A12) 
 
The main point of the error theory is to account for the absolute truthfulness of 
perception and to show that alleged misperceptions are in fact false beliefs. If this is achieved 
then, perception as totally free form error, can serve as a secure foundation of knowledge. 
This could be done only if perception is sharply distinguished from judgment. The distinction 
is indicated by the notion of ‘differentiation’ (dialepsis) which specifies an internal movement 
of atoms which arises from within and different from the movement caused by external 
impact, eidola, in perceiving. As I argued previously, perceptions are true because they 
accurately reflect the state of impacting eidola on the sense organs and the mind, whereas 
belief, as a separate process, then interprets perceptual content. In the process of belief-
formation it is possible to misinterpret the content of perception and to judge that perception 
presents something that does not actually obtain. However, the crucial part is that the content 
of perception always remains unaffected by any kind of interpretation and precisely because 
of this perceptions can serve as the criterion of truth. In regards of accuracy of beliefs, 
Epicurus claims that a subject will form a true belief only if the content of belief does not go 
beyond what is given in perception, either by taking away from it (disregarding those 
elements that are present in perception) or by adding (making assumptions about parts of the 
content which are not present. Otherwise, a false belief occurs. Nonetheless this is not of 
much help if we do not know how to avoid making errors in judging things in the world and 
exactly in what way to make true beliefs, that is, how to learn to recognize misinterpretation 
of perceptual content made up in the process of belief-formation. In the passage quoted above 
Epicurus lists the methods by which the truth of beliefs is tested, named as the methods of 
witnessing and counterwitnessing. He lists four possible combinations of practical usage of 
the methods: (i) non-witnessing (also translated as non-confirmation or non-attestation, ouk 
epimarturesis); (ii) counterwitnessing (refutation, contestation, antimarturesis); witnessing 
(confirmation, attestation, epimarturesis); and (iv) non-counterwitnessing (non-refutation, 
non-contestation, ouk antimarturesis). First two methods yield falsehood and the other two 
yield truth. And the principle by which the methods are distinguished is their practical 
applicability: by witnessing and non-witnessing are tested beliefs about evident or observable 
things, while by counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing beliefs about non-perceptible 
reality. The following table presents the main notions of the methodology: 
 
In establishing the methods Epicurus proceeds from the fact that beliefs about things 
in the world actually refers to two different groups of objects: the first one consists of objects 
that can be directly observed (prodela) and the second is the group of non-observable ones 
(adela). This is due to the fact that perceptions provide us with a direct knowledge of visible 
things, but knowledge of the world if limited only to those objects would be rather poor. In 
other words, Epicurus wants to show that it is possible to determine the truth or falsehood of 
beliefs not only about objects such as towers or other macroscopic objects apprehended 
directly by perception from a nearby, but also about further remote objects as sun and other 
celestial phenomena or things that do not belong at all to the perceptible reality, such as 
atoms. This is clearly emphasized by Epicurus in passage 38 of the Letter when he says that 
we should observe everything in the light of our perceptions “in order to have a basis for sign-
inferences about evidence yet awaited (prosmenon) and about non-evident (adelon)”.  
So, according to the Sextus’ report Epicureans first distinguish between reality of what 
is evident (enarges) and non-evident (adelon). Next he distinguishes between two types of 
non-evident things: observable things which await confirmation (prosmenonta) and things 
which are imperceptible (adela). Finally, in the class of imperceptible things, some of them 
are totally non-evident and some naturally non-evident.275 The examples will be discussed in 
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 METHODS OF TESTING BELIEFS 
OBSERVABLE REALITY NON-OBSERVABLE REALITY 
TRUE witnessing non-counterwitnessing 
FALSE non-witnessing counterwitnessing 
more length, but I will list them briefly to clarify the key notions: things awaiting 
confirmation (prosmenonta) are those temporarily non-evident or things far off, such as 
someone approaching from a far; things totally non-evident are those that go beyond 
possibility to be known, such as whether the number of stars is even or odd; and things 
naturally non-evident are those which by their nature cannot be evident, such as atoms or 
celestial bodies which cannot be seen from a close up.  
In Epicurus’ view methods of testing beliefs about these types of objects are not the 
same. Namely, the truth of beliefs about perceptible class of objects will be based on direct 
evidence of perception. However, the truth of beliefs about imperceptible objects clearly 
cannot be established on direct evidence of perception simply because they do not belong to 
perceptible reality, either temporarily or naturally, and as such are not part of the content of 
perception. Therefore, the method of testing beliefs about non-evident will invoke indirect 
justification and specific methods of inference which nevertheless, Epicurus argues, are 
grounded in perception. In 38, thus, Epicurus introduces the theory known in ancient 
philosophy as the theory of signs according to which perceptual evidence can have a special 
evidential function for the justification of what is non-evident when used as a sign for the 
invisible reality.276 After this general sketch of the main notions in Epicurean methodology of 
testing beliefs, we can proceed to a detailed analysis based on the examples of testified 
beliefs. 
The most detailed report of the practical application of the methods fulfilled with the 
examples is found in Sextus. His account of the methodology appears immediately after the 
presentation of Epicurus’ central epistemological claim about incorrigibility of perception. 
The text then runs as follows: 
 
Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, some are true, some false. True are those attested and those 
uncontested by self-evidence; false are those contested and those unattested by self-evidence. 
Attestation is perception through a self-evident impression of the fact that the object of opinion is such 
as it was believed to be. For example, if Plato is approaching from far off, I form a conjectural 
opinion, owing to the distance that it is Plato. But when he comes close, there is further testimony that 
he is Plato, now that the gap is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself. Non-contestation 
is the following from that which is evident of the non-evident thing posited and believed. For example, 
Epicurus, in saying that there is void, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact 
of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not to be motion either, since the moving body would 
lack a place to pass into as a result of everything’s being full and solid. Therefore the non-evident 
thing believed is uncontested by that which is evident, since there is motion. Contestation, on the other 
hand, is something which conflicts with non-contestation. For it is the elimination of that which is 
evident by the positing of the non-evident thing. For  example, the Stoic says that void does not exist, 
judging something non-evident; but once this is posited about it, that which is evident, namely motion, 
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ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, necessarily motion does not occur either, 
according to the method already demonstrated. Likewise, too, non-attestation is opposed to attestation, 
being confrontation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was 
believed to be. For example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the 
distance, that he is Plato. But when the gap is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is 
not Plato. That is what non-attestation is like: the thing believed was not attested by the evident. Hence 
attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something’s being true, while non-attestation and 
contestation are the criterion of its being false. And self-evidence is the foundation and basis of 
everything. (SE M VII.211-16, transl. LS 18A) 
 
We can start with the first pair of methods, witnessing and non-witnessing, used for 
testing beliefs about observable things. Sextus uses the example of a person approaching at a 
distance where it is not clear whether it is Plato approaching in order to explain how beliefs 
which are attested are true and those which are not attested are false. The belief ‘this is Plato’ 
is true just in the case when on the person's near approach, it shows up that it actually is Plato, 
that is, when we posses the evident fact which attests belief. The evident fact is of course 
perception by which the belief is confirmed, since the belief actually presents what really is. 
In the process of belief-formation about person approaching nothing is added or subtracted 
from perception and therefore the belief ‘this is Plato’ is attested by perception. In the same 
fashion, the belief about our well known tower seen from afar is not attested when we 
approach to the tower and declare its actual shape form a nearby. Now the difference between 
perception and beliefs can be fully explained. Namely, perception reporting the shape of the 
tower from afar is true just as much is the one reporting the shape from nearby. Both 
perceptions are true because they truly report the state of eidola once they reach the sense 
organ. This means that the state of eidola always reflects the difference of perceptual 
circumstances because of which the same state of affairs or objects can be presented in 
different ways. And as I previously argued, the content of perception in Epicurean theory 
should be explained as non-conceptual in order to capture this element which secures the 
truthfulness or the self-evidence of perceptions. On the other hand, beliefs involving 
interpretation of perceptions have content that is opened for falsehood.  Therefore Epicurus’ 
idea is that the belief ‘the tower is round’ is not supported by perception received from afar 
since that belief subtracts the content of the perception, which is supported with the other 
perception of a closer view. In Epicurean terminology, therefore, the belief ‘the tower is 
round’ is not confirmed by perception and as such is false. Thus, falsification of beliefs about 
what is awaiting confirmation occurs when there are clear facts to show that the belief in 
question is not attested, that is, not confirmed by what is evident, i.e. expected perception. 
The crucial part of the theory is that all perceptions have the same evidential data and 
as such serve as the standards against which beliefs are testified. Once the standard is settled 
Epicurus proceeds to distinguish between states of affairs which are actually presented in a 
sense perception from those which are judged to be presented. We are often inclined to think 
that when an object is presented in ways which are seemingly incompatible with each other 
that what is presented in at least one of the perceptions must be false. But Epicurus simply 
claims that there is nothing wrong with the fact that objects are not presented in the same way 
in different perceptual circumstances and therefore each perception has the same evidential 
validity as it is shown in the case of the tower seen from afar and nearby, namely they all 
counts as evident (enarges) because they serve as the secure foundation for developing true 
judgments about the things in the world. However, in that process Epicurus recognizes that in 
order to get a true belief about the nature of particular objects we need to collect appropriate 
evidence and we should not judge things too hastily. We need to wait for a close up view to 
judge the nature of the tower or person approaching because in that position we are able to get 
appropriate evidence for the belief in question. This means that we have to find as much as 
possible evidence to verified or falsified our beliefs and, as Diogenes reports, “hence their 
[Epicurean’s] introduction of ‘that which is awaited’ – for example, waiting and getting near 
the tower and learning how it appears from near by” (DL X.34, transl. LS).277     
However, as scholars usually observe, the strange thing in Epicurus’ methodology is 
that he does not take the method of refutation by perception (antimarturesis) to be appropriate 
one for this sort of beliefs, but rather he pairs the method of witnessing with the method of 
non-witnessing as opposites. Sextus’ example thus seems to be misleading, namely, it seems 
that the belief that it is Plato is simply refuted by perception we get once the distance is 
reduced, that is, we have evidence against and not the lack of evidence as the name of 
Epicurus’ method suggests. Nevertheless it seems to me that Sextus’ example may fit 
Epicurus’ terminology if we understand it in the following way: once the distance is reduced 
we realize that expected evidence for the thing awaiting confirmation does not occur, which 
indicates then that our belief is not witnessed. In other words, since we were expecting Plato, 
Plato’s not showing up is considered as non-confirmation of the belief that this is Plato. 
Therefore, as Asmis nicely points out, “what constitutes this nonappearance is the failure of 
an object to be evident just when, according to our opinion, it should be evident”.278 Further 
reason for taking attestation and non-attestation as the opposite method Long and Sedley find 
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in the fact that those methods are used primarily as scientific methods for testing empirical 
generalizations and “in such cases non-attestation – failure to discover confirmatory instances 
– will normally be sufficient ground for rejecting the hypothesis, and perhaps the only 
possible ground”279. 
So, the methods of verification and falsification of the first type of non-evident things, 
observable things awaiting confirmation, show that the belief is true when it is supported by 
direct evidence of perception, that is, when witnessed by what is evident (enarges) about the 
nature of the object the belief is about. By the method of non-witnessing the belief is testified 
as false since the evidence in favor of what is expected to be confirmed does not occur.  In 
both cases, the truth value of the belief about observable reality is tested through direct 
application of the sense organs which necessarily grasps the truth due to the eidolic theory of 
perception and as such serve as the evidence. What we also learn is that the preferable 
position for making judgments about things awaiting confirmation is a closer view because in 
that case we have a ‘clear’ view. This should not be interpreted, as some scholars280 do, that 
Epicurus is introducing distinction between perceptions, claiming that only perception from a 
clear view are in fact true ones. I take it that the fact that we get more precise information 
about the nature of observable things from a closer view is something that we actually learn 
through perception, namely because the difference in perception are causally related with the 
differences in circumstances of observation. Therefore Epicurus’ points as I see it is that it is 
normal that perceptual report vary in different positions, but we have to be cautious when we 
judge what is given in perceptual report.  
Let us turn now to the other pair of the methods used for non-evident things belonging 
to imperceptible reality. The things belonging to this ontological group are, as already said, of 
two kinds: things imperceptible by nature, such as atoms, and things imperceptible from a 
nearby, such as celestial bodies.281 The main difference between these groups of things lies in 
the fact that the things awaiting confirmation by nature fall under direct evidentness while 
non-evident things (adela) are naturally forever hidden from direct evidence. Therefore the 
methods used for the beliefs about the later group, as it is reported, are non-counterwitnessing 
and counterwitnessing. Explanation of these methods of testing beliefs is more demanding 
since the methods are not established on direct evidence of perception, but uses perception as 
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an indication or sign (semeion) for knowledge of the things hidden from our experience and 
obviously imply using some kind of inference. Justification of this sorts of belief, as I already 
pointed out, is central for Epicurean epistemology, since here they have to prove atomism and 
moreover, to show its compatibility with the phenomenal experience and beliefs about 
observable reality. 
What is obviously the case here is that these sorts of verification or falsification of 
imperceptible things will involve inferential processes, that is, sign-inferences. As Barnes282 
explains, such inferences consist of the two elements: (i) thing from which we infer 
(semeion), which is the evident thing (to phainomenon, to phaneron or to enarges), which 
usually denotes something in our experience and “it incorporates whatever we know by peira 
or historia, by our own or other men’s experiences”; and (ii) thing to which infer (to adelon or 
to aphanes) which is non-evident thing which is not part of our experience. In these processes 
of inference perceptual content, as what is evident from which we infer, serves as a sign of the 
imperceptible reality to which we infer. When it comes to the exact process of inference we 
meet again the notion familiar from the discussion of the formation of preconception, 
empirical reasoning (epilogismos). There I argued that epilogismos is a calculation of the 
similar experiences or the process of recognizing of the connections between repeated 
perceptions of external things which outcome is a formation of preconception. Here we have 
to say more about the character of the inferential processes which is important part Epicurean 
epistemology and scientific methodology. The problem for the interpretation is the lack of a 
precise definition of this technical term because of well known Epicurean resistance towards 
definitions. The examples of epilogismos in Epicurean texts are the following. Epicurus writes 
that, 
 
“One must reason (epilogizesthai) about the real goal and every clear fact, to which we refer mere 
opinions. If not, everything will be full of indecision and disturbance” (KD XXII, transl. Inwood). 
 
In another passage where Epicurus discusses why the investigation of time does not 
presuppose preconception of time, the role of epilogismos is explained in the following way: 
 
One should not investigate time as we do other things which we investigate in an object, [i.e.,] by 
referring to the basic grasps (preconceptions) which are observed within ourselves, but we must reason 
[on the basis of] the clear experience according to which we utter [the phrases] “for a long time” or 
“for a short time” interpreting it in manner closely connected [to our experience]. […] But the best 
policy is to reason solely by means of that which we associate with this peculiar thing and by which 
                                                 
282 Barnes (1989), 96. 
we measure it. For this need no demonstration (ouk apodeixeos), but [only] reasoning (epilogismou), 
because we associate it with days and nights and their parts… (DL X.72-3, transl. Inwood) 
 
This discussion comes right after Epicurus’ discussion of permanent and accidental properties 
for which, as it appears from the context, we obviously have preconceptions. In contrast, the 
time is investigated by calculation or reasoning (epilogismos) of what is evident in our 
experience, that is, the relative duration of properties. For the present purposes it is important 
to notice empirical character of epilogismos, which is than further emphasized in the texts of 
later Epicureans. Philodemus writes the following: 
 
…by empirical inference (epilogismou) from appearances I shall arrive at the view that similarity must 
exist in this respect also. For since this property follows on the men among us, I shall assuredly judge 
that it follows on all men, confirming by empirical inference that the similarity must exist in this 
respect also.  (De Sign. XXII.37-XXIII.7, transl. De Lacy). 
 
Philodemus’ passage deals with the situation in which epilogismos serves as an empirical 
inference by which we calculate similarities among particular instances and from that we infer 
to what is non-evident. In other words, epilogismos is here case of sign-inference from 
observed property of men, mortality, to the inference that that property belongs to all men, 
that is, to those which are not part of our direct experience. 
So, what can we conclude about epilogismos? Barnes observes that there are “different 
varieties of sign-inferences, but they are all genuine inferences, sullogismoi, and they thus 
offer proofs, apodeixes”.283 What is evident from Epicurus’ writings, as it is emphasized by 
Asmis, is that he recognizes three types of inferential processes (logismos): sullogismos, 
analogismos and epilogismos.284 All three terms are types of logismos which stands for “a 
logical relationship worked out by calculation”. Sullogismos is “the combination of concepts 
by argument”, analogismos is calculation of similarities either among the phenomena or 
among the perceptible and imperceptible reality. The most frequently used term is 
epilogismos for which I previously adopt Sedley’s translation as ‘empirical reasoning’. An 
overview of various interpretations of the term mostly suggests that epilogismos is used for 
both ethical and epistemological purposes. Leaving aside the ethical ones,285 in the 
epistemological debate the term indicates some kind of a natural process of generalization 
based on empirical data of the kind inherent in the formation of preconceptions. Sedley starts 
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his explanation of the term saying that epilogismos “is the name of a process of reasoning, and 
that the prefix epi- carries the same connotation of empiricism and objectivity that we have 
found in epiballein and cognate forms. It is a process of reasoning based on practical 
experience – but not necessarily involving analogy or induction, as De Lacy maintains”.286 
And De Lacy maintains that epilogismos “may readily be interpreted as referring to principles 
or generalizations derived from accumulated experience. Several times it is linked with 
memory, which is one of the empiricists' chief sources of data. There is also recognition of the 
need to examine all the pertinent evidence in a systematic way. Again, epilogismos is 
associated with the confirmation or refutation of an opinion.”287 Asmis, relying on Epicurus’ 
usage of epilogismos in the discussion of time, explains that epilogismos is “an analysis of the 
observed association of time with days and night, affections and non-affections, and 
movements and states of rest; no demonstration is required, because it is an observed fact that 
we associate time in this way”.288 What is common to all these interpretations is that they 
considered epilogismos as the method used in scientific inferences for the purposes of 
showing whether scientific hypothesis are in accordance with what is evident. The central 
element of the empirical reasoning in that context is nicely pointed out by Schoefield who 
says the following: 
 
In science, what we must do is compare all our clear presentations of, for example, men to determine 
what is common to all and what is more peculiar to some. Then we will be in a position to infer – by 
what is called the ‘likeness method’ – what the men are like whom we have not seen.289  
 
So what is indicated in Schoefield’s quotation is the fact that the inferential step for 
Epicurus’ in epilogismos is grounded on the similarity between the things from which we 
infer to the things which we infer, and as such epilogismos works as a comparative form of 
evaluation in scientific methodology. We have previously seen that the relation of similarity 
was essential for the formation of preconceptions but here we are given a more general 
framework: in fact all sign-inferences about non-evident things and moreover justification of 
such beliefs is established upon the crucial relation – similarity. More precisely, the sign-
inferences based on similarity have the following form: “Since all K’s in our experience are F, 
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Ks elsewhere/everywhere are F.”290 The similarity, as we can see, does the all work in sign-
inferences. According to the Epicureans the similarity is what establishes an inference from 
the sign to what the sign indicates, that is, from the evident to the non-evident thing, and it 
also justifies the inferential step from the sign to the signified thing. However, presented in 
the form above, it appears that sign-inferences for Epicurus are just inductive inferences. But 
the methods of testing beliefs for non-evident things, counterwitnessing and non-
counterwitnessing, show that Epicurus is not limited only to the cases of inductive 
generalizations, but we find also the cases in which the similarity is part of the inferences 
which prove incompatibility of the non-evident with the phenomena or those in which the 
consequences are inferred directly from the evident. Both of the examples are concerned with 
the proof for the existence of void, as we shall see, and can be found in Epicurus’ own texts. 
So let us now turn to the examples of sign-inferences in order to discuss this general 
framework of methodology of testing beliefs and their justification in practice. 
 In Epicurus own texts we do not find some chapter or part of his writings exclusively 
dedicated to some systematic and detailed discussion of the methods and the way they are 
applied, but what we find are occasional applications of the methods as a part of justification 
of certain problem in Epicurean physics. Therefore we have to turn to the other sources, 
which deliver systematic analysis of the methods. The most relevant for the sign-inferences 
are already quoted passage from Sextus and Philodemus’ work On Signs. 291 And the key 
example of the sign-inference about the non-evident is the inference about the existence of 
atoms and void which entails justification of atomism by the methods of counterwitnessing 
and non-counterwitnessing. Finally the question we have to answer is: in what way do these 
methods justify inferences about atomism? 
 To remind us, Sextus reports that the example of non-counterwitnessing for Epicurus 
is “in saying that there is void, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident 
fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not to be motion either, since the 
moving body would lack a place to pass into as a result of everything’s being full and solid. 
Therefore the non-evident thing believed is uncontested by that which is evident, since there 
is motion.” Sextus claims that the relation between the non-evident void and the evident 
motion is such that the existence of void follows from the evident fact of motion and therefore 
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the belief about the void is uncontested. To put it more formally, according to Sextus, then, 
beliefs about the existence of void are justified if they fit within the following logical form in 
which non-counterwitnessing is explained as the form of logical entailment:  
1. If there is motion, there is void. 
2. There is motion. 
3. There is void. 
Similarly, the opposite method of counterwitnessing consists, as Sextus reports, of the 
removal or elimination (anaskeue) of the phenomenon when the non-evident thing is 
removed. Again, the formal version is the following: 
1. If there is no void, there is no motion. 
2. There is motion. 
3. There is void. 
That is, the method shows that by the elimination of the void as the non-evident thing, also the 
evident phenomenon, motion is co-removed.  
However, scholars warn that Sextus’ ascription to Epicurus this understanding of the 
method of non-counterwitnessing is problematic. Long and Sedley write that this could be 
hardly regarded as the example of non-counterwitnessing for Epicurus since the “expression 
(ouk antimarturesis, literally no ‘counter-evidence’) plainly implies nothing stronger than 
consistency with phenomena”.292 Similarly Asmis maintains that Sextus’ terminology used for 
elucidation of the methods, namely the notions ‘the consequence’ or ‘the following’ 
(akolouthia) for non-counterwitnessing and the ‘elimination’ or ‘removal’ for 
counterwitnessing, is “very different from Epicurus’ own use of the terms “agreement” and 
“disagreement” to explain the relationship between what is observed and what is unobserved; 
and the relationship of consequence, which Sextus illustrates by the claim that the existence of 
void follows upon the evident fact of motion, seems to consist in an incompatibility between 
the phenomena and the contradictory of the proposed theory.”293 Finally, the most vivid 
explanation of Sextus’ error gives Sedley saying that any of the Epicureans “would be 
horrified by the false emphasis with which is done [the void inference by the elimination], 
particularly by the assumption that it is the inference from the motion to void that in itself 
‘confirms’ the existence of void”294 (the emphasis is mine).  
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So what is problematic with Sextus’ report is that Epicurus does not ascribe to the 
methods of counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing such logical necessitations 
according to which the non-evident follows from the evident in non-counterwitnessing or that 
the evident is eliminated by elimination of the non-evident in counterwitnessing, which 
implies that the necessity is given in the concepts themselves. Namely, according to the 
majority of scholars, it is very unlikely that Epicurus would approve such inferences within 
his empiristic methodology and in fact we would expect that he explains the connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent in these methods primarily by relying on the sense 
experience. And clearly the accent on empiricism is indicated, it seems, already in the name 
of the methods which suggests that Epicurus does not have in mind strict logical entailments 
when talking about counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing, but probably wants to show 
that the proof about what is forever non-evident should be either in accordance with what is 
evident to be validated as true or when not in accordance is validated as false. In other words, 
it is rather certain that for Epicurus the criterion of truth for the non-evident things is based on 
their compatibility or incompatibility with the phenomena.  
However, in Epicurus’ own writings we find the following argument for the proof of 
the existence of void. In the passage 40 of the Letter Epicurus claims that “if there where no 
space (which we call void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in 
which to be and in which to move, as they are plainly seen to move”. The similarity with 
Sextus’ report is quite striking, in spite of the differences and problems of Sextus’ report to 
which scholars warn us. In fact, it appears that Epicurus’ argument can also be formulated in 
the form of modus tollens which than support strongly Sextus’ report. So my aim is to try to 
argue that both Sextus’ and Epicurus’ proofs of the existence of void, and consequently of all 
the things forever hidden from direct observation, are grounded upon the same principle that 
enables the transition in inference from the evident to the non-evident, namely, the 
compatibility of conclusion about the non-evident with the phenomena. In order to point to 
the similarities in the reports I shall turn now to the justification of beliefs about celestial 
phenomena, since the application of the methods in those cases unambiguously presents 
Epicurus’ original idea about the methods.  
Celestial bodies also belong to the group of the things which are forever non-evident 
in spite of the fact that we can see sun or moon, since their true nature cannot be discovered 
from a closer view. Therefore any theory about such objects cannot be verified by direct 
observation. Epicurus about this topic writes the following: 
 
Signs relating to events in the celestial region are provided by certain of the things familiar and 
evident – things whose mode of existence is open to view – and not by things evident in the celestial 
region. For these latter are capable of coming to be in multiple ways. We must nevertheless observe 
our impressions of each one; and we must distinguish the events which are connected with it, events 
whose happening in multiple ways is uncontested (ouk antimartureitai) by familiar events. (DL X.87-
8) 
 
 One of the things relevant for the present discussion Epicurus emphasizes is that the 
method of testing beliefs about celestial phenomena is established upon agreement or 
consistency with the evident things. This means that contrary to Sextus’ evidence of strict 
logical entailment as, Long and Sedley rightly point out, “when Epicurus appeals to the 
principle the phenomena invoked are not […] the explanandum itself, but analogous 
phenomena within our direct experience”.295 Long and Sedley’s view is supported by several 
other passages from Epicurus’ own texts, such as passage 47 of the Letter where Epicurus 
argues for exceptional fineness of images (eidola) saying that “the images are of unsurpassed 
fineness is uncontested by anything evident”.296 In other words, since the theory of fineness of 
eidola is not inconsistent with the phenomena, we should accept it as true. The hidden, but the 
crucial premise is the one that relies on similarity between observable and non-observable 
reality. Only on these grounds it is possible to establish such argument since observable 
phenomena “serve as the model for analogous explanation of natural phenomena with the 
non-evident causes”.297 The theory in that way is proved by the method of non-
counterwitnessing. However, what is problematic with such an explanation of the methods is 
the following: are the methods of counterwitnessing and non-counterwitnessing, being 
established upon mere compatibility with the phenomena, able to determine the truth? The 
possible objection to Epicurus’ proposal, as Allen formulates, consists in the fact that 
“multiple explanations modeled on the phenomena in our experience are proposed for 
meteorological phenomena such as the waxing and waning of the moon, the varying lengths 
of nights and days, thunder and lightning, and the like. And it could seem that analogy is used 
in an unexceptional way in these cases to suggest aetiological hypothesis which can be neither 
decisively confirmed nor falsified by the evidence at our disposal”.298 So the most obvious 
problem, which is already indicated in the passage quoted above from the Letter to Pythocles, 
is Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations. 
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 Namely, the problem that arises from Epicurus’ theory of justification based on the 
agreement or disagreement with the phenomena is that there is a serious danger of having 
many theories about the non-evident which are compatible with the phenomena and which are 
mutually contradicted. And this is exactly the case with the celestial phenomena, for which 
Epicurus is ready to adopt multiple explanations. Although it might appear counterintuitive to 
maintain equal trustworthiness of inconsistent theories (or at least it might appear to ancient 
philosopher who thought that there is only one possible explanation of the real nature of the 
non-evident thing in question), Epicurus does not provide us with a solution for 
discrimination between conflicted theory. In contrast, Epicurus allows multiple explanations 
within his epistemology as we can see from the following passage: 
 
First we should not think that any other end is served by knowledge of celestial events, whether they 
be discussed in a context or in isolation, than freedom from disturbance and firm confidence, just as in 
other areas of discourse. And neither should we force through what is impossible, nor should we in all 
areas keep our study similar either to discourse on the conduct of life or those belonging to the 
solution of other problems of physics, for example that the totality of things is body and intangible 
substance, or that there are atomic elements, and all the theses of this kind which are uniquely 
consistent with things evident. In the case of celestial events this is not the case: they have multiple 
causes and accounts of their essence consistent with sensations. For physics should not be studied by 
means of empty judgments and arbitrary fiat, but in the way that things evident require. What our life 
needs is not private theorizing and empty opinion, but an untroubled existence. Now in respect of all 
things which we have a multiplicity of explanations consistent with things evident, complete freedom 
from trepidation results when someone in the proper way lets stand whatever is plausibly suggested 
about them. But when someone allows one explanation while rejecting another equally consistent with 
what is evident, he is clearly abandoning natural philosophy and altogether and descending into myth. 
(DL X.85-7, transl. LS 18A) 
 
 We can see from the quoted passage that the main motive in explanation of the non-
evident things is completely subordinated to the main aim because of which all 
epistemological investigation are undertaken: to free us form all false and superstitious fears. 
This ethical end is achieved, Epicurus maintains, even if multiple explanations of unobserved 
phenomena, namely celestial bodies, are allowed.299 What is crucial is the path to freedom 
from disturbance is already secured if we know that there is some natural explanation of 
celestial phenomena and moreover, Epicurus clearly argues against any arbitrary selection of 
the possible explanations which are all compatible with the phenomena. But, the multiple 
explanations gives more than merely stating that there is some cause or explanation and their 
objectivity is guaranteed by the fact that atomism allows that some of these explanations are 
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working in our world and others in some of many other possible worlds within infinite 
universe, since “for an infinite universe nothing intrinsically possible could fail to be realized 
somewhere”.300 And this should not be considered as something insignificant or meaningless. 
The importance is pointed out by Allen in the following way: 
 
His innovation was to construe theories first put forward in the spirit of universal explanation – as 
applicable at all times and in all places to natural phenomena in need of explanation – so that they 
apply only to some episodes of it or its occurrence in some worlds, when more than one theory is not 
contested by the phenomenon.301  
 
 However, for one particular scientific theory about the non-evident Epicurus does not 
allow multiple explanations: atomism. And now we are back again to the explanation of the 
proof of atoms and void by the methods of non-counterwitnessing. We have seen the practical 
usage of the methods for the other group of the non-evident, namely celestial phenomena. We 
have seen that the inferential step in this case does not rely, as Sextus reports, on logical 
entailment between the evident and the non-evident, but that the inferential step relies on the 
similarity between the observable and non-observable and the proof consists in checking the 
consistency with what is evident.  
 However, for atomism the non-counterwitnessing should exclude any other possible 
explanation and firmly confirm that the only basic elements in physics are atoms and void. 
Recall that Sextus in his report claims that the non-counterwitnessing is the following (or the 
logical consequence) of the non-evident (void) from the evident phenomenon (motion). The 
objection raised against Sextus was that Epicureans do not allow this kind of deductive 
inference and that the method of non-counterwitnessing is compatibility with phenomena. 
Commentators at this point directly make reference to Philodemus’ work and his presentation 
of sign-inference in later Epicureanism. By that time sign-inference became an important 
topic and a matter of quarrel between the Stoics and the Epicureans. In the debate are 
introduced technical terms that we already met in Sextus’ report: ‘consequence’ (akolousthia) 
and ‘elimination’ (anaskeue). These notions are explanatory notions of what is known in the 
debate as the elimination method, which was preferred by the Stoics. The elimination method 
states that “q follows from p if and only if when q is ‘eliminated’ p is thereby co-
eliminated”302. And the major problem with Sextus’ report is that it is indebted to the Stoics’ 
terminology against which Epicureans argue and therefore wrongly equates the non-
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counterwitnessing with the elimation method. Epicureans in contrast to the Stoics adopted the 
similarity method, which formulation I already offered. But now, we can supplement previous 
formulation to sharpen the difference from the elimination method. Therefore, the similarity 
method grounds inferences of the form “‘If (or ‘since’) x is F, y is F’, where y’s similarity to x 
is held to make it ‘inconceivable’ that y should lack an essential predicate of x”.303 So, loosely 
speaking, the elimination method can be identified as deduction, while the similarity method 
is closer to inductive inference.304 So the quarrel between the Stoics and the Epicureans is 
concerned with the question which of the two methods justify the transition from the evident 
to non-evident in sign-inferences.  
The Epicureans prefer the similarity method for the reasons reported by Philodemus in 
the following passage: 
 
Those who attack sign-inference by similarity do not notice the difference between the aforementioned 
[sense of ‘in so far as’], and how we establish the ‘in so far as’ premise, such as, for instance, that man 
is so far as he is man is mortal…For we establish the necessary connextion of this with that from the 
vary fact that it has been an observed concomitant of all the instances which we have encountered, 
especially as we have met a variety of animals belonging to the same type which while differing from 
each other in all other respects all share such-and-such common characteristics. Thus we say that man, 
in so far as and in that he is man, is mortal, because we have encountered a wide variety of men 
without ever finding any variation in this kind of accidental attribute, or anything that draws us toward 
the opposite view. So this is the method on which the establishment of the premises rests, both for this 
issue and for the others in which we apply the ‘in so far as’ and ‘in that’ construction – the peculiar 
connexion being indicated by the fact that the one thing is the inseparable and necessary concomitant 
of the other. The same is not true in the case of what is established merely by the elimination of a sign. 
But even in these cases, it is the fact that all the instances which we have encountered have this as their 
concomitant that does the job of confirmation. For it is from the fact that all familiar moving objects, 
while having other differences, have it in common that their motion is through empty spaces, that we 
conclude the same to be without exception true also in things non-evident. And our reason for 
contending that if there is not, or has not been, fire, smoke should be eliminated, is that the smoke has 
been seen in all cases without exception to be a secretion from fire. Another error which they make is 
in not noticing our procedure of establishing that no obstacle arises through things evident. (Phil. De 
Sign., 34.29-36.17, transl. LS 18G) 
 
 The main idea of the passage is to offer a defense of the similarity method through the 
criticism of the opponents which Philodemus establishes by pointing out that both methods in 
sign-inferences depend upon similarities. Given this, the elimination method becomes 
admissible for Epicurean methodology. Namely, Philodemus argues, in some cases the 
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similarity is obvious and direct, as in the paradigm example of inference that all men are 
mortal that we infer through the evident cases of mortality of men within our experience. The 
inference is based on the fact that in our experience we do not face any exceptions to the 
premises that men within our experience are mortal, from which we are allowed then to go 
beyond our experience and infer that mortality is common feature to all men. So from 
observation of a direct similarity between men within our experience we infer that men 
elsewhere/everywhere are mortal. Therefore Philodemus’ explanation of the sign-inference in 
such cases, as Asmis notices, relies on two requirements, namely, “careful observation and the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary” which can be considered as cases of inductive 
generalizations.305 Philodemus also reply to the powerful objection made by the opponents to 
this kind of inference, namely that the conclusion in such sign-inferences lacks the necessity. 
The reason for the insistence upon necessitation lies in the fact that “were the validating link 
in the inference anything weaker than necessity, it might seem unjustifiable to repose so much 
trust in the conclusion”.306 A reply to the objection, as Sedley simply explains it, relies on the 
argument according to which the observed similarity between the instances “is so strong that 
it becomes ‘inconceivable’ that an essential predicate of one should fail to belong to the 
other”.307 The inconceivability in question secures the validity of inference although not by 
logical necessitation but by pointing out that the necessity in question is empirical or a 
posteriori necessity. According to Hankinson, “the necessity involved in the case of a true 
contrapositional proof is not logical, but empirical: it is only by experience that we come to 
know, for example, that solid bodies do not permit the transfer of liquid, and only then can we 
use that fact in the pursuit of further knowledge”.308  
The kind of necessitations in question is actually the same one secured by empirical 
reasoning (epilogismos) we met already in preconception-formation. Namely, preconceptions 
of natural kinds hold this kind of necessitation since we conceive of different bodies, such as 
fire or water, on the basis of their permanent properties (or necessary accompaniments) 
without which we cannot conceive body as being such and such body. That hotness is 
necessary accompaniment of the fire is calculated by epilogismos on the basis of repeated 
similar perception of the same phenomena from which we infer that all instance of that kind 
share the same feature and formulate the preconception ‘fire’.  
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 However, we see from Philodemus’ report that Epicureans accept that not all sign-
inferences can be established upon such direct similarity between the subject terms in the 
premises of transition from the evident to the non-evident and therefore for such cases allow 
the elimination method. The paradigm case is the inference about the existence of void. The 
method is the same one as we find in Sextus’ report according to which void follows from 
motion because if void is eliminated, motion is co-eliminated by that. However, Philodemus 
adds an important element to this inference. Namely, he claims that even such sign-inferences 
are established upon the similarity. The inference in the elimination method could not even 
start if there were no observation of moving things and the premise that things within our 
experience need motion in order to move. By this move, the similarity method is established 
as foundational to any kind of sign-inference and moreover, as prior to the elimination method 
which than assures validity of the inference by elimination.  
 Now if we compare what has been said about later Epicurean discussion of sign-
inferences with the argument for void in Epicurus’ own writings it is clear these technical 
notions for the methods, similarity and elimination, are not part of Epicurus’ own discourse. 
However, I want to point out that in spite of this linguistic difference later Epicureans do not 
abandon Epicurus original explanation of sign-inference based on compatibility with 
phenomena. As I have already pointed out, Epicurus claims in the Letter to Herodotus 40 that 
“if there where no space (which we call void and place and intangible nature), bodies would 
have nothing in which to be and in which to move, as they are plainly seen to move”. It seems 
that Epicurus proof for the existence is in fact the method of non-counterwitnessing for the 
existence of void since it is not refuted by perception, but it is completely compatible with the 
phenomenon of motion. What is distinct about this particular proof is that the conclusion 
about the existence of void is the only explanation of motion, that is, motion can occur only if 
there is void.309 It is the only explanation because the negation of the belief that there is void 
is incompatible with the phenomena and therefore that particular belief is refuted by 
perception or it is counterwitnessed. These cases, to which all the principles of the atomistic 
theory belong, differ from those explanations about celestial phenomena in one important 
respect: the former are the only possible explanations compatible with the phenomena, while 
for the latter it is possible to multiple explanations. And now, it takes only a small formal step 
to say that for the cases in which only one explanation of the phenomenon is possible, that by 
the refutation of such explanation, the phenomenon is refuted as well. Because of this it seems 
                                                 
309 Ofcourse, this was not a standard view on motion. For the arguments against the existence of void see for 
example Aristotle, Physics IV. 
that Sextus’ report and what was later labeled as the elimination method is actually 
transformed Epicurus’ method of non-counterwitnessing.  
As far as the similarity method is concerned, it seems to me that the roots of the 
method again are already given in Epicurus own writings though not in such a formal way as 
the later Epicureans formulated. Namely, empirical reasoning (epilogismos and all other 
forms of inferential processes covered by the generic term logismos) in fact calculates what is 
given in our experience by systematizing it on the grounds of similarities between 
perceptions. This is the initial and most important step by which we form preconceptions, 
which together with perceptions serve as the criteria of truth. In other words, the insistence of 
later Epicureans as we have seen in Philodemus on the importance of the method of similarity 
captures the original Epicurus’ guidance for scientific investigation given at the very 
beginning of the Letter 37-8: namely that first, we need to have preconceptions as the starting 
points of any inquiry and second, “we should observe everything in the light of our 
sensations, and in general in the light of our present focusing whether of thought or of any of 
our discriminatory faculties, and likewise also in the light of feelings which exists in us, in 
order to have a basis for sign-inferences about evidence yet awaited and about non-evident” 
(transl. Long and Sedley). Preconceptions are inferred on the grounds of similarities within 
our experience and our experience is the starting point for any knowledge of the world. More 
generally, by epilogismos we also check whether particular scientific theory is compatible or 
incompatible with what is evident and directly observed. 
And finally, we come to notorious Epicurean idea of coupling empiricism and 
atomism in order to show that the atomistic theory can be justified only from sense 
experience, and also that the atomistic theory is the only possible way of explaining 
phenomena. This is the major difference from Democritean epistemology since Epicureans 
aims to prove that the explanation of the phenomenal world is possible only on the atomic 
hypothesis. The proof is based on the method of non-counterwitnessing since the hypothesis 
that atoms and void exists does not contradict perceptual evidence. Furthermore, it appear to 
be the only possible explanations of the way world appear to us as it is confirmed by many 
examples in Lucretius. The clearest ones deal with the explanation of properties for which 
Lucretius shows are dependent only upon the arrangement of atoms in bodies and structural 
relationships between them. Textual evidence can be found in many places in Lucretius, for 
example: 
 
And we see wine flow through the strainer as swiftly as you will; but, on the other hand, the sluggish 
olive-oil hangs back because, we may be sure, it is composed of particles either larger or more hooked 
and entangled one with the other, and so it comes about that the first-begginigs cannot so quickly be 
drawn apart, each single one from the rest, and so ooze through the single holes of each things. 
(Lucretius, DRN II.391-397, transl. Bailey) 
 
Epicureans thus aim to modern style of scientific explanation based on the idea of 
supervenience since the difference between the properties of wine and olive-oil is explained in 
terms of the difference in their atomical structure and more importantly, the difference in 
atomical structure is the one that leads to the difference in the properties they have as a 
compound bodies. If we want to introduce any change in the properties of some body, we 
must make difference in atomical configuration of that body. But we can make one step 
further. The explanation why some compound bodies have these particular properties and not 
some other is grounded in the atomic hypothesis about specific configuration and 
relationships between the atoms in the compound. In later Epicureanism this method of 
inference is called elimination.  
So what gives Epicurean empiricism its distinctive character is that all sorts of 
explanation have to start with what is observed because perceptions are incorrigible guidance 
to truth. By that he puts himself on the side of foundationalists claiming that the possibility of 
knowledge is established in self-evident truths, perceptions and preconceptions. Knowledge 
nonetheless is not limited only to what is perceived, since perception can signify things which 
are non-evident. The transition in inference from the evident to the non-evident is established 
on the methods of testing beliefs, which are falsified if inconsistent with the evident and 
verified if consistent. Once our investigation through the specific methods of inference brings 
us to the unobservable world of atoms that is highly different from the world of observation, 
phenomenal picture of the world remains unaffected. Furthermore, phenomenal picture by 
that becomes finally fully accounted and not eliminated as Democritus thought. Epicurus’ 
epistemological optimism, unique in the history of philosophy, is finally revealed in totality: 
world of phenomena is saved by atoms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In the work I attempted to offer a positive reading of Epicurus’ central epistemological 
claim according to which all perceptions are true. I started from the background motivation 
for the development of the problem of the criterion of truth which I consider as an important 
epistemological turn Epicurus provoked in Hellenistic philosophy. The turn is focused around 
the question whether knowledge is possible and if it is possible, by which means we acquire 
knowledge. Epicurean epistemology is therefore an investigation of the proper 
epistemological tool that will enable us to discriminate between true and false beliefs and by 
that to ascertain knowledge of the world. This is indicated by the term ‘kanon’, which implies 
that the task in epistemology is to provide us with equivalent epistemological measuring 
device with respect to truth and falsehood. Epicurus coined and introduced the term into the 
debate in Hellenistic philosophy so the problem of the criterion of truth became the central 
epistemological discussion. 
In the first chapter I argued that Epicurus’ main motivation for opening the problem 
was the threat of the atomistic skepticism that followed from the gap between phenomenal 
world and the world according to the atomistic theory opened by Democritean epistemology. 
Epicurus was aware that the only possible way to defend atomism is through sense-experience 
and that is exactly what atomistic theory tends to defeat. So unlike Democritus, who accepts 
this consequence and rejects phenomenal knowledge, Epicurus wants to save the phenomena 
and to claim that these to kinds of knowledge are not incompatible. His way of defending 
relies on the claim that all perceptionS are infallible.  
Epicurus’ strategy, as I reconstruct it, starts form the recognition of perception as the 
ultimate and primary source of knowledge. Therefore, perception is on the list of Epicurean 
criteria. Perceptions are established as the criterion of truth by two main arguments. Both of 
them support the central Epicurean epistemological claim that all perceptions are true. I 
argued that in the first argument Epicurus establishes the thesis about perceptual 
incorrigibility by showing that other possibilities in which some or none of perceptions are 
true, would lead to skepticism. Since for Epicurus it is obvious that there is knowledge, the 
only plausible move is to accept the thesis that all perceptions are true. In the second line of 
argument the thesis about infallibility of perception is justified within the atomistic theory. 
The main idea we get from this is that perception is always caused from outside, that is, it is 
passive response to external stimuli. Furthermore in perception there is no any cognitive 
element in the sense of interpretation of what is received so there is no possibility of error. 
The error lies in belief. Because of this I proposed the interpretation according to which the 
content of perception should be understood as non-conceptual, whereas the content of belief is 
conceptual. The introduction of non-conceptual content explains the difference in the 
seemingly identical contents in the examples such as seeing tower from afar, which are in fact 
different. Perceptual content is true because its proper objects are eidola and as such it always 
matches its objects, while the content of belief is interpretation of perceptual content and thus 
is opened to falsehood. Perceptions therefore, being self-evident, are established as the first 
criterion of truth. 
Epicurus claims that besides perceptions, preconceptions are also necessary for 
ascertaining the truth. As I argued in the third chapter, perception alone is not capable of 
telling us what kind of object is in question, that is, it tell there is something, but 
preconception tell us what is something. This function of preconceptions follows from the 
way they are formed, as a memory of what is often seen from outside. This fits my 
interpretation about non-conceptual perceptual content, since preconceptions then are the link 
that explains conceptualization and formation of belief. Another function Epicurus ascribes to 
preconceptions is that they serve as a starting point in inquiry. However, the basic criterion 
still is perception since preconceptions are derived from perception and their self-evidence is 
grounded in perception. However, they serve as the criterion on their own and they are crucial 
for Epicurean epistemology.  
Once the criteria are established we are able to test our beliefs. The testing of beliefs 
Epicurus explains through the methods of verification and falsification which are different for 
observable and non-observable things. In the case of the former objects beliefs are falsified 
and verified directly by perception. In the case of what is hidden from our perception this is, 
of course, not possible so Epicurus introduces the methods which rely on the compatibility or 
incompatibility with what is perceived. These methods, in which perception works as a sign 
of what is non-evident, are fundamental for confirmation of atomism. The atomistic theory is, 
as I showed in the last chapter, verified because it is compatible with sense-experience. Also, 
atomism is the only explanation of the phenomenal world, since otherwise it would be 
impossible to give an account of phenomenal world and its properties. In other words, the 
Epicurean shows that perceptions prove that the fundamental elements of the world have to be 
atoms and void. However, acceptance of atomism does not disregard phenomenal world from 
our experience, but in fact explains it.  
We can infer two general conclusions about Epicurean epistemology. First is that 
epistemology in Epicurean system is subordinated to moral theory since it helps us to get rid 
of false belief and by that avoid disturbance and pain. Therefore its value is instrumental, 
which implies the second conclusion about Epicurean epistemology. Namely, Epicurean 
epistemology is not concerned with the structure of knowledge or its nature in the fashion of 
the modern theory of knowledge. The backbone of the epistemological discussion is the 
theory about the criteria of truth which are supposed to help us in discovery and verification 
of what is not evident. Given this Epicurean theory can be characterized as a proto theory of 
justification.  
In the end it is worth noticing again that what is particularly significant about 
Epicurean theory is the extent to which Epicureans are ready to pursue their empiricism. The 
claim about incorrigibility of all perception is unique in the history of philosophy and it 
reveals specific Epicurus’ solution of closing of the gap between the world of appearances 
which is subjective and the external world which guarantees objectivity. In Epicurus’ view the 
world of appearances is in fact the external world and therefore the gap is closed due to a 
perfect match between the cause of perception, eidola, and its content. In other words, 
perceptions are not subjective experiences of the world but they are in fact parts of the 
external reality and as such are self-evident and objectively true. And we can only imagine 
what the history of philosophy would look like if, for example, Locke had understood 
Epicurus’ theory of phenomenal knowledge in this way.  
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